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A Strategic Analysis of Al Shabaab 
John Edward Maszka 
Abstract 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the body of literature by applying 
strategic theory to the Somali militant group al Shabaab. By tracing the line of 
thinking of the organisation, I endeavour to more fully comprehend the group’s 
strategic objective(s).  
The U.S. State Department designated al Shabaab a terrorist organization in 
February 2008 (Shinn 2011), but has the group been engaged in terrorism or should it 
more accurately be labeled an insurgent group? The answer to this question is not as 
straight forward as it may seem because the group has gone through a number of 
transitions in which its ideology and tactical operations have changed considerably. In 
fact, I argue that even its strategic goals appear to have changed. Therefore, we need 
more than a superficial understanding of the organization and what it hopes to achieve 
through violence. 
The first order of business is to clearly define what we mean by “terrorism” 
and what we understand an “insurgent” to be. While the definition of terrorism is a 
hotly debated subject, this thesis employs the definition articulated by Neumann and 
Smith. 
According to Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 574), terrorism is “the deliberate 
creation of fear, usually by the use or threat of the use of symbolic acts of physical 
violence, to influence the behavior of a given target group.” Furthermore, while 
conventional warfare seeks to conquer the enemy, terrorism merely seeks to 
manipulate political change through terror (Ruby 2002; Neumann and Smith 2005). 
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In the most generic sense, we can differentiate between conventional warfare 
(which seeks to conquer the enemy) and terrorism (which aims to manipulate political 
change through terror). However, because the decision to employ terrorist violence is 
strategic, we can also distinguish between groups that employ terrorist violence as 
simply part of an overall strategy and those that rely solely on terrorist violence to 
achieve their goals. By employing this three-part typology, we are left with three 
basic categories of militant violence: (1) military violence intended to overthrow a 
regime, (2) terrorist violence employed along with a number of other tactics intended 
to coerce political concessions from a regime, and (3) terrorist violence employed as 
the sole means for obtaining  political concessions. Neumann and Smith refer to this 
third category of violence as strategic terrorism, and they define it as the attempt to 
obtain political objectives through the use of primarily terrorist activity rather than 
through some other means. 
The main focus of this thesis is to determine al Shabaab’s strategic goal(s), and 
therefore, whether it is an insurgent group or a terrorist organization. After tracing al 
Shabaab’s ideological underpinnings back through its predecessors, I examine the 
various phases the organization has passed through and attempt to determine what its 
strategic objective is and whether it has changed from one phase to another. I 
conclude that al Shabaab has passed through three phases and is currently in phase 
four. While the organization began as an insurgent group, it has since altered its 
strategic goal from overthrowing the Somali government to the use of violence to 
coerce political concessions from foreign governments. It has also adopted strategic 
terrorism. 
A component of this analysis is the theory of perception of the other. 
Perception plays a huge role in both the decision to engage in terrorist violence and in 
 5 
 
the way target governments respond. Strategy is the use of one’s resources towards 
the attainment of one’s goals. Therefore, how an actor perceives its own resources 
vis-a-vis the resources of another plays as large a role as the strategic goal itself. 
Furthermore, because al Shabaab has adopted the takfiri doctrine―which 
dramatically affects its tactical operations―perception of the other is indispensable 
for understanding how to interpret the group’s actions as a means for obtaining its 
respective goals. Perception of the other is also critical for comprehending both who 
al Shabaab directs its acts of symbolic violence towards and why this audience has 
changed over time.  
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Foreword 
When the Boston Marathon Bombings occurred in April 2013, I was the 
Director of International Relations at a university in Tokmok, Kyrgyzstan. The two 
brothers who committed the attacks had gone to elementary school at a “madrasa” 
right down the road from my office. Madrasa, of course, is simply the Arabic word for 
school (in Russian, “schkola”). However, after 9/11 the word has taken on a diabolical 
connotation as a breeding center for Islamic terrorists.  
For the first few weeks after the attacks, the community expressed genuine 
fear that the United States (U.S.) would retaliate with a drone strike against the 
school. In their eyes, America was the real threat, not the two Tsarnaev boys that most 
still remembered as children who grew up among them.  
One of my students at the university had a sister who worked for an NGO in 
Afghanistan. He was all too familiar with the reality (and frequency) of U.S. drone 
strikes against civilian targets.    
That very same month, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) entered Syria and changed 
its name to Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS changed its name again to 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and on 29 June, 2014, the group officially 
changed its name again to Islamic State (IS) after announcing the establishment of a 
new caliphate. 
Given these events, the world largely forgot about the Boston Marathon 
Bombings, but I never forgot the feeling of living and working so close to ground zero 
of a potential U.S. target. Every day as I walked past Schkola #1 before and after 
work, the school-age children would run up to me, laughing and wanting to practice 
their English. My wife and I knew many of them personally as we used to give free 
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English lessons at the library every Saturday. I tried not to think about the fact that the 
entire school and surrounding blocks could be eliminated, in the blink of an eye, by 
someone sitting behind a simulator with a cup of coffee 7,000 miles away. But I knew 
better. 
The single most common question I’m always asked is, “Why do you study 
terrorism?” I guess the best response is that I don’t study terrorism. I study people. 
After all, it’s not the violence per se that‘s interesting (although violence certainly 
attracts the media), it’s the people behind the violence that fascinate me.  
I had originally thought that I wanted to study literature. After enrolling in a 
PhD program, I quickly realized that reading about other people’s experiences would 
never be enough. I needed my own adventures. You know what they say though…be 
careful what you wish for. 
Studying people is a lot like walking on the beach, you never know what’s 
going to wash up. I learned this lesson during my first ethnographic study, when I 
lived with David Koresh and the Branch Davidians.  
Two friends of mine had joined the sect a few months earlier. Moved by 
Koresh’s charisma, they exclaimed, “We have found the Messiah! David Koresh 
from Waco, Texas.” 
“Can any good thing come from Waco?” I replied skeptically. 
“Come and see!”  
The next thing I knew, I was on a plane. At that time, the Branch Davidians 
had three compounds: one in Waco, one in Los Angeles and one in Honolulu. My 
two friends invited me to come and stay with them in Honolulu. Little did I realize 
that they had over a dozen roommates (and another dozen or so sect members lived 
in the apartment next door). 
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At first the sect seemed like a tight-knit group, all true believers and fiercely 
loyal to Koresh. But things are not always as they seem. It turned out that one of the 
“members” was only staying there for the cheap rent. He was not at all convinced by 
Koresh and his message concerning the soon approaching apocalypse. This particular 
individual was quite well-informed regarding Koresh’s plans, however.  
He revealed to me that the groups in L.A. and Honolulu were planning to 
move to Waco where the sect would prepare for the end. The Branch Davidians 
believed that, like the Levites in the days of Moses, God was about to command them 
to slay the wicked- beginning with the members of the Christian churches. He also 
told me that I should get out of there before I got killed.  
“Some of these nutcases are just itching to start killing.” 
I decided to take his advice seriously, but there was someone I needed to take 
with me. Another member, a young Samoan woman in her late teens, who had 
recently joined the group. She confided in me that she had been trying to contact her 
father because she was scared and wanted to go home. The newer members were all 
monitored very closely, however, and no one was allowed to leave.  
We plotted our escape, and the next day we simply ran away. Several sect 
members chased us, but we were able to dodge them in the crowded streets. We 
ducked inside a busy pizza parlor, ordered a pie and called her father. The group 
packed up and moved to Waco soon after, and the rest is history. To the best of my 
knowledge, everyone in the Honolulu group, except the two members mentioned 
above, died at Waco. It still makes me sad. 
Were they terrorists? No. They had no political aspirations. They weren’t 
attempting to obtain concessions from the government or provoke a reaction. They 
simply believed that they were ‘wave sheaves’- first fruits of God- and that they 
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would be instrumental in ushering in the Apocalypse. They were no more terrorists 
than the school shooter at Northern Illinois University who killed himself along with 
five others and wounded 21 more.  
I was on campus that day. The scene was surreal. First the gunshots, then the 
screaming and then the helicopters. The entire campus was on lock-down for over a 
week- held under siege by police investigators and news helicopters.  
The shooter wasn’t a terrorist. Whatever he wanted, it wasn’t political 
concessions. If it was attention he craved, he certainly received it. It’s truly 
unfortunate that the media is so willing to make such people into instant celebrities. 
Some of our young people are literally dying for attention.  
The recent shooting at a nightclub in Orlando is a case in point. Because it 
was the worst mass shooting in U.S. history, the media milked all the hype it could 
get out of the story (which in today’s currency is headlines for a few days). This was 
not a terrorist attack, however. What concessions were demanded? Besides, no true 
IS operative calls 911 and confesses to be a member during an attack. This was 
clearly a case of a disturbed young man seeking his five minutes of fame. Again, the 
media was more than happy to oblige. Sigh… 
The second most common question I’m asked is, “Why Africa?” My response 
is usually similar, “I don’t study Africa.” It’s a fair enough question, though. 
Especially since I grew up in a small Midwestern town in the United States- just 
about as far from Africa as you can imagine (in every conceivable way). So I 
normally qualify my answer by adding that I’ve been fortunate to travel extensively 
and meet many wonderful people from all over the world. 
Oddly enough, I met Da’uud (David), my first Somali friend, in the same 
small town that I grew up in. I was a freshman at university, working the overnight 
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shift at a local Kinkos copy shop- trying to make ends meet. The fall semester had 
barely begun. In the wee hours of the morning, a dark, thin man with bloodshot eyes 
entered the lobby and moved slowly toward the counter. Articulate and soft-spoken 
with a flat affect, Da’uud appeared to be in his mid-forties. He handed me a thick 
packet and inquired about sending a fax. 
I opened the envelope routinely and began to flip through the pages. “You 
want to fax all of this?” I questioned, glancing up as I passed him a cover sheet.  
“Yes,” he replied quietly. “I need to fax it to this number here.” 
The number Da’uud gave me belonged to the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. The 
document contained over 150 pages of names, dates and facts as well as photos of 
charred corpses and bodies that had been hacked to pieces. At first I was afraid to 
ask, but the fax was taking so long that the silence started to feel awkward.  
“What happened?” I mumbled under my breath, not realizing that he could 
hear me.  
The pain in his eyes spoke volumes. In a thick Somali accent, he explained 
that his family had been attacked in their home while they were sleeping. The 
attackers raped his sisters and brutally hacked several of his brothers to death before 
moving on to the next house. Those who managed to escape were scattered and fled 
on foot to Kenya. One by one, the survivors found each other in the huge refugee 
camp that would become their home for nearly a year.  
This had all happened while Da’uud was attending university in the States. 
Forced to drop out of school, he’d been working three jobs for the past six months. 
One job to provide for his wife and two children in America. A second job to support 
his parents and surviving siblings and their children in Kenya. And a third job to pay 
for the daily faxes. 
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Da’uud had been applying for refugee status for his family so that they could 
come to the U.S. and live with him. But the red tape was such that after faxing the 
documents every day for six months, he’d gotten nowhere. 
When the fax finally transmitted, Da’uud reached for his wallet. “$78.50?” he 
confirmed with the confidence of someone who’d done this many times before.  
“No, please,” I insisted, pretending to have an employee discount. “Let me 
take care of it.”   
An expression that faintly resembled a smile appeared on his face. “You 
would do that?”  
I tried to answer, but the words got stuck in my throat. So I just nodded in the 
affirmative. Offering a reciprocal nod, he turned to leave. Suddenly a wave of 
compassion mixed with outrage washed over me. 
“W-why don’t I just fax the document every night when I come in to work?” 
The words didn’t come out as smoothly as I would have liked, but at least this time I 
managed to say something. 
Da’uud looked stunned. He didn’t say a word. I didn’t know him and he 
didn’t know me, but at that very moment we became brothers and we both knew it. 
Feeling the need to lighten the mood, I quipped, “Besides, you need to start saving 
your money for airline tickets.”  
“Yes,” he exhaled, and I finally saw him smile.  
Hope is an amazingly powerful force. For the next six months, I actually 
looked forward to going to work. During that time I poured over the report of his 
family, staring at their photos and reading the details of their lives until I felt as 
though I knew them personally. 
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On a particularly cold February morning around 3 am, an entourage of eight 
colorfully-dressed Somalis passed in front of the store window. As they approached 
the entrance, a strangely familiar young man in his mid-twenties emerged through the 
door.  
“Da’uud?” The words had hardly escaped my lips when his father and mother 
entered behind him followed by six others. Da’uud’s father stepped towards me, and 
grasping both of my arms, he squeezed them as tightly as he could. 
“Mahadsanid…” He spoke warmly, in a voice that sounded like it was 
coming from somewhere else. I had never seen a human being so thin and frail, and 
yet so dignified, in all my life.  
These eight people had made it through one of the worst humanitarian crises 
in modern history- something my sheltered American mind couldn’t even begin to 
comprehend. They were survivors. But others wouldn’t be so fortunate. 
On 12 May, 2003, a suicide bomber entered an American military compound 
in Riyadh and exploded his vehicle near a huge gas tank before going on to paradise. 
In his wake, he left behind a graveyard of sand and ashes. One survivor―who had 
been far enough away to only be injured―described the attack as “unreal.” The huge 
scar it left on his face and the limp it gave him are nevertheless quite real, and he will 
live with them for the rest of his life (Munson 2014).  
For more than a decade, huge chunks of concrete block served as tombstones- 
silently standing watch around the perimeter of the blast. As I approached the site, 
the mid-day sun was scorching hot. Like a laser, it penetrated the desert sky and 
created a glare so bright that I could barely keep my eyes open. My retinas literally 
felt like they were melting. I had entered a restricted area. Like the chocolate factory 
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in Willie Wonka, no one ever went in and no one ever came out. But on that 
particular day, I decided that this would change.  
The scene evoked images of a fierce future slaughter in which ancient hatreds 
would clash with apocalyptic fury. Faithful blades of rebar impaled the enemies of 
Allah. Like ten thousand arrows in the quiver of al Qadir, they had all found their 
mark. Carnage and obliteration defeated the forces of the enemy. Together they laid 
siege to the former haunt of the Great Satan, now a mere skeleton of warped metal, 
dust and shattered glass.1    
The sight reminded me of endless Saturday mornings I’d spent at catechism 
in the church basement. And now, the dark fears that haunted me as a boy- purgatory, 
everlasting punishment, hellfire and brimstone- all returned at once… and with a 
vengeance.  
My eyes watered and stung as I squinted through the sandy wind- hunting for 
something that might have survived the intense heat- anything…a watch, a coin, a set 
of keys. But there was nothing. An eerie realization crept up my spine… that was the 
point.   
I once interviewed Richard Behal, a former member of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) who had become somewhat of a local celebrity after escaping from 
Limerick Prison in 1966. Behal had been imprisoned for attacking a British naval 
vessel (the HMS Brave Borderer) in Waterford in 1965. Originally authorized to use 
a bazooka in the attack, he used an anti-tank rifle instead so as not to hurt anyone. As 
someone who took pride in fighting for Ireland’s freedom, Behal insisted that his 
                                                 
1 Al Qadir is Arabic for “the All Powerful One.” 
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intent was to coerce the British government to change their Ireland policy- never to 
hurt anyone. He was emphatic about this point throughout the entire three-hour 
interview (Behal, 2011).   
Four decades later and some seven thousand kilometers to the East, collateral 
damage was no longer a problem. If this were an isolated incident, we could consider 
it a hate crime or the realization of a sick fantasy played out by a deranged lunatic 
(like the many school shooters we’ve encountered). However, attacks such as these 
have become commonplace, routine... almost clockwork.  
If these atrocities were all perpetrated by a unitary actor (or even a coalition 
of actors) with an identifiable goal, then like the Bush administration, we could call 
them an act of war. But if this is a war, who’s the enemy? The Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) implies that terrorism itself is the enemy. But how can terrorism 
be the enemy? Terrorist violence is merely a tactic- employed by virtually anyone- as 
part of an overall strategy to obtain a particular goal.  
So who’s the enemy? Is it the militants that attacked Da’uud’s family? Is it 
the IRA or the British government? Is it al Qaeda or the American servicemen that 
regularly consume alcohol, pork and pornography in the land of the two holy 
mosques? Is it the Tsarnaev brothers or the children from Schkola #1?  
The short answer is, there are many enemies. There are literally dozens of 
conflicts raging at any given moment with both sides routinely denouncing each 
other as “terrorists.”  
The long answer?  
As a graduate student, I was taught to view terrorism as an abstract 
phenomenon. Inside the classroom, terrorism is explained via theories and models 
and causal variables. We’re taught not to be too descriptive in our approach and not 
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to base our conclusions on single case study analyses because they’re not 
generalizable enough.  
But here I was, standing on the unmarked graves of the people who had once 
lived and worked here. Their memories, their hopes and their dreams- their plans for 
the future- everything was gone. For them, and for their loved ones (indeed for the 
suicide bomber and his loved ones as well), there was nothing abstract about it. 
I realized that, in order to truly understand terrorist violence, I needed a more 
realistic conceptual framework through which to view it. I set off on a quest for 
illumination. My journey has taken me to more than a dozen countries around the 
world, to hotspots and cold (both literally and figuratively), and this research is 
largely the result.   
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Introduction 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the body of literature by applying 
strategic theory to the Somali militant group al Shabaab. Strategic theory (Schelling 
1966 & 1980; Liddell Hart 1967; Summers 1985; Berry 1987; Hughes 1989; Smith 
1991, 1997, 2003 & 2005; Cohen 1996; Gray 1999; Neumann 2002; Neumann and 
Smith 2005 & 2007; Waldmann 2005; Harris 2006; Strachan 2005 & 2008; Rousseau 
2012) examines how political actors perceive their immediate reality and how 
effectively they respond to that perception toward the achievement of their strategic 
goals. Put more simply, strategic theory allows scholars to evaluate the effectiveness 
of terrorist violence as a means to a desired end. By tracing the line of thinking of the 
organisation, I endeavour to more fully comprehend the group’s strategic objective(s).  
The U.S. State Department designated al Shabaab a terrorist organization in 
February 2008 (Shinn 2011), but has the group been engaged in terrorism or should it 
more accurately be labeled an insurgent group? The answer to this question is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. The first order of business is to clearly define what we 
mean by “terrorism” and what we understand an “insurgent” to be. 
While the definition of terrorism is a hotly debated subject (including those 
who suggest that we either cannot arrive at an agreed upon definition or that we 
should not even try, e.g. Ramsay 2015), this thesis employs the definition articulated 
by Neumann and Smith (2005). 
According to Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 574), terrorism is “the deliberate 
creation of fear, usually by the use or threat of the use of symbolic acts of physical 
violence, to influence the behavior of a given target group.” Terrorism is, therefore, a 
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tactic (Halliday 2004). As James S. Albritton (2006, p.6) argues, “terrorism is a 
means to an end—i.e., a technique that is used by terrorists to achieve a calculated 
objective by applying a variety of deliberately violent means and methods to that 
specific goal.” Furthermore, while conventional warfare seeks to conquer the enemy, 
terrorism merely seeks to manipulate political change through terror (Ruby 2002; 
Neumann and Smith 2005). 
Thus, in the most generic sense, we can differentiate between conventional 
warfare and terrorism. However, because the decision to employ terrorist violence is 
strategic, we can also distinguish between groups that employ terrorist violence as 
simply part of an overall strategy and those that rely solely on terrorist violence to 
achieve their goals. Neumann and Smith (2005) refer to this third category of violence 
as strategic terrorism, and they define it as the attempt to obtain political objectives 
through the use of primarily terrorist activity rather than through some other means. 
By employing this three-part typology, we are left with three basic categories 
of militant violence: (1) military violence intended to overthrow a regime, (2) terrorist 
violence employed along with a number of other tactics intended to coerce political 
concessions from a regime, and (3) terrorist violence employed as the sole means for 
obtaining  political concessions. Still, even with this simple trichotomy, the inquiry is 
not as clear-cut as it may appear because al Shabaab has gone through a number of 
transitions in which its ideology and tactical operations have changed considerably. In 
fact, I argue that even its strategic goals appear to have changed. Therefore, we need 
more than a superficial understanding of this organization and what it hopes to 
achieve through its tactical use of violence. 
After tracing al Shabaab’s ideological underpinnings back through its 
predecessors, I examine the various phases the organization has passed through and 
 27 
 
attempt to determine what its strategic objective(s) are and whether they have changed 
from one phase to another. 
I identify four distinct phases through which the group has transitioned. For 
each phase, I question whether al Shabaab’s strategic goal has been to overthrow the 
government or to coerce political concessions. I conclude that for the first two 
phases, al Shabaab’s strategic objective was to drive out the Ethiopian military and to 
overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, after the group’s 
leadership changed, al Shabaab’s ideology and tactical operations also changed―as 
did the audience toward which it directed its violence. Strategic analysis suggests that 
the organization’s strategic objective was also changing at this time, but what was its 
new goal?  
I conclude that al Shabaab’s strategic objective changed from replacing the 
government in Somalia to destabilizing the entire region. During the third phase, the 
group gradually (and seemingly voluntarily) engaged in governance less and less 
while adopting terrorist violence more and more. By stage four, al Shabaab was 
utilizing violence exclusively as a means to achieving its goal. 
A component of this analysis is the theory of perception of the other 
(Garfinkel 1952; Merleau-Ponty 1973; Abdallah-Pretceille 1983; Kornprobst 2002; 
Castano et al. 2003; Crozier 1998; Millas 2004). Perception plays a huge role in both 
the decision to engage in terrorist violence (Laqueur 1977b; Crenshaw 1981) and in 
the way that target governments respond (Berry 1987).   
Since “counterinsurgency warfare is fought among the people, it is ultimately 
won or lost through human interaction and perceptions” (Mansoor 2008, p. 346). For 
instance, Solomon (2015) points to the Bush administration as an example. By 
characterizing the war on terror as one between good and evil, Bush glorified one side 
 28 
 
and dehumanized the other. The administration thus attempted to justify its actions by 
manipulating the public’s perception of the threat. 
Strategy is the use of one’s resources towards the attainment of one’s goals 
(see section 1.3). Therefore, how an actor perceives its own resources vis-a-vis the 
resources of another plays as large a role as the strategic goal itself. Furthermore, 
because al Shabaab has adopted the takfiri doctrine which dramatically affects its 
tactical operations, perception of the other is indispensable for understanding how to 
interpret the group’s actions as a means for obtaining its respective goals. 
I employ strategic theory rather than the traditional deductive approach used 
by most terrorism scholars as it allows me to analyze al Shabaab’s violence within its 
historical and socio-economic context rather than forcing me to strip away most of 
these details as theoretical models often do. Furthermore, strategic theory enables me 
to consider the utility of al Shabaab’s terrorist violence rather than simply attempt to 
identify its “causes.” Most importantly, strategic theory makes it possible to trace the 
line of thinking between an actor and the violence that actor employs―thus making it 
possible to determine al Shabaab’s strategic goal and apply that knowledge toward a 
better understanding of its tactical use of violence.   
 Because al Shabaab did not emerge in a vacuum, it’s critical to understand its 
historical and ideological roots. Given that al Shabaab has pledged bay’ah 
(allegiance) to al Qaeda it’s important to assess the nature of this alliance and to 
determine whether it has had an impact on the group’s strategic objective(s) or tactical 
operations.  
Because many of the actors involved in the study are either dead or in hiding, 
the primary sources that I employ are a combination of media statements, video 
releases and correspondence between these actors as well as my own field research 
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and interviews with locals who have first-hand experience with the groups examined. 
However, even much of the original correspondence has been translated into English, 
and so I take advantage of secondary sources for their linguistic expertise.  
Furthermore, because many of the original social media accounts through 
which the key actors communicated have since been deactivated, much of this 
material has also been gleaned from secondary sources. Given that my analysis of al 
Shabaab is based upon its strategic objective(s), I utilize the sources available to 
determine (as best as possible) what the group’s strategic objectives are and to what 
extent they might have changed over time.  
Since no actor is a true utility maximizer in the strict economic sense of the 
word, it is impossible to fully understand the decision-making of any entity without 
first comprehending the values to which it subscribes. Therefore, I explore the extent 
to which ideological, tribal and religious factors influence and shape al Shabaab’s 
strategic goals and tactical use of violence.  
First, I consider the social context, analyzing relevant historical and 
contemporary details that shed light upon the organization’s stated political goals. 
Second, I examine predecessor groups and look for similarities and differences in 
their strategic goals and the tactics they employed. Finally, after tracing the group’s 
ideological underpinnings back through its respective predecessors, I examine the 
various phases it has transitioned through and analyze each phase to determine 
whether its strategic goals have remained consistent and if not, I note how they have 
changed and evolved since inception.  
It is important to note that I do not attempt to establish causation. Also, since 
strategic theory is not a theoretical model per se, but more a level of analysis, there 
are no independent or dependent variables to speak of. Rather, I employ a 
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combination of assumption, observation and deduction in order to determine al 
Shabaab’s preferences. My endeavor is to trace the group’s line of thinking in order to 
determine (1) what its strategic objectives are at any given stage, and (2) whether its 
use of violence has been successful.  
This inquiry reflects an important distinction between strategy and tactics. 
Strategy entails an actor’s ultimate purpose while tactics are merely techniques 
employed to obtain that purpose. Actors engage in violence in order to attain a 
specific goal. The main focus of this thesis is to determine what al Shabaab’s strategic 
goal(s) are, and therefore, whether it is an insurgent group or a terrorist organization. 
My training as a terrorism scholar was not unlike most others who study in 
the United States (U.S.). I was educated in the deductive use of theoretical models 
and tested on most of the normal and customary explanations for terrorism. When I 
first acquired an academic interest in al Shabaab, I applied a variety of systemic and 
lower-level theories in an effort to better understand the organization. However, I 
always came up with more questions than answers because of the inherent limitations 
of these approaches. 
Concluding that all of the various theories and levels of analysis are needed to 
arrive at a comprehensive understanding, I eventually came to realize why the 
Foucauldian battle for truth raging within terrorism studies has been so unfruitful. 
The only agreement among most scholars is that terrorism consists of "violence of 
which we do not approve" (Jongman 1988, p. 3).  
Since people all approve and disapprove of different things, at different times 
and places, under different circumstances and for different reasons, many who 
analyze the same data arrive at wildly different conclusions. In other words, the 
concept of terrorism (and therefore, the discipline of terrorism studies itself) is highly 
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subjective. Given that some of the greatest minds in the field (at least in the U.S.) 
have endeavored to gain an objective understanding of the phenomenon, one has to 
wonder how the discipline arrived at such a state. 
Neumann and Smith (2007) argue that much of the conceptual ambiguity 
surrounding terrorism stems from the academic tradition of separating terrorist 
violence and all other forms of low-intensity conflict from interstate war. Given that 
my justification for employing strategic terrorism is based upon the limitations of 
systemic and lower-level models, it is necessary to not only argue the strengths of the 
strategic approach but also to expose the weaknesses of the many causal approaches 
in use today. Therefore chapters one through three are theoretical while chapters four 
and five are substantive. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
 
 In Chapter One, I discuss how the strategic study of war fell from its original 
state of purity. War, in all its various manifestations, has historically been understood 
as a tool in the hands of rational actors; used as a means to obtain a desired political 
outcome. However, in the wake of World War Two (WWII), the academic field of 
strategic studies artificially separated the study of conventional (interstate) war from 
most other forms of political violence. The main reasons for prioritizing the study of 
interstate war were: (1) the potential for a nuclear confrontation between the two 
superpowers took precedence over the relatively less important skirmishes breaking 
out around the planet and, (2) it was conceptually easier to count and compare 
military assets in the form of warheads and ballistic missiles than it was to assess the 
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less quantifiable strength of will. As a consequence, strategic theorists largely ignored 
what they referred to as “irregular war.”  
Another heresy crept in during the Cold War era that would have an even more 
long-term effect on the future study of unconventional warfare- the equating of all 
non-Western insurgencies with the global threat of Communism. As a result, the 
residual category of previously non-related conflicts took on a shared identity and 
came to be viewed as irrational, senseless, psychotic, and even evil (Frum and Perle 
2003). Consequently, those who did study these “lesser wars” tended not to apply the 
same Clausewitzian logic as they would to interstate wars.  
In the case of terrorism studies, efforts to be more scientific led to the use of 
theoretical models that were then devised to determine the “causes” of terrorism. 
Countless books and journal articles in every academic discipline imaginable have 
been published since, associating terrorism with a myriad of causes including poverty, 
illiteracy, inequality, democracy, authoritarianism and mental illness- to name just a 
few.  
 After defining key terms such as “strategy,” “terrorism” and “strategic 
terrorism,” I discuss the takfiri doctrine. I then explore the utility of perception of the 
other as a lens for understanding how the group’s tactics serve its strategic objectives. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I articulate the main inquiry of the research project 
and discuss the methodology employed. 
 Chapter Two elaborates upon the foundation laid in Chapter One by 
illustrating the conceptual apparatus used to construct what I metaphorically refer to 
as the Tower of Babel. I lay out a blueprint of the theoretical edifice that terrorism 
scholars have erected, largely upon the erroneous foundational beliefs that (1) 
terrorism is a separate category of political violence that can be identified by the 
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ideology, the deed or the actor involved, and (2) that terrorism is, for the most part, 
irrational at best- or at the very worst- engaged in by only the deranged and 
psychotic.2  
By accepting the artificial separation of interstate war from all other types of 
political conflict, terrorism scholars have become so focused on the tactics employed 
in terrorist violence that they have stripped away all other relevant details. Without 
the benefit of strategic theory as the basis of their analysis, many have adopted a 
largely deductive approach. Terrorism scholars now rely heavily upon the use of 
oversimplified models that “test” theories but largely ignore reality. In the quest for 
enlightenment, terrorism scholars have attempted to reach the heavens. Ironically, this 
endeavor takes us further and further from the phenomenon we seek to understand. As 
we specify our models with ever more abstract variables, our edifice penetrates the 
clouds and increasingly obscures our vision of reality. In this chapter, I discuss the 
limitations of theoretical models in terrorism studies and offer examples of how 
academics and policymakers can both benefit from the strategic approach.  
Chapter Three carries the metaphor one step further by comparing the 
enormous and contradictory body of terrorism literature to the story in the Tanakh 
which recounts how God confused the languages of the people of the earth.3 The 
chapter enumerates the various definitions of terrorism, analyzes the more popular 
typologies employed in terrorism studies, examines the traditionally accepted causes 
of terrorism and considers potential solutions.  
                                                 
22 There are, of course, scholars who argue that terrorism is rational (e.g. (Crenshaw 1998; Anderton 
and Carter 2006; Caplan 2006; Kidd and Walter 2006; Neumann and Smith 2007; Ayres 2015). The 
rational argument is discussed in Chapter Three. 
3 The title also aptly refers to Upton Sinclair’s classic 1906 novel depicting the harsh economic, 
cultural and institutional realities of life for immigrants in Chicago at the turn of the century. 
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The first three chapters comprise a literature review of sorts. Of course, the 
sheer magnitude of the scholarship renders it virtually impossible to offer more than a 
representative sampling in a work of this size and limited scope.  
Because the strategic goals of al Shabaab cannot be fully understood without a 
minimal knowledge of the region’s colonial and modern history, Chapter Four begins 
by discussing the history of Somalia and exploring how the Somali population 
became so fragmented. Second, the chapter examines the various groups that have 
appeared in Somalia since independence and analyzes their strategic objectives in an 
effort to demonstrate the continuity between them.  
Chapter Five identifies al Shabaab’s theoretical underpinnings, traces any 
influences the group may have adopted from its predecessors and explores the 
practical implications of these influences on the group’s strategic goals and tactical 
use of violence. The chapter concludes that al Shabaab has thus far gone through 
three phases (from inception to December 2007, January 2008 to April 2008, May 
2008 to July 2011) and is now in phase four (August 2011 to the present). In the first 
two phases, al Shabaab was a jihadist group, and in the last two phases it has been a 
takfiri group.4  
In the first three phases, the organization’s activity more closely resembled a 
guerrilla insurgency than strategic terrorism as two of its strategic objectives were to 
                                                 
4 To the vast majority of Muslims, the word jihadist signifies the struggle to be a good Muslim. 
However, in the mainstream media, jihadist is synonymous with terrorist. In this research, I employ a 
threefold typology consisting of Islamist, jihadist and takfiri groups. All three wish to establish sharia. 
While Islamists are willing to contest in democratic elections, jihadist reject democracy as an 
usurpation of the sovereignty of Allah and therefore are willing to employ violence to impose sharia. 
Jihadist organizations such as al Qaeda, however, following al-Banna’s more conciliatory bottom-up 
approach, believe that the ummah (Muslim community) should be taught the true way of Islam from 
the ulama (Muslim scholars). Takfiri groups such as Islamic State on the other hand, following Qutb’s 
authoritarian top-down approach, believe that apostate Muslims should be killed, not as a means to an 
end but as an end in itself (Husain 1995; Zollner 2007). 
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overthrow and replace the enemy, rather than merely manipulate political change 
through terror. Furthermore, while al Shabaab possessed very limited military and 
administrative capability in phase one, by phase two it had managed to incorporate 
both the political organization of the masses and the eventual use of conventional 
military force. By phase three, al Shabaab had gained control of eight regions in 
south central Somalia (Marchal 2011).  
Chapter Six offers concluding remarks and establishes the importance of 
strategic theory for both understanding terrorist violence and devising sound strategy 
to deal with it. 
Why is this research important? Beyond the conceptual clarity that the 
strategic approach provides, there is also the practical policy application from which 
everyone can benefit. For example, counterterrorism—one of the most popular 
responses to terrorism— often utilizes harsh retaliatory measures that can be 
manipulated by organizations to increase popular support for their cause (Kydd and 
Walter 2006; Tsoukala 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; LaFree et al. 
2009; Silke 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Solomon 2015). As Etzioni (2015, 
p. 346) puts it, the essence of counterterrorism is “brute force.” 
As Robison et al. (2006) suggest, organizations that engage in terrorism rely 
on popular support to succeed. Cronin (2006b) further distinguishes between active 
support (providing a safe haven for operatives, recruits and donations) and passive 
support (refusal to cooperate with the group’s opponents). Both types of popular 
support equate to an overall reduction in the cost of engaging in terrorist violence, 
making future acts of terrorism even more feasible.  
While tactical counterterrorism is necessary, it often exacerbates terrorist 
violence when it is not part of an overall strategy. Knowledge of the strategic goals of 
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actors who engage in terrorism allows us to more successfully respond to tactical 
violence in ways that both protect our immediate interests and address the actors’ 
long-term strategic goals. “Terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way the 
terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs” 
(Fromkin 1975, p. 697).  
Furthermore, the quality and sheer quantity of usable intelligence needed 
concerning the nature, location, and timing of future terrorist attacks— as well as the 
identity of the perpetrators— is simply not readily available and shared in most 
situations to render antiterrorism effective (Coaffee 2016). A more fruitful approach, 
both academically and from a policy perspective, would be to improve our 
understanding of the strategic goals that al Shabaab hopes to achieve. This increased 
understanding will afford academics and policymakers alike a more objective 
perspective and the ability to respond to acts of violence more strategically. 
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Chapter One: The Fall                                                                                                                                          
Strategic Studies since World War Two 
 
 
1:1: Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I address the overall trajectory of strategic studies since the end 
of the Second World War. I also consider the influence of the scientific method- and 
particularly the adoption of theoretical models- on the field of terrorism studies. I 
discuss the strategic approach, define the term “strategy,” and detail how strategic 
studies have changed since WWII. I then propose a definition of terrorism, clarify 
what is meant by strategic terrorism and introduce the takfiri doctrine. Finally, I 
explore the utility of perception of the other as a lens for understanding how the 
takfiri doctrine allows us to understand al Shabaab’s tactics and how they serve the 
group’s strategic objectives. I round out the chapter with a discussion of the research 
question and the methodology employed. 
 
1:2: The Strategic Approach 
 
While terrorism literature is replete with studies attributing violence to either 
various widespread systemic factors at the societal, national, or international levels of 
analysis or to individual decision makers at the individual and group levels of 
analysis, strategic theory considers the utility of violence as a military strategy 
(Neumann and Smith 2007). While most terrorism literature is concerned with why 
terrorist violence occurs, strategic theory seeks to “examine how political actors 
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define the circumstances around them and how they react to those circumstances to 
achieve their objectives” (Smith 1991, p. 17).  
In other words, strategic theory examines how political actors perceive their 
immediate reality and how effectively they respond to that perception toward the 
achievement of their goals. Put more simply, strategic theory allows scholars to 
evaluate the effectiveness of terrorist violence as a means to a desired end. In the 
cases of al Shabaab and Boko Haram, the strategic approach sheds considerable light 
on the why question as well.  
Of course, one major drawback of the strategic approach (for most terrorism 
scholars) is its limited ability to produce generalizable results. This is largely because 
strategic theory is not a theoretical model per se, but more a level of analysis 
(Neumann 2002).  
The scientific method involves both induction and deduction. Induction is the 
collection of data from a specific phenomenon under analysis. From this data, 
scholars hope to produce generalizations or theories that they can then apply to other 
similar phenomena. The application of these theories is known as deduction. Scholars 
apply theories to test them and determine whether their descriptive, explanatory and 
predictive power holds true within the light of each new analysis. 
Terrorism scholarship seeks to compare similar types of conflict based upon 
their common use of tactical violence. On the one hand, this approach is beneficial as 
(theoretically) it allows scholars to differentiate between different categories of 
violence such as war, terrorism and crime (albeit somewhat artificially). Through the 
use of theoretical models, scholars can then apply systemic-level and individual-level 
theories more generally by specifying a particular cause as the independent variable 
and terrorism as the dependent variable. However, this approach largely strips away 
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the unique historical and cultural context in which conflict occurs. The result is 
inevitably more focus upon the independent variable that supposedly caused the 
violence than the conflict itself.  
Alternatively, strategic theory “enables contexts to develop whilst preserving 
an overarching rationale that organises the content in a systematic fashion” (Neumann 
2002). This overarching rationale is comprised of three primary assumptions: (1) 
military force is a dimension of power exercised toward political goals, (2) politics is 
a game of thrones in which each actors strives to maximize its own power in relation 
to other actors, and (3) all actors act rationally (Smith 1991).  
To elaborate on the first assumption, Clausewitz viewed war as an extension 
of policy. In other words, violence is just one way to enforce policy. However, the 
opposite side of the coin is also true. In fact, Clausewitzian logic demands that force 
only be used as an instrument of policy. Therefore, strategic theory evaluates the use 
of violence as a tactic according to its efficacy in serving the policy that guides it, not 
according to moral or ethical sensibilities (Rousseau 2012).    
As for the second assumption, it is important to clarify that strategic theory 
considers all actors as unitary, an assumption that is borrowed from realism 
(Neumann 2002). Therefore, even though individual differences among members of 
an entity are acknowledged in the overall evaluation of whether the use of violence is 
strategic, the decision to employ violence is analyzed via the perspective of a unitary 
decision maker.  
Regarding assumption three, strategic theory assumes that all actors are 
rational, an assumption borrowed from economics (Neumann 2002). One definition of 
rationality is “the endeavour to relate means to ends as efficiently as possible” 
(Lopez-Alves 1989, p. 204). However, rather than simply assuming unbounded 
 40 
 
rationality (a condition in which actors possess full knowledge and perfect 
objectivity), strategic theory also acknowledges the various limitations on actors’ 
knowledge, capacity, time and resources. Garnett (1987, p. 19) addresses these two 
levels of rationality as the difference between “cold calculation” and “complexity.”  
Aside from these three assumptions, the strategic approach is largely an 
inductive process which requires an analysis of both the conflict and the context in 
which it occurs to determine whether the use of violence was strategic or not. 
“Because each situation varies so enormously in both time and place, it is impossible 
to elaborate durable and all-embracing strategic models. Strategic theory can only 
delineate norms of expected logical behaviour within any specific situation” (Smith 
1991, p. 20).  
Consequently, the strategic approach places much more emphasis upon the 
conflict itself and the context in which it occurs than the traditional theoretical models 
employed by most terrorism scholars. This largely inductive nature of the strategic 
approach is perfectly acceptable, given the goal of the strategic theorist. However, it 
flies in the face of the heavily deductive approach employed by most terrorism 
scholars, requiring that they put aside their cherished theories and let the data speak 
for itself.  
 
1.3: Strategy 
 
So what is meant by strategic? Strategy is defined as “a plan, method, or series 
of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result” (Andrews and 
Roland 1987, p. 77). Still, the term has been use in such a vast number of contexts as 
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to almost render it a cliché (Strachan 2005). A Google Scholar keyword search using 
the term produces 5,000,000 results.  
If the first page is indicative of its most popular use, then one could say that 
strategy is a business term, or perhaps an organizational term. Of the ten results on the 
first page, five are related to business, three are related to organizational theory, one is 
related to preventative medicine and one is related to the theory of evolution. On the 
second page, seven results were business-related, one dealt with preventing substance 
abuse and two were social science-related (an article by Rosenthal (1973) on game 
theory and Satterthwaite’s (1975) confirmation of Kenneth Arrow’s conditions for 
voting behavior).  
Not one in the first twenty results were related to military or war. It is only on 
page three that T.C. Schelling’s 1980 book, “The Strategy of Conflict,” appears 
nestled in with nine more non-related results. Pages four through twelve are all non-
related results. Finally again, on page thirteen, the United States National Security 
Strategy appears (Bush 2002). Of the first 130 academic publications listed in a 
Google Scholar keyword search for the term ‘strategy,’ just two military-related 
sources appeared.   
Yet the origin of the word is the Greek strategos, meaning general or military 
commander. Strategos is a derivative of the word stratos, which literally means 
something that lies beneath (figuratively, it can refer to an army or a camp), and egos, 
which means to lead (Andrews and Roland 1987, p. 77). So the term is militant in 
both origin and connotation. As Clausewitz (1976, p.128) famously defined it, 
strategy is “the use of engagements for the object of war.”  
Elaborating on Clausewitz, Gray (1999, p.17) distinguishes strategy from 
tactics. “Armed forces in action, indeed any instrument of power in action, is the 
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realm of tactics. Strategy, in contrast, seeks to direct and relate the use of those 
instruments to policy goals.” In other words, “you have a strategy, but you do tactics” 
(Hughes 1989, p.54).5 As Clausewitz (1976) reminds us, the aim of war is not to 
break the enemy, but to force it to bend to your will. 
Eliot Cohen (1996) explains strategy via the metaphor of a bridge that 
connects military capability with political policy. Of course, this explanation of 
strategy focuses on its military aspects.  Another way to look at strategy would be to 
consider it as the use of all an actor’s assets toward the fulfillment of a political end, 
what might be referred to as grand strategy (Liddell Hart 1967). Again, the key focus 
is on the instrumental relationship between the assets at an actor’s disposal and the 
policy outcome the actor wishes to achieve.  
Hew Strachan (2005) makes a valid point concerning this relationship in his 
discussion of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In addition to several other 
problems (i.e., the lack of an identifiable enemy and the lack of a clearly demarcated 
theatre of war), the U.S. lacked a strategy in 2003 because the war it hoped to win was 
not compatible with the war its military was prepared to fight.  
Neumann (2002) alludes to this same idea by defining strategy as the 
employment of means to obtain a particular end. He goes on to stipulate that strategic 
thinking “assumes that means are subordinate to ends, that is, in strategy, social actors 
take autonomous decisions on how to employ the tools at their disposal in order to 
realise their objectives” (p.15). In other words, policy should drive strategy and not 
                                                 
5Kydd and Walter (2006) discuss five principal goals of actors that engage in terrorist violence (regime 
change, changes in territorial boundaries, specific changes in policy, social control, and maintaining the 
status quo) and five enduring strategies employed to achieve those goals: (1) attrition- wherein an actor 
attempts to demonstrate its capability to the target, (2) intimidation of the public, (3) attempts at 
provoking the target to react, (4) attempts at spoiling a peace settlement, and (5) outbidding wherein 
one actor attempts to gain greater recognition over other actors in the eyes of the public. 
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the other way around. However, one could argue that Neumann also implies sound 
strategy requires an actor to employ the means at its disposal in such a way as to 
achieve its policy objectives. Going back to Strachan’s observation of the GWOT, one 
could argue that strategy drove policy because the U.S. initiated the war with the 
military it had rather than the military required to achieve its goals. 
Likewise, Smith (1997) further clarifies the strategic approach as the tracing of 
"the line of thinking of a particular political entity in order to comprehend how it 
proposes to achieve its objectives; and also to look at the ideological assumptions and 
values that underlie that entity's thinking and how this informs the way it formulates 
its strategy" (p. 4). Put more simply, one could say that sound strategy is the shortest 
available line between two points: an actor’s current reality and the reality that actor 
hopes to secure. However, reality is an important factor in the equation. If an actor’s 
means are insufficient, ill-equipped or ill-adapted to achieve its political goals, then its 
strategy is not sound. Thus, as Waldmann (2005) concludes, not only is the decision 
to engage in political violence strategic, but the decision as to what type of political 
violence to engage in (whether traditional warfare, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, etc.) is 
also strategic. 
Additionally, to act strategically assumes the involvement of two or more 
actors because strategy involves the anticipation of what another actor will do. As T. 
C. Schelling (1966, p.2) puts it, strategic analysis is “the art of looking at the problem 
from the other person's point of view, identifying his opportunities and his interests.” 
Or as Winston Churchill quipped, “it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into 
account” (quoted in Medby and Glenn 2002, p. 89). 
Just as strategy can entail the use of any means available to achieve a desired 
end, power entails more than mere military might. There are many types of power: 
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coercive or military (hard power), persuasive, seductive or diplomatic (soft power) 
and various combinations of the two, commonly referred to as smart power (Nye 
2006; Armitage & Nye 2007; Wilson 2008). Given that the strategic approach is 
morally neutral regarding the type of power used, actors are scrutinized vis a vis their 
actions, their desired outcome and the options available to them. In other words, 
strategic theorists evaluate the use of political violence according to its efficacy, not 
its morality.  
An obvious question emerges at this point. If the strategic approach to 
studying all types of political violence is basically the same, why is such a huge 
distinction made between terrorism studies and the study of conventional (interstate) 
war? I will address this question in the next section. 
 
 1.4: Strategic Studies since World War Two 
 
Neumann and Smith (2007) argue that much of the conceptual ambiguity 
surrounding terrorism stems from the academic tradition of separating terrorism and 
all other forms of low-intensity conflict from interstate war. As a result, strategic 
analysts failed to apply the same Clausewitzian logic and methodology to the former 
as they did to the latter (Summers 1985; Smith 2003).6 
The use of strategy in war is as old as warfare itself. However, the academic 
study of strategy can be dated to the post- World War II era when weapons 
technology eventually led to the bipolar nuclear stalemate between the two 
                                                 
6 Eckstein (1965) also points out that scholars studying intra-state war tended to focus on insurgents 
and ignore regimes involved in the conflict. 
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superpowers of the Cold War. During this era, strategic analysts focused solely on 
conventional inter-state warfare and potential scenarios involving the U. S. and the 
Soviet Union. All other classes of political violence were categorized together under 
vague terms such as liberation wars, low-intensity conflicts, insurgencies or terrorism 
(Smith 2005). One reason for this distinction was that unconventional war was taken 
to mean intra-state war, and that form of war clearly took the back seat to 
conventional (inter-state) war given the high stakes of a nuclear exchange between the 
two super-powers. A second reason why strategic theorists focused solely on 
conventional war was that it was easier to engage in quantitative analyses based on 
troops, tanks and missiles than it was to navigate the murky waters of political will in 
distant third world capitals (Neumann and Smith 2007).   
Furthermore, the threat of global communism inspired policy-makers in the 
West to view basically all anti-Western insurgents as terrorists (Smith 2005). Hence, 
the tactic itself became the object of focus rather than the strategic goals of the 
insurgents. This largely remains the case today. Rather than accept the analytical 
weakness inherent in lumping all these various forms of violence together into one 
residual category, strategic theorists continue to isolate their field from the study of 
insurgent warfare considering it more a matter for law enforcement. Consequently, 
they largely ignore terrorism as a focus of analysis altogether.  
Meanwhile both terrorism scholars and policy-makers continue to focus on the 
tactic rather than the strategic goals of individual actors, and so they tend to lump 
actors all together based on their modus operandi and ignore other critically relevant 
distinctions between them. Likewise, most terrorism scholars today confuse the 
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description of terrorism with a moral judgment of its use and the objectives of those 
who employ it (Neumann and Smith 2007).7 
Of course, the synonymous use of terms such as low-intensity conflict, 
insurgency, guerrilla warfare and terrorism to refer to all political violence falling 
outside the category of inter-state war is a misnomer at best. More importantly, it 
creates a number of analytical problems. First, terrorism is “the use of violence to 
instill fear for political ends” (Neumann and Smith 2007, p 13). Therefore, since there 
is no single act or set of actions that constitute terrorist violence per se, it cannot be 
categorically differentiated from other acts of political violence.8 Second, this tactic 
(whatever one labels it) can be employed by virtually any actor, whether individual, 
organizational or state (Corbett 1986; Jarvis 2009).9 Hence, the term “terrorist” is a 
misleading one.   
Despite the fact that more than 80 percent of all military conflicts since 1945 
constitute non-conventional engagements (Holsti 1995), the separate treatment of 
interstate war and the arbitrary categorization of all other forms of conflict continues. 
As the collapse of the Soviet Union brought still more international challenges, the 
concept of ‘new war’ entered the discussion with several scholars debating whether 
Clausewitz was still even relevant to modern warfare (Stueck, et al. 1989; Keegan 
                                                 
7 See also Shanahan (2010) who contends that the morality of terrorism should be judged on a case-by-
case bases and not categorically, and Teichman (1989) who explores whether and when acts of 
terrorism can be justified. 
8 Neumann and Smith (2005) do, however, distinguish the strategy of terrorism from other forms of 
irregular warfare. For instance, guerrilla warfare incorporates both the political organization of the 
masses and the eventual use of conventional military force while strategic terrorism relies solely on 
acts of political violence to achieve its desired end.   
9 Solomon (2015) points out that states are particularly culpable in Africa where regimes tend to prey 
upon their own citizens. 
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1997; Lambeth 1997; Gat 2001; Ignatief 2001; Wilkinson 2003; Gray 2005; Smith 
2005; Fleming 2009; Kaldor 2013).  
  
1.5: Terrorism 
 
According to Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 574), terrorism is “the deliberate 
creation of fear, usually by the use or threat of the use of symbolic acts of physical 
violence, to influence the behavior of a given target group.” Terrorism is, therefore, a 
tactic (Halliday 2004). As James S. Albritton (2006, p.6) argues, “terrorism is a 
means to an end—i.e., a technique that is used by terrorists to achieve a calculated 
objective by applying a variety of deliberately violent means and methods to that 
specific goal.” Furthermore, while conventional warfare seeks to conquer the enemy, 
terrorism merely seeks to manipulate political change through terror (Ruby 2002; 
Neumann and Smith 2005). 
In order to be analytically useful, however, the use of terrorist violence should 
be understood as the rational decision of a unitary actor10 rather than either an 
immoral act or the result of some external cause (Crenshaw 1998; Anderton and 
Carter 2006; Caplan 2006; Neumann and Smith 2007).  
On the one hand, the assumption that terrorism is immoral leads to efforts to 
prevent and punish it. The current Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a classic 
example. The political climate created by the GWOT has allowed political actors to 
                                                 
10 A unitary actor can be an individual, an organization or a state. 
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abuse the concept, each labeling their enemies as terrorists and thus stripping the 
term of any true conceptual value.  
On the other hand, Neumann and Smith (2007, P. 5) contend that defining 
terrorism as the result of a grievance, injustice or inequality is “logically redundant” 
as root causes are “infinitely divisible and therefore inherently contestable.” Both 
approaches subject the term to value-laden interpretations and rob the analyst of an 
objective position from which to begin his or his examination.  
Alternatively, strategic theory seeks to understand the decisions of an actor 
via the relationship between means and ends as well as through any system of values 
that expands our understanding of the actor’s decisions. That is to say, strategic 
theorists recognize that actors are impacted by the strategic environment. Harris 
(2006, p. 542) defines the strategic environment as the “determinant of the 
information that is available to an actor and the structure within which actors operate. 
The environment determines what the actors think they know for sure and what they 
have to infer, if possible, from the behaviour of others.” To sum it up, strategic 
theorists view terrorist violence as the result of a rational decision made by a unitary 
actor who, after weighing the various options available, believes that the use of 
terrorism offers the most successful means to a desired end (Crenshaw 1998).11 
Nearly twenty years ago, Richard Betts (1997, p.8) wrote that strategic studies 
“focuses on the essential Clausewitzian problem: how to make force a rational 
instrument of policy rather than mindless murder.” In a sense, this is also the task of 
the terrorism scholar. 
                                                 
11 See also Abrahms (2008) who argues that terrorism is not a rational act. 
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However, Neumann (2002) correctly points out that terrorism scholars tend to 
categorize violence according to common tactical uses rather than employ clearly-
articulated definitions. The result has been a blurred understanding of what is 
sometimes referred to as low-intensity conflict, insurgency, guerrilla warfare or 
terrorism. A wide variety of terminology has been employed to address a common 
tactical use of violence. These terms include, but are in no way limited to: 
unconventional war (Janos 1963); non-trinitarian war (van Creveld 1991); small wars 
(Beaumont 1995); wars of the third kind (Holsti 1996); uncivil wars (Snow 1996); 
ethnic conflict (Kaufmann 1996); complex emergencies (Maynard 1999); virtual war 
(Ignatieff 2001); new war (Kaldor 2013) and internal war (Manwarring 2001).  
So how does one differentiate terrorism from other types of political 
violence?  
 
1.6: Strategic Terrorism 
 
Neumann and Smith (2005) define strategic terrorism as the attempt to obtain 
political objectives through the use of primarily terrorist activity rather than through 
some other means. They distinguish between terrorism and other forms of irregular 
warfare such as guerrilla war by noting that terrorism bypasses the need to mobilize 
the masses or introduce conventional military force. It is solely reliant upon terror 
alone to achieve its political ends. Strategic terrorism involves three stages: (1) 
disorientation, (2) target response and (3) gaining legitimacy.  
In the first stage, an actor tries to erode the security of the people in order to 
make the government look incapable of maintaining order and stability. This is 
typically attempted through a series of random violent attacks. Neumann and Smith 
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(2005) are careful to point out that the primary focus of this stage is disorientation, 
not winning hearts and minds. Therefore, rational actors face a dilemma. They must 
make the violence threatening enough and destabilizing enough to render the general 
public open to accepting the political concessions demanded without tipping the 
scales of public opinion against the perpetrators of the violence.   
In the second stage, an actor attempts to provoke a reaction from the target. 
Neumann and Smith discuss four potential responses proposed by N.O. Berry (1987). 
First, a target could potentially overreact by engaging in extra-legal responses and 
thereby discrediting its own legitimacy. Alternatively, a target could impose a 
number of security features which ultimately inconvenience the public enough to lose 
popular support.  
Another possible reaction is that the target fails to react sufficiently to 
demonstrate that it is capable of dealing with the threat. Berry (1987, p.10) calls this 
reaction “power deflation.” This is a common problem for regimes that attempt to 
balance the need to maintain security with principles of civil liberty and basic human 
rights. By deliberately attempting not to over-react, the target errors on the side of 
caution.  
A third potential reaction is that a target attempts to crush moderate 
opposition for fear that they may form a coalition with the extremists. Berry warns 
that unless totally successful, the target risks radicalizing the moderate opposition 
rather than eliminating them.  
Finally, the fourth potential reaction is for the target to appease the moderates 
among the political opposition with political reform in an attempt to isolate and 
weaken the extremist faction. Berry warns that there are a number of risks involved 
in this option. (1) Reform will be viewed as weakness on the part of the target 
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government, and will invite more terrorist violence, and/or (2) traditional supporters 
of the target government will interpret reforms as appeasing the terrorists, which 
could diminish political support for the regime.12 
In the third and final stage of strategic terrorism, an actor attempts to gain 
legitimacy through either extensive media coverage or through grassroots methods of 
mobilizing public support. The latter has been employed by many organizations such 
as Hamas and others that have not only created legitimate political parties but also 
hospitals, schools and various other charitable organizations.  
The third stage is critical in tipping public approval in favor of the 
perpetrators. However, Neumann and Smith (2005) argue that such grassroots 
methods defy the defining tenet of strategic terrorism: namely that terrorist violence 
alone can bring about the political changes desired. Therefore, they propose that 
strategic terrorism is “a potentially flawed strategy, which- except in the most 
favorable circumstances- is unlikely to achieve the political ends for which it is used” 
(Neumann and Smith 2007, p. 10). The most favorable circumstance is one of foreign 
occupation as foreign authorities generally lack legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population they control (Neumann and Smith 2005).13  
Strategic terrorism is based upon two main assumptions: (1) that a target 
government’s resolve can be eroded by persistent terrorist violence, and (2) that 
terrorist violence will create sufficient fear within the target population to undermine 
                                                 
12 Berry (1987) discusses five possible reactions: (1) overreaction; (2) power deflation; (3) failed 
repression of moderates; (4) appeasement of moderates; and (5) massive intimidation. 
13 Crozier (1960) argues that terrorist violence in general is most likely to succeed during conditions of 
foreign occupation. 
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its trust in the government’s ability (or desire) to protect its citizens (Neumann and 
Smith 2005). 
The first assumption is based largely upon the success of terrorist campaigns 
to drive out colonial occupiers such as the British in Palestine in the 1940s (Hoffman 
2011). However, foreign occupation by colonial powers represented the most 
favorable circumstance for strategic terrorism. Whether strategic terrorism can be as 
successful in less favorable circumstances is debatable. Politics is the “act of seeking 
to fulfill one’s will through violence or other means” (Neumann and Smith 2007, p. 
17).  If a target government is already enjoying a measure of legitimacy, and its 
desire is to protect that legitimacy as well as its citizens, it has a wide range of policy 
choices at its disposal.  
The second assumption of strategic terrorism has a number of caveats. The 
first is that the campaign of violence could possibly backfire and generate support for 
the target government rather than undermine it. A second caveat is that, rather than 
creating a destabilizing atmosphere of panic and fear, a campaign of protracted 
violence may become normalized. The people may simply accept it as a part of their 
daily lives.  
I recall a conversation that I had with a Serbian man who was a young boy in 
Bosnia in the early 1990s. He told me that the war became so commonplace that 
when he would ask his mother if he could go outside and play, she would reply, 
“watch out for the snipers” (Nišić 2010).  
Beyond simply normalizing violence, societies may even learn to capitalize 
on it (Keen 1997; Kaldor 2013). In Somalia, for example, warlords profit from the 
violence. And since many individuals are employed by the warlords, irregular 
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warfare has become an economic opportunity (Menkhaus 2004a; Bakonyi and 
Stuvøy 2005).    
To instill (and maintain) the necessary fear and climate of insecurity, terrorist 
violence needs to be “sudden, brutal, unpredictable and indiscriminate” (Neumann 
and Smith 2005, p. 588). However, maintaining violence of this magnitude poses a 
number of challenges. The first is the sheer difficulty of orchestrating repeated 
attacks and evading the authorities. A high degree of technical ability, accessibility, 
personnel and financial support are necessary, not to mention dedication and personal 
resolve among the members. 
The second challenge involves balancing the need to shock and awe the 
public into a state of fear and instability without turning the tide of public opinion 
against the group and increasing support for the target government. Finally, while the 
group seeks to provoke a reaction from the target government, it risks annihilation 
should the target government elect to react with overwhelming force (Berry 1987).  
The need to provoke a target government into sufficiently reacting without 
overreacting requires a group to engage in a number of carefully calculated chess 
moves: How much violence is a target government willing to withstand? How will 
political supporters react? How much domestic and political support can the target 
regime expect should they elect to overreact? What options are available to the group 
should the target government decide to escalate its own counterterrorist campaign? 
Can the organization alter its strategy? Is the group willing to compromise? How 
might the organization’s supporters react if it did? Navigating through this minefield 
of decisions is difficult at best, and most likely impossible. 
Neumann and Smith (2005) contend that most religious groups that employ 
strategic terrorism are not willing to compromise. Therefore, one of two options is 
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probable: (1) the group will either fail to sufficiently escalate the violence to the 
necessary level to provoke a reaction, or (2) if it is successful in provoking a reaction, 
the group will lose the support of the people, disintegrate into splinter factions and/or 
be annihilated by the target government. The likelihood that it will succeed in 
provoking just the right response so as to cost the target government a sufficient 
measure of legitimacy and also garner a measure of legitimacy for itself is highly 
unlikely. In fact, Neumann and Smith (2007) argue that it is precisely this limited 
efficacy of strategic terrorism that explains why many groups choose to employ other 
tactics in addition to political violence to achieve their goals. 
 
1.7: The Takfiri Doctrine 
 
The takfiri doctrine is a radical Sunni interpretation allowing the accusation of 
a fellow Muslim of major unbelief (which is punishable by death) based on deed 
alone (Stanley 2005; Lahoud 2010). Typically, moderates acknowledge certain acts to 
be sufficient for the pronouncement of takfir (major unbelief). These include 
denouncing the faith, throwing the Quran in filth or wailing over the dead.14 Other 
acts, such as a ruler not adhering strictly to sharia or an individual Muslim not 
fulfilling a particular obligation of the faith, are held by moderates to be minor 
unbelief and require that they be declared “permissible” by the actor before they 
constitute major unbelief (Al-Rasheed 2006; Crooke 2015). The radical interpretation, 
on the other hand, is that any Muslim who believes differently than the takfiri (the one 
                                                 
14 See also for example, a fatwa issued in 1982 by Shaykh Jadd al-Haqq (mufti al-Azhar University in 
Cairo) stating that only the refusal to profess tawhid (the unity of God) could justify the 
pronouncement of takfir upon a Muslim (Calvert 2009).  
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pronouncing takfir) is automatically guilty of major unbelief and therefore subject to 
immediate execution (Paz 2005; Wood 2015).  
While jihadists maintain that violence against the apostate regime is necessary 
for instituting sharia, takfiri groups do not distinguish between the government and 
the governed (Podeh 1996). The takfiri doctrine is the cornerstone of much of the 
violence committed by jihadist groups today (Lahoud 2010; Crooke 2015).15  
 
1.8: Perception of the Other 
 
A component of this analysis is the theory of perception of the other 
(Garfinkel 1952; Merleau-Ponty 1973; Abdallah-Pretceille 1983; Kornprobst 2002; 
Castano et al. 2003; Crozier 1998; Millas 2004). As discussed in section 1.3, strategy 
is the use of one’s resources towards the attainment of one’s goals. Precisely because 
both al Shabaab and Boko Haram have adopted the takfiri doctrine which 
dramatically affected their tactical operations, perception of the other is indispensable 
for understanding how to interpret each group’s actions as a means for obtaining their 
respective goals. 
Perception of the other is an intuitively satisfying theoretical construct that has 
been around for some time. In short, the theory suggests that actors possess multiple 
identities based on religion, class, ethnicity, citizenship, gender, profession, political 
affiliation, etc. (Gopin 2000). Some identities are salient in given situations while 
others are not because identity is relational (Reis & Shaver 1988; Hazan & Shaver 
                                                 
15 The takfiri doctrine is discussed in somewhat greater length in Chapter Four. 
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1994; Brewer & Gardner 1996; Tice and Baumeister 2001). In other words, identity is 
constructed by our perception of others. 
Perception of the other agrees with the basic tenets of Social Identity Theory 
which proposes that social identity is derived from perceived membership in certain 
in-groups and the perception of others in certain out-groups (Van Walraven and 
Leiden 1999). It is also in harmony with the psycho-sociological approach that 
suggests that individual actors shape their perception of others based upon social 
influences (Wilkinson 1987; Crenshaw 1990b; Post 1990, 2005a & 2005b; Horgan 
2008). Elements of perception of the other are even visible in systemic studies such as 
Waldmann (2005) who concludes that subjective factors (generational differences, 
limited career opportunities, perceived status inequality, etc.) are far better indicators 
of potential terrorist violence than objective factors such as poverty, low literacy rates, 
high unemployment, etc. 
According to Katzenstein (1996, p.5), norms are “collective expectations about 
the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.” Norms then determine acceptable 
and unacceptable interaction within and between groups of various identities (Rogers 
1996). On the micro level, individuals interact with one another for a variety of 
reasons such as personal interest, attraction, necessity, etc. However, perception of the 
other maintains that it is an actor’s conceptual placement of others (either within or 
without a particular identity or group) that determines which norms of behavior apply 
(Schwartz et al. 2009). One can, therefore, define perception of the other as the 
information upon which decision-makers discern which category of norms apply to 
specific parties in any given situation.  
 For instance, on the micro level, individuals who owned slaves clearly 
distinguished between slaves and freemen and treated them accordingly- as did 
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virtually everyone else in societies that permitted slavery. On the macro level, due to 
the principle of self-determination, the West European powers were willing to grant 
autonomy to certain Central and East Europeans following World War One (WWI), 
but they were not willing to grant autonomy to Africans and Asians. The decision to 
grant autonomy to one group but not the other was based on the West European 
perception of Central and East Europeans on the one hand and their very different 
perception of Africans and Asians on the other. A similar perceptual distinction can 
be seen behind America's long-time support for Israel over Palestine. Likewise, the 
perception of Western Europe as imperial and colonizing determined the norms that 
applied in several African struggles for liberation and the eventual decision to resort 
to force (Van Walraven and Leiden 1999).  
 The decision to go to war or engage in armed conflict would seem to involve a 
perceptual process (Castano et al. 2003; Jackson 2005b). For conflict to occur 
between two or more groups, each participant must first assume an identity for itself 
and assign an identity to its opponent(s). An interesting example of armed conflict 
research that employs perception of the other as an independent variable is Markus 
Kornprobst’s (2002) study of border disputes in Africa, in which he compares the sub-
regions of West Africa and the Horn. He finds that of the ten border disputes he 
investigated in West Africa, none escalated into war while two of the four border 
disputes in the Horn escalated into intractable conflicts.  
 Kornprobst’s research questions how one can account for such a remarkable 
difference between the two sub-regions' willingness and ability to resolve interstate 
conflicts. He concludes that the low level of cooperation among the members of the 
Horn sub-region may be due to their perception of Ethiopia as a colonial and 
predatory state. Therefore, the importance of maintaining territorial integrity in the 
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Horn is trumped by the perceived need to resist Ethiopian neo-colonialism by any 
means available.  
As the substantive chapters demonstrate, perception of the other also offers 
considerable insight into how the tactics of al Shabaab and Boko Haram serve their 
respective strategic objectives in ways that might not otherwise be discernable. This 
insight leads us to an important question regarding the very nature of the groups 
themselves.  
 
 1.9: Research Question 
 
The U.S. State Department designated al Shabaab a terrorist organization in 
February 2008 (Shinn 2011), but is al Shabaab a “terrorist” organization? 
Furthermore, if it is engaged in terrorism, has it always been? Or has the 
organization’s strategic goal(s) changed since inception? Finally, if it is determined 
that al Shabaab is engaged in terrorism, to what extent is the group reliant upon 
terrorist violence as a part of its overall strategy? In other words, has al Shabaab 
engaged in strategic terrorism? If so, how successful has this strategy been? 
 
1.10: Methodology 
 
In this project, I employ a strategic analysis of al Shabaab. Strategic theory 
considers the utility of violence as a military strategy (Neumann and Smith 2007). 
While most terrorism literature is concerned with why terrorist violence occurs or its 
causes, strategic theory seeks to “examine how political actors define the 
circumstances around them and how they react to those circumstances to achieve their 
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objectives” (Smith 1991, p. 17). By tracing the line of thinking of the organization, I 
strive to understand what al Shabaab’s strategic objective is, whether it has changed 
over the years since the group’s inception and to measure how successful al 
Shabaab’s use of violence has been toward the achievement of its strategic goals.  
I employ a qualitative case study design as it allows for a wide variety of 
approaches to the phenomenon under analysis. The basic structure of a case study 
contains a detailed and in-depth analysis of the entity being examined (Yin 1981). Its 
strength is that it captures the complexity of the particular case in the study- what 
Geertz (1994) calls "thick description." One major weakness of the case study design 
is that such specificity limits the generalizability of the findings (Bryman and Bell 
2003). However, because I will not be attempting to generalize my results, this 
approach is preferable for its depth of focus and flexibility. 
My primary reason for choosing al Shabaab is that the group is one of the 
deadliest organizations on the continent of Africa, making this study salient to 
scholars and policy makers alike (Kelley 2014). First, I will discuss the group’s social 
context and analyze relevant historical and contemporary details that shed light on the 
organizations’ stated political goals. Second, I will examine al Shabaab’s predecessor 
groups and look for similarities and differences in the strategic goals and tactics that 
each has employed.  
Given that no actor is a true utility maximizer in the strict economic sense of 
the word, it is impossible to fully understand the decision-making of any entity 
without first comprehending the values to which it subscribes. Therefore, I explore the 
extent that ideological, tribal and religious factors influence and shape al Shabaab’s 
goals. Finally, after tracing the group’s ideological underpinnings back through its 
respective predecessors, I examine the various phases the group has transitioned 
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through and analyze each phase to determine whether al Shabaab’s strategic goals 
have remained consistent―and if not, I note how they have changed and evolved 
since inception.  
It is important to note that I am not attempting to establish causation. Also, 
since strategic theory is not a theoretical model per se, but more a level of analysis 
(Neumann 2002), there are no independent or dependent variables to speak of. Rather, 
I employ a combination of assumption, observation and deduction in order to 
determine al Shabaab’s preferences (Frieden 1999). It is dangerous to rely on just one 
method alone for reasons that I will discuss below. My endeavor is to trace al 
Shabaab’s line of thinking to determine the group’s strategic objective(s) since 
inception and whether its use of violence has been successful in achieving that goal.  
Assumption is the first factor in the equation. It is important to be aware of 
any assumptions one is making when analyzing a group such as al Shabaab. The 
assumptions one makes regarding an actor’s use of violence will be informed by the 
preference structure that actor is believed to possess at any given time. In this respect, 
changing preferences create somewhat of a moving target. Fortunately the theoretical 
framework one uses can help to stabilize the analysis by providing a consistent set of 
assumptions. For example, the rational framework assumes that actors will seek the 
most efficient alternative in an effort to maximize their utility. As mentioned above, 
the overarching rationale of strategic theory is comprised of three primary 
assumptions: (1) military force is a dimension of power exercised toward political 
goals, (2) politics is a game of thrones in which each actors strives to maximize its 
own power in relation to other actors, and (3) all actors act rationally (Smith 1991). 
The danger in relying on assumption alone is that one can never be 100% certain that 
their assumptions are correct. 
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Observation is the second element in the analysis. The observation involved in 
this analysis entailed studying al Shabaab’s radio broadcasts, videos, media releases 
and various correspondence (e.g. bin Laden 2009; Hammami 2012; ). Much of this 
material, while originally in the public domain, is now only available through 
secondary sources as the original accounts have been deactivated (e.g. Bakier 2008; 
Grace 2008b; NEFA 2008; Menkhaus 2013a; Moore 2016). For instance, al 
Shabaab’s English language Twitter account, (HSM Press) was deactivated in January 
2013 after only having been active for two years (Anzalone 2013, BBC 2013, Hodge 
2014). At least six other Twitter accounts operated by al Shabaab were also suspended 
in September 2013 (Hamza 2013).  Likewise, the various branches of the group’s 
Radio al Andalus and multiple relay stations were also shut down as the group lost 
territory.  Another major challenge has been collecting data from within the 
conservative Gulf countries where I reside as al Shabaab media 
announcements―such as those released by the organization’s media arm, al-Kataib 
Media―are heavily censored in this region.  
Initially the group employed YouTube, websites and chat rooms to raise 
finances and recruit members. However, al Shabaab has since evolved into a 
sophisticated user of social media. The group’s real-time tweets during the Westgate 
Shopping Mall attacks generated almost as much media attention as the attack itself 
(Menkhaus 2013a). Likewise, in 2014 the organization’s leadership issued a directive 
that all members change their mobile phone numbers to prevent messages from being 
intercepted. The leadership also placed a ban on the use of smart phones among 
members (Hodge 2014).  
Ironically, while al Shabaab has mastered the use of modern media, it has also 
attempted to prohibit (or at least restrict) the use of most other forms of modern 
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technology in areas under its influence or direct control (Mohamed 2014). This move 
to prohibit the use of communication technology by the civilian population, along 
with the fact that many of its more recent media releases have been in Swahili, Arabic 
and English, support the suggestion that the groups is increasingly reaching out to 
foreigners (Vidino 2010). 
In addition to these various media releases, I also rely upon personal 
interviews with individuals who have witnessed these groups and the effects they 
have had upon Somali society. The main problem with relying on observation 
alone―or even personal interviews―is that observed behavior may not necessarily 
reflect one’s true preferences. In fact, the second assumption of strategic theory 
suggests that actors will base their behavior upon their expectation of what other 
actors will or will not do—not upon their true preferences. So, actions can be 
misleading.  
The third tool I employ is deduction.  As discussed in Section 1:2, deduction 
involves the application of pre-existing theories to test them and determine whether 
their descriptive, explanatory and predictive power holds true within the light of each 
new analysis. For example, there are many theories regarding the causes of terrorism 
(e.g. systemic, psychological, psycho-social, etc.). However, if we were to apply such 
theories to the violence of al Shabaab or Boko Haram, we would quickly realize that 
these explanations are inadequate. We need a broader approach to understanding these 
militant organizations—one that considers their strategic objects as well as their 
motives. In other words, it is necessary to know what actors want before we can 
attempt to understand why they want it.  
This inquiry reflects an important distinction between strategy and tactics. 
Strategy entails an actor’s plan to achieve its ultimate purpose while tactics are 
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merely techniques employed to implement a strategy. Unfortunately, 
counterterrorism often is so focused on an actor’s use of tactical violence that it fails 
to consider the strategic goal behind the violence. This failure leads to highly 
ineffective measures that often produce disastrous results. 
In order to ascertain the goal of a particular actor, one must employ all the 
tools at his or her disposal― assumption, observation and deduction―to avoid 
confusing tactics with strategic objective(s). Likewise, one should not confuse 
ideology (e.g. Islamism, jihadism or takfiri) with strategic objectives (e.g. obtaining 
political concessions versus overthrowing the regime). An actor’s strategic objective 
is the end result the actor hopes to achieve. An actor’s ideology dictates to a large 
extent 1) the strategy that an actor will employ (i.e. how that actor will use its 
resources toward the achievement of its goals), and 2) which tactics will be 
acceptable (targeting corrupt governments or killing apostate Muslims). Hence, 
ideology is not the same as an actor’s strategic goal(s).  
For instance, al Qaeda shared the same strategic objectives as al Qaeda in Iraq 
(the expulsion of the U.S. and its allies from the Middle East, the overthrow of 
Western puppet regimes in the Muslim world and the eventual establishment of an 
Islamic caliphate based on sharia). However, Zarqawi embraced the takfiri doctrine 
and, as a result, employed tactics that greatly alarmed bin Laden and Zawahiri. The 
two groups eventually split. 
Zarqawi’s vision was the exact opposite of bin Laden’s (Fishman 2006). Bin 
Laden, following al-Banna’s more conciliatory bottom-up approach, believed that the 
ummah (Muslim community) should be taught the true way of Islam from the ulama 
(Muslim scholars). Bin Laden was convinced that the establishment of the caliphate 
had to wait until America was driven out of the Middle East and the corrupt puppet 
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regimes in the Muslim world were overthrown. Only then would Muslims be strong 
enough to establish the caliphate.  
Zarqawi, following Qutb’s authoritarian top-down approach, insisted that 
Muslims were only as strong as their leaders. He wanted to set up an Islamic state 
immediately. Rather than attempt to win the hearts and minds of the majority of 
Muslims as bin Laden wanted to do, Zarqawi wanted to wage a brutal campaign that 
would instill fear, not win popular support (McCants 2015). Even though the two had 
virtually the same strategic objectives, their strategies and hence their tactics, were 
very different from one another. 
It is also important to point out that, while the reasons for an actor to adopt 
the takfiri doctrine are no doubt complex and fascinating, such an inquiry is beyond 
the scope of this project. It could well be a project in itself―one that I am not 
qualified to embark upon. 
Silke (2003) points out that despite the growing multidisciplinary body of 
literature on terrorism, only one fifth of research published on the subject produces 
substantially new findings. This research makes an original contribution to the body 
of literature on al Shabaab in that there is currently no other strategic analysis of the 
group that also applies the threefold application of violence employed here or the 
framework of strategic terrorism.  
Menkhaus has written extensively on al Shabaab, and he is clearly one of the 
world’s leading experts on the group. Menkhaus is an area specialist. As such, his 
approach is largely systemic. Menkhaus focuses on the emergence and continued 
existence of al Shabaab as a result of the historical and political context of Somalia, 
rather than applying the more rational lens of strategic theory to explain the group’s 
tactical use of violence. Hence, while Menkhaus offers considerable insight into al 
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Shabaab’s tactical use of violence in light of current systemic realities, he does not 
apply the strategic terrorism framework in order to better understand the 
organization’s strategic objective(s). 
Gartenstein-Ross (2009) also takes a systemic approach by attributing many of 
al Shabaab’s changing tactics to the external influence of al Qaeda rather than to 
internal changes in the group’s leadership, ideology or strategic objective(s). For 
example, Gartenstein-Ross points to the fact that Godane increased the number of 
foreign fighters, adopted the tactic of suicide attacks (which were previously 
unacceptable in Somalia), and upgraded the quality and sheer quantity of the group’s 
media releases as indications of al Shabaab’s ideological connection to al Qaeda while 
completely ignoring more strategic explanations.  
Wise (2011) concludes that al Shabaab has gone through two phases (phase 
one: December 2006- early 2008 and phase two: early 2008-2011). However, his 
analysis is largely based upon al Shabaab’s increased military capacity in the second 
phase rather than the changing strategic objective(s) of the organization. Wise’s 
dichotomy is also outdated as the groups has since gone through a number of setbacks 
in its military capacity.  
Wise also takes a systemic approach, attributing al Shabaab’s emergence and 
initial success to the Ethiopian invasion. According to Wise, Ethiopia was largely 
responsible for both radicalizing al Shabaab and transforming it into the most lethal 
militia in Somalia―dramatically increasing the group’s membership from about 400 
initially to several thousand. Like Gartenstein-Ross (2009), however, Wise 
completely ignores more strategic explanations for al Shabaab’s use of tactical 
violence and views it instead as a reaction to outside forces. 
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Hansen (2013) offers an extremely detailed discussion of al Shabaab’s 
membership and organizational structure, including an in-depth accounting of the 
group’s finances and even records of payments to its militants (e.g. $20/per hand 
grenade attack, $30/per soldier killed, etc.). Hanson’s approach is also largely 
systemic rather than strategic, however. While Hansen also divides the history of al 
Shabaab into four distinct phases (phase one: 2005-06, phase two: 2007-08, phase 
three: 2009-10, phase four: 2010- 2013), his phases are mainly focused on changing 
external pressures (such as the group’s changing enemies and the influence of al 
Qaeda) rather than changes in the group’s leadership, ideology and the evolution of 
the organization’s strategic objective(s). Thus, Hansen largely neglects a strategic 
analysis of the organization as well.  
Finally, Marchal has written extensively on al Shabaab’s resilience in the face 
of its many enemies. However, Marchal largely attributes the organization’s success 
to exogenous factors such as questionable policies on the part of the United States and 
its allies in the region, Somali nationalism, the perceived illegitimacy of the Somali 
government and financial support from conservative Gulf States. 
Anzalone (2016) stands apart from the rest in that his primary focus is on al 
Shabaab’s strategic use of violence. However, Anzalone argues that the organization’s 
tactics have not changed in any significant way―certainly not enough to suggest a 
change in the group’s strategic objective(s). 
While I necessarily discuss the organizational structure of al Shabaab as well 
as the historical, political and socio-economic context in which al Shabaab emerged― 
unlike Menkhaus, Gartenstein-Ross, Wise, Hansen and Marchal―my approach is 
strategic rather than systemic. Furthermore (unlike Anzalone), my emphasis is on the 
group’s leadership and how its changing ideology impacted the organization’s 
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strategic objectives and tactical use of violence. For example, I draw a stark 
distinction between the strategic objective(s) of Ayro and the nationalists and those of 
Godane (and later Umar). The former targeted its perceived enemies largely within 
the borders of Somalia, while the latter adopted a very different strategy of attacking 
mainly foreign targets outside the borders of Somalia. The two groups employed 
radically different tactics which, when understood in light of their respective 
ideologies, speak volumes concerning the group’s transforming strategic objective(s).  
Furthermore, while scholars such as Gartenstein-Ross (2009) and Hansen 
(2013), clearly identify al Shabaab as an al Qaeda affiliate, my analysis suggests that 
al Shabaab’s ideology is much more in line with Islamic State than al Qaeda. 
Finally, my analysis differs from the leading scholars in the way that I slice 
the data. The distinction is more than merely a different set of dates. My analysis 
reflects an emphasis on strategic objective(s) rather than military capacity or changing 
external pressures. 
The United States designated al Shabaab as a terrorist organization in 2008 
(Menkhaus 2013b), however, the violence in Somalia represents ongoing conflict that 
is much older than al Shabaab. I argue that the decision to designate this group as a 
terrorist organization was politically motivated rather than based upon sound analysis. 
Since The U.S. refuses to negotiate with terrorists as a matter of policy, but has on 
several occasions backed insurgents, the designation has long-term implications as it 
has set U.S. foreign policy regarding al Shabaab in stone. This designation also 
directly affects the extent of military intervention involved in the region.  
Unfortunately, America’s involvement in Somalia has only served to 
exacerbate the violence. The policy prescriptions in this thesis could make all the 
difference between success and failure for the incoming Trump administration as it 
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attempts to address the challenges that al Shabaab continues to present. As I also 
briefly discuss, the application of the strategic terrorism framework sheds 
considerable light upon the similarities and differences between groups such as al 
Qaeda and Islamic State as well as their affiliates. Thus, a proper understanding of 
these groups is essential as their potential impact on the world is immense. To date, 
no work has applied either strategic theory or Neumann and Smith’s (2005) 
framework of strategic terrorism to al Shabaab.   
Another strength of this thesis is that, in the course of gathering data, I have 
visited blast sites and interviewed survivors and witnesses whenever possible, rather 
than relying solely upon secondary sources. Dolnik (2013) argues that the best way to 
increase the current output of new information is for terrorism scholars to rely less on 
secondary sources and to rely more on theory-driven approaches to field research. 
In this chapter, I have discussed the fall of strategic studies from its original 
state, defined the relevant terms in the study (strategy, terrorism and strategic 
terrorism) and introduced the takfiri doctrine and perception of the other. I have also 
laid out the basic plan of the research project (the research question, the methodology 
and justification for employing strategic theory). In Chapter Two, I will address the 
limitations of theoretical models in terrorism studies.   
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Chapter Two: The Tower of Babel                                                                                                             
Limitations of Theoretical Models in Terrorism Studies 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
  
 In this chapter, I lay out a blueprint of the theoretical edifice that terrorism 
scholars have erected, largely upon the erroneous foundational beliefs that (1) 
terrorism is a separate category of political violence that can be identified by the 
ideology, the deed or the actor involved, and (2) that terrorism is, for the most part, 
irrational at best- or at the very worst- engaged in by only the deranged and psychotic.  
There is, as I will discuss in Chapter Three, a substantial body of literature that 
argues that “terrorists” are rational as well as a number of studies that conclude that 
“terrorists” are perfectly normal human beings (Silke 2014). However, these 
approaches still, to varying degrees, define terrorism by the act itself, the ideology 
behind it, or by those who perpetrate it rather than as a tactical means to a desired end 
that can be comprised of any number of acts, employed even for legitimate reasons by 
any actor. 
  I begin with a discussion of the limitations of systemic and lower levels of 
analysis when used in isolation. From there, I progress to a generic examination of 
theoretical models. 
 
2.2: Limitations of Systemic Levels of Analysis 
 
One body of terrorism scholarship focuses on large systemic causes such as 
structural, cultural or institutional factors (e.g. Piazza 2006; Wilkinson 1997; Krueger 
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and Laitin 2008). The level of analysis in this approach is most often national, 
societal, or larger. Therefore, scholars in this category specify one or more broad 
systemic factors such as economic conditions, culture, religion, and various political 
and/or social institutions as the independent variable. While such factors certainly 
must play a role, as individuals are affected by their environment (Hays 1994), these 
systemic forces are extremely common and widespread.  
It is, therefore, very difficult to establish a consistent correlation between such 
prevalent systemic forces and the fairly irregular phenomenon known as terrorism. As 
Laqueur (1977a, p. 15) puts it, trying to “unravel the mysterious character of terrorist 
movements with reference to general economic trends is like using a giant nut-cracker 
to crack a very tiny object, which might not even be a nut.”  
To make this task a bit less arduous, systemic terrorism literature is further 
divided by the type of systemic factor being examined (e.g. structural, cultural or 
institutional). This artificial dissection of the data allows scholars to be more precise 
in the specific variable that they are attempting to measure. Still, it is generally 
accepted that rather than any one systemic condition alone, a combination of systemic 
factors is likely culpable.  
On the continent of Africa, for instance, one might point to the combination of 
Islamic extremism and weak governments as contributing factors to terrorism. For 
example, the governments in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of 
Congo have been incapable of preventing groups such as Hezbollah from exploiting 
blood diamonds to finance acts of terrorism. This systemic approach combines 
cultural and institutional explanations as the independent variables. While this model 
lends to our understanding of how such groups are able to support their illicit 
endeavors, it leaves unanswered questions regarding why the Islamic extremist groups 
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involved have chosen terrorism over the status quo in the first place. Not to mention, 
it tells us nothing regarding strategic objective. 
Certainly not all Muslims who adhere to a strict interpretation of Islam support 
or engage in violence (Zaidi 2008). Nor do all weak governments experience 
terrorism within their borders. Therefore, systemic explanations alone leave us with as 
many questions as they do answers. Again, a more promising approach would be to 
trace these groups’ tactical use of violence to their strategic goals. This approach 
would (1) allow us to determine the strategic value of their use of violence and, (2) 
shed light on their decision to employ terrorism as a means of achieving their goal in 
the first place. 
 
2.2.1: The Big Bang? 
 
Other terrorism scholars in the systemic category, while acknowledging that 
systemic factors do sometimes change very quickly, point out that these broad 
realities usually tend to change rather slowly. Hence it is difficult to demonstrate a 
correlation between such normally stable systemic factors and the fairly erratic 
phenomenon known as terrorism. This second category of scholarship suggests that, 
like the Big Bang Theory, there is a triggering event or precipitating factor that sparks 
the nebulous gasses into flame to produce terrorist violence. Such triggers could be 
anything from famine or drought to election fraud scandals and full-scale civil war. 
Therefore, scholars in this category specify systemic forces and triggering events as 
the independent variable (Crenshaw 1981; Ehrlich and Liu 2002; Bjørgo 2004; 
Shrivastava 2005; Newman 2006; Noricks 2009).  
 72 
 
This, of course, is an oversimplification. Some of the models in this body of 
literature are actually quite elaborate. For example, Crenshaw (1981) distinguishes 
between preconditions and precipitants. According to Crenshaw, preconditions are 
long-term conditions that “make terrorism more likely” to occur over decades and 
generations (such as racial inequality/discrimination against specific sub-groups or a 
lack of opportunity for political participation) while precipitants are events that spark 
individual acts of terrorism (p. 380). Precipitants can be further divided into 
permissive factors (such as modernization, urbanization, social facilitation and the 
inability or unwillingness of a regime to prevent terrorism) and direct causes (such as 
grievances on the part of a subgroup, the lack of opportunity for political participation 
and the most immediate precipitant, harsh repression on the part of the regime which 
sparks a retaliatory response).  
Crenshaw maintains, however, that terrorism arises primarily from elite 
disaffection (and most probably from a combination of elite disaffection and mass 
passivity) which helps to explain why such a relatively small percentage of the 
population choose to engage in terrorist violence in the first place. Therefore, 
according to Crenshaw, the decision to engage in terrorism is made by rational actors 
when (1) preconditions create grievances, (2) material circumstances are such that 
terrorism is possible and (3) due to urbanization, it’s likely to have an impact, (4) 
permissive factors are in the actors’ favor and (5) some direct cause sparks the flame 
of terrorist violence. However, if this is true, then why don’t Native Americans 
commit acts of terrorism? Or Eskimos for that matter? Once again, when we focus on 
the “why” question, we’re left with more questions than answers. 
Like Crenshaw, Gupta (2005) argues that root causes are merely rallying 
points around which leaders can spark dissatisfaction and possibly even violence. 
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Gupta further argues that there are three main categories of actors who participate in 
terrorist violence: (1) true believers who are in it for the cause, (2) mercenaries who 
are in it for the money, and (3) captive participants who are coerced into it out of 
pressure from family, friends or some other influential group.    
Ross (1993) offers a similar typology of permissive and precipitant causes. 
However, Ross suggests that three permissive causes (geographic location, regime 
type, and level of modernization) are necessary but not sufficient factors that 
“prestructure and facilitate the presence of the precipitants” (p. 5). In addition, Ross 
argues that systemic models need to be specifically conceptualized regarding the 
scope, frequency and intensity of the terrorism being examined as well as the type of 
terrorism be it domestic, international or state-sponsored.  
Bjørgo (2004, p.3) distinguishes between root causes of terrorism (systemic-
level causes), facilitator causes (factors that may accelerate terrorism such as modern 
technology or mass media), motivational causes (actual grievances) and what he 
refers to as “trigger causes,” which he defines as the “immediate circumstances and 
events” that spark acts of political violence. Trigger causes may be any precipitating 
event that spark acts of terrorism. Bjørgo lists three examples: the slaying of a student 
by police in West Berlin in 1967 which led to the founding of the Red Army Faction; 
the 1972 ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre in Belfast which invited a slew of Irish 
Republican Army retaliations; and the 2000 visit of Ariel Sharon to the al-Aqsa 
Mosque which triggered the Second Intifada. 
Newman (2006) also employs this approach. He refers to root causes as 
indirect and/or underlying causes and concludes that root causes are only useful for 
understanding terrorism when studied in tandem with precipitant factors. A variety of 
terminology has been used to express this concept (e.g., root; primary; permissive; 
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proximate; precipitant; catalyst and trigger causes). Regardless of the terminology one 
uses, the prevailing wisdom in this body of terrorism literature suggests that a 
combination of both long-term systemic factors and more immediate causes is 
necessary to produce the decision to engage in terrorism.  
 
2.2.2: Weak States?   
 
 While the systemic body of terrorism scholarship contributes much to our 
understanding regarding some cases of terrorist violence, terrorism is a beast of many 
stripes. So, the focus on systemic conditions alone (or even a combination of systemic 
conditions and precipitating factors) simply does not tell us the entire story. Like the 
proverbial blind men describing an elephant (Silke 1996), each approach is 
incomplete in itself. 
For example, in Africa poverty produces vulnerability as millions of young, 
uneducated males with little or no economic opportunity live in politically unstable 
conditions under corrupt governments that are willing to host and sponsor militant 
organizations. Still the majority of African states fail to experience the terrorism one 
might expect from these conditions (Ehrlich and Liu 2002). Why? 
Piombo (2007) argues that one explanation is that most terror organizations 
require a fairly stable and reliable infrastructure in which to operate. Therefore, while 
some indigenous terrorist groups do exist in politically unstable states such as Liberia 
and Somalia, terrorism is a substantially greater problem in more advanced African 
states such as Kenya and South Africa. According to Piombo, political instability and 
poor infrastructure serve as barriers to terrorist activity. 
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On the other hand, it is also widely acknowledged that weak states are often 
ill-equipped to prevent terrorist attacks, apprehend suspects, and secure their borders. 
So-called “weak states” are also considered a threat to the national security of their 
neighbors. Rice (2006) warns that spillover from weak states can include conflict, 
terrorism, disease and environmental degradation.16 Furthermore, the informal 
economies in these states offer excellent opportunities for money laundering and 
various trafficking enterprises that can be used to finance terrorist operations (Takeyh 
and Gvosdev 2002; Mair 2003; Piazza 2008). Failed and failing states are also often 
either incapable or unwilling to provide basic public goods for their citizens, making 
it easier for terrorist organizations to secure popular support through humanitarian 
programs (Ehrlich and Liu 2002).  
Supportive of this second view, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, al Qaeda's well-known 
strategist, specifically noted that Somalia and other chaotic places are well-suited for 
hosting terrorist organizations and jihadist training camps (Lia 2008; Cruickshank and 
Ali 2007). Such statements also tend to resonate well with Lia and Skjolberg (2000) 
who argue that, rather than less terrorism, there is simply less reporting of terrorist 
activity in developing states. 
In Somalia for example, al Shabaab takes full advantage of the chaos (Wise 
2011). The group’s operatives move freely among the state’s millions of refugees and 
displaced persons, and the incompetence and corruption of government forces have 
allowed al Shabaab to capture towns and launch countless deadly attacks including 
                                                 
16 Rice (2006, p. 4) defines weak states as, “poor states that lack the capacity to fulfill essential 
government functions, chiefly: 1) to secure their population from violent conflict; 2) to competently 
meet the basic human needs of their population (i.e. food, health, education), and; 3) to govern 
legitimately with the acceptance of a majority of their population.”  
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several trans-border attacks (Ali 2008). Of course, al Shabaab has since forfeited 
much of its territory, but the chaos persists nonetheless.  
Which theoretical approach is correct? Do poor economic conditions and 
political instability empower those who would engage in terrorist violence or restrict 
them? Both approaches employ systemic models, yet they make contradictory 
assumptions. While theory should inform the model, theory itself also needs to be 
informed by the unique context in which the violence occurs- the very data that is so 
readily stripped away in order to make the analyses more generalizable.  
The basic assumption behind systemic explanations is that there is a direct 
correlation between the degree or intensity of systemic causes and the resulting 
number of terrorist incidents. Therefore, conventional wisdom suggests that by 
identifying systemic causes of terrorism, scholars can both predict future acts of 
terrorism and prevent them from occurring (e.g. Hopple 1982; Ackoff and Strumpfer 
2003; Cronin 2006a).  
It is beyond doubt that systemic realities shape and constrain our decisions and 
actions to a point. Kofi Annan (2003) made this very point in a speech to the heads of 
state, insisting that it is as big of a mistake to overlook systemic factors as it is to 
focus solely on them. Still, those who ultimately decide to engage in acts of terrorism 
comprise a very small percentage of the total human population (Richardson 2007). 
Therefore, one can rather easily conclude that the decision to engage in terrorist 
violence must be driven by more than just the prevailing systemic realities that affect 
us all.  
 
2.3: Limitations of Lower Levels of Analysis 
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Individual and group levels of analysis focus on the actors themselves (e.g. 
Post 1990, Hudson 1999, Sageman 2004). These lower levels of analysis often rest 
upon psychological, socio-psychological or rational explanations. There are obvious 
problems associated with these approaches as well. Psychological explanations can be 
divided into two main approaches: psycho-pathological theories and psycho-
sociological theories.  
 
2.3.1: The Psycho-pathological School 
 
The first tradition attributes terrorist behavior to some type of abnormality or 
deviant character trait (Hacker & Hacker 1976, Cooper 1978, Schmid and Jongman 
1988, Taylor & Ryan 1988, Post 1990, Pearlstein 1991). For instance, McCauley et al. 
(2013) have isolated four characteristics that are common to both school shooters and 
assassins: both tend to suffer from depression, both have a perceived grievance of 
some sort, both are going through some type of personal crisis and both groups have 
experience with weapons outside of military duty. But even with these four 
characteristics in common, McCauley et al. admit that there are many more individual 
differences that make it nearly impossible to make meaningful comparisons.  
For example, John Allen Muhammad was former military and a convert to 
Islam, Ted Kaczynski was a professor of mathematics, Scott Roeder was a blue-collar 
worker and anti-abortion activist who allegedly struggled with mental illness and 
James von Brunn graduated from college and became a World War Two naval officer. 
These individuals differed in age, race, level of education and socio-economic status. 
One can imagine that they also held different religious, political and social views as 
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well.  For instance, Muhammad resented the treatment of African Americans in the 
U.S. while von Brunn was a white supremacist. 
The various individual differences among people who engage in acts of 
terrorism obviously creates an obstacle to establishing a single common trait that they 
all share. Adam Lankford (2014) sidesteps this problem of diversity altogether by 
focusing mainly on the psychiatric health of the perpetrators. Lankford suggests that 
there is a common psychological component behind both suicide terrorism and school 
shootings. His psychological autopsy of Mohamed Atta concludes that Atta 
demonstrated strong psychological similarities with school shooters and everyday 
suicides alike.  
Lankford’s work has been criticized on a variety of levels, however. For 
example, Qamar (2013) is critical of Lankford's use of a convenience sample, the 
subjective nature of his conclusions, and Lankford’s criticism of other experts in the 
field. Atran (2012) also disagrees with Lankford’s conclusions regarding the 
similarities in the psychiatric health of the perpetrators. 
Meanwhile, the modern surge in suicide terrorism sparked an interest in 
whether suicide bombers were actually suicidal. Merari (2005) argues that acts of 
suicide terrorism cannot be compared to ordinary suicides. The former are most often 
carried out with the consent and knowledge of (and often as the result of coercion or 
manipulation by) significant others, while the latter are most often done in secret 
without the consent or knowledge of significant others. 
Sosis and Alcorta (2008) suggest that organizations specifically target 
adolescents for suicide missions as the unique patterns of brain development at 
adolescence make them vulnerable to new ideas and willing to engage in high-risk 
behavior. 
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While the psychiatric health of individual perpetrators is relevant, two 
questions even more relevant to this study are (1) whether it is possible to profile 
individuals who engage in terrorist violence and, (2) if so, whether an individual’s 
psychological profile can be generalized to a larger group.  
Victoroff (2005) concludes that it is not possible to accurately profile the mind 
of a terrorist. However, Moghaddam (2005) insists that common psychological factors 
are identifiable. Other scholars agree, citing a feeling of humiliation as the most 
commonly occurring trait (Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003b; Richardson 2007). 
According to Moghaddam, what is difficult is identifying the triggers that cause some 
individuals possessing these psychological factors to engage in acts of terrorism while 
millions of others, who also possess them, do not.  
There are several other psychological studies that investigate personal motives 
for terrorism (McGeorge 1996; Parachini 2000; Moghadam 2003; McCauley et al. 
2013). For example, Moghadam (2003) concludes that revenge often plays a powerful 
role in individual Palestinians’ decisions to volunteer for suicide missions. Also, 
Parachini (2000) claims that Ramzi Yusef was driven by ego and rage rather than 
religious ideology. Likewise, McGeorge (1996) found that of 244 chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) attacks, only 25 percent were perpetrated toward a 
political objective. The other 75 percent were committed by criminals, disgruntled 
employees or the mentally ill.  
Aside from ignoring the socio-economic and political realities of terrorism, the 
psycho-pathological approach lacks empirical support. While conceding that mental 
illness may well be a contributing factor in isolated cases, the majority of research 
discounts a causal relationship between mental illness and individual acts of terrorism 
(Rasch 1979; Crenshaw 1981; della Porta 2006). The main problem is, unless there is 
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a clear history of mental illness prior to an actor’s decision to engage in acts of 
terrorism, there is no way to be certain whether the psychological disorder caused the 
terrorism or whether the stress and strain of the terrorist lifestyle caused the mental 
illness (Weatherston and Moran 2003). No doubt the danger, isolation, fear of capture 
and perhaps even the tremendous guilt associated with such a lifestyle takes its toll.  
However, even if it were possible to be certain that the mental illness preceded 
the decision to engage in terrorism, one could not be certain that the decision to 
engage in terrorism was influenced solely by the mental illness rather by than a host 
of other causes. Furthermore, if mental illness was a fundamental cause of terrorism, 
one could expect to see incidents of terrorism more evenly distributed to match the 
global occurrence of mental illness. Remarkably, however, the majority of scholars 
concur that most terrorists tend to be quite normal (Corrado 1981; Turco 1987; Ruby 
2002a; Weatherston and Moran 2003; Silke 2004 & 2014).  
 
2.3.2: The Psycho-sociological School 
 
The second approach in the psychological camp is the psycho-sociological 
school which attempts to connect an actor’s individual beliefs and ideologies to the 
broader social context (Wilkinson 1987; Crenshaw 1990b; Post 1990, 2005a & 2005b; 
Horgan 2008). For example, Post (2005a) argues that hatred toward an outside group 
(labeled the enemy) is often bred in childhood via the broader society. Therefore, 
efforts need to be made to combat this systemic hatred as well as lower-level sources 
of animosity. The problem with Post’s theory is that while it accurately describes 
protracted conflicts such as the one between Israel and Palestine, it does little to either 
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explain the source of systemic hatred or predict future conflicts. The psycho-
sociological school approach can be further broken down into a number of theories.  
 
2.3.2.1: Relative Deprivation Theory 
 
Relative deprivation theory attempts to address the source of systemic hatred 
by suggesting that violence is the result of long-standing grievances (Galtung 1964; 
Davies 1962 & 1973; Gurr 1970; Thompson 1989; Blomberg et al. 2004). 
Moghaddam (2005) suggests that perceived deprivation is critical to understanding 
this phenomenon. He specifically refers to the concept of fraternal deprivation (where 
a person feels deprived because of the position of his or her group within a larger 
social order) as a factor as opposed to egoistical deprivation (where an individual 
feels deprived due to his or her individual position within a group).  
However, as Gross (1972) argues, actors must first perceive relative 
deprivation for it to become a potential factor. Furthermore, Lupsha (1971) contends 
that indignation over perceived unjust inequality trumps relative deprivation. Finally, 
as Laqueur (1977a) observes, even if it were possible to demonstrate that relative 
deprivation is widespread in any given society, it still would not establish a causal 
connection to terrorist violence. 
 
2.3.2.2: Social Distance Theory 
Social distance theory is similar to relative deprivation in that it considers 
social location between socio-economic classes as well as racial and gender 
inequality. However, social distance theory recognizes that grievances alone lack 
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sufficient explanatory power, and therefore also considers factors such as the level of 
sympathy one groups holds for another, how exclusive or inclusive the various classes 
and groups of people appear, and the level of interaction between groups (Senechal de 
la Roche 1996; Black 2004).  
 
2.3.2.3: Contagion Theory 
Contagion theory postulates that terrorism is contagious. Noting distinct trends 
or waves of terrorist activity, contagion theorists suggest that actors are influenced by 
one another, mimic one another and learn from each other’s successes and failures. 
Modern mass media and the growing coverage of terrorist attacks is generally 
regarded as an enabling factor (Redlick 1979; Midlarsky et al. 1980; Nacos 1994; 
Hoffman 2013; Weimann and Brosius 1988; Bjørgo 1997; Hodgson 2002; Johnston 
2004; Rapoport 2004).  
 
2.3.2.4: Gender Relations Theory 
Gender relations theory explores the impact of socially constructed gender 
roles, gender imbalances and the effect of changing gender relations on social issues 
such as hegemony, sexual repression and violence. Gender relations theory speaks to 
at least one aspect of the current clash between conservative Muslim migrants and the 
comparatively more liberal European societies receiving them. While the former are 
accustom to much more rigidly defined gender roles, the latter have largely softened 
or eliminated such distinctions (Lewis 1990; Buvinić and Morrison 2000; Hudson and 
Den Boer 2002; Baruch 2003; Kimmel 2003). 
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2.3.2.5: The Tactical Utility of Terrorism 
An obvious outgrowth of the psycho-sociological school is the study of the 
tactical utility of terrorism as an effective means of achieving one’s goals, whether 
these be more long-term strategic goals or short-term goals such as mobilizing 
supporters, spoiling peace negotiations or taking advantage of a temporary turn of 
events (Crenshaw 1990a; Milton-Edwards 1996; Stedman 1997; Atlas and Licklider 
1999; Whittaker 2001; Kydd and Walter 2002; Ayres 2003).  
The rationale behind this approach is precisely why we cannot define terrorism 
by the deed, the actor or the actor’s ideology because the only way to evaluate the 
tactical utility of violence is to first identify the strategic objective of the actor. 
For conceptual clarity, one can imagine the gamut of lower-level analyses 
extending along a continuum with the psycho-pathological school at one extreme, the 
rational approach at the other and the tactical utility of violence approach in the 
middle.  
Of course, the use of terrorism as a tactic implies rational decision-making on 
the part of the actor. And while an understanding of the tactical utility of violence is 
necessary for the strategic theorist, the rational approach itself breaks with the 
psycho-sociological tradition altogether by assuming that all actors are utility 
maximizers who will always choose the most cost-effective solution (Enders and 
Sandler 2000; Berman 2003: Frey 2004). In other words, actors are impervious to any 
consideration beyond the pure logic of a cost-benefit analysis.  
2.3.3: The Rational Approach  
 
The rational approach (also known as the rational choice approach) assumes 
that actors possess unbounded rationality- a classical liberal economics term that 
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states actors possess (1) complete information, (2) sufficient time and intellectual 
capacity to understand that information and (3) perfect objectivity (Smith 1776).  
There are several problems with this approach. First, while it addresses the 
role of human agency, the rational approach fails to acknowledge the myriad of 
emotions, values, traditions and beliefs that influence human agency (Soule 1990; 
Waldman 2001; Stern 2003a). Second, if actors are mere utility maximizers, they 
should only engage in terrorism when it is the most cost-effective alternative available 
to them. As the examination of al Shabaab demonstrates, this is not always the case. 
A way around this second problem is to expect actors to engage in acts of 
terrorism when the expected gains exceed the expected losses, thereby, making 
terrorism appear to be more attractive than other forms of political action. I stress that 
the expected gains make terrorism appear to be more attractive than other alternatives 
because actors possess neither complete information nor perfect objectivity. This is 
known as bounded rationality which assumes that decision-makers are limited by the 
information available, their cognitive ability to understand the information available 
and the time available to make a decision (Simon 1972).  
So, the assumption of bounded rationality helps to move rational choice 
theorists back toward the center of the continuum a bit. However, the effect is 
minimal because even with the assumption of bounded rationality, the rational 
approach is centered upon a cost-benefit analysis which often times simply is not 
relevant to an actor’s decision to engage in violence. 
The strategic approach bypasses these problems altogether by tracing the 
decision to engage in violence to an actor’s strategic goals. What is more, while 
strategic theory assumes that actors act rationally, it recognizes both bounded and 
unbounded rationality (Garnet’s two levels of cold calculation and complexity). 
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Finally, the strategic approach allows us to recognize that the decision to engage in 
terrorist violence is informed by both systemic-level realities and individual-level 
factors. (Smith 1991; Neumann 2002). Individually, each of these considerations are 
essential for determining the strategic value of violence as a means to an end. 
Combined, they also go a long way in explaining why a particular actor engaged in a 
particular act of violence in the first place. 
The continent of Africa offers an excellent example. If systemic conditions 
told the whole story, then Africa should be a hotspot for terrorist activity. Groups such 
as al Shabaab should be springing up everywhere. Yet, this is not the case. Systemic 
explanations alone offer only a partial, and often misleading, understanding of the 
problem. What is worse, they lead to partial, and often counterproductive solutions. 
The same can be said of lower-level explanations. Each has its own individual 
approach which focuses on a single facet or dimension of the problem, but excludes 
other important considerations.  
A more comprehensive understanding recognizes that the states that have 
experienced terrorism in Africa tend to be targeted by a handful of the same groups. 
For example, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti all have Somali-speaking people 
within their borders. When one combines this information with the fact that al 
Shabaab is dedicated to uniting all Somali-speaking people, it suddenly becomes clear 
why al Shabaab is active in those states. In addition to enabling us to assess the 
strategic value of the group’s tactical use of violence, this awareness also provides a 
clearer understanding of the group and its strategic objectives.  
A clearer understanding of the strategic goals of those who engage in acts of 
terrorism affords us a broader understanding of their decision to use tactical violence 
in the first place. Once scholars understand what actors hope to achieve through 
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violence, they can assess the utility of that violence as a mean to an end rather than 
simply reacting to it as an end in itself. This broader understanding empowers 
everyone involved to act more strategically as well.  
 
2.4: Limitations of Theoretical Models 
 
Related to the limitations associated with systemic and lower-level 
explanations of terrorism is the limitations of the theoretical models use to test them. 
The phenomenon of terrorism is a very complex social issue. As social scientists, 
terrorism scholars utilize theoretical models which allow us to analyze data through a 
very narrow lens and examine a single facet or dimension at a time. The advantage of 
using theoretical models is that they often produce generalizable results. However, 
while theoretically beneficial, such results are not always useful in the real world 
because theoretical models tend to strip away most of the unique historical and/or 
cultural context in favor of a more uniform “cookie-cutter” approach. As Laqueur 
(1977a, p. 16) quips, the “conclusions may not be true but they are certainly stated in 
an orderly, unequivocal fashion…”  
Ideally, theory should dictate which independent variable(s) to specify within 
a given model. However, just as terrorism literature is commonly divided by the 
independent variable employed (whether systemic or lower-level), many terrorism 
scholars have become known by the literature that they are associated with and tend to 
always view the phenomenon through the same theoretical lens.  
Therefore, due to the widespread use of theoretical models that specify either 
systemic or lower-level factors as the independent variable (and the tendency of many 
scholars to rigidly adhere to either one or the other), the vast body of literature on 
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terrorism often appears to be disjointed, at odds and perhaps even a bit contentious. 
Add to this scenario the myriad of definitions and typologies of terrorism- all of 
which attempt to generalize and categorize the phenomenon (largely by stripping 
away the relevant details such as the actor’s strategic objective) - and the result is a 
very artificial process (Easson and Schmid 2011). The well-known proverb is fitting: 
“If all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.”  
But all terrorism is not the same, nor are all actors who employ terrorist 
violence the same. The social realities of terrorism defy our efforts to sort it into neat 
little packages. It is messy and arbitrary, and it rarely cooperates with our efforts to 
label and theoretically contain it.  
Take Boko Haram, for example. There is no doubt that Boko Haram leader, 
Abubakar Shekau, appears to be insane in much of the video footage released by the 
group. However, lower-level explanations are problematic. To attempt to condense 
Boko Haram in all its complexity into the madness of Shekau is paramount to 
consolidating the entire Third Reich into the despotism of Hitler. And while psycho-
sociological explanations shed considerable light on the group’s decision to employ 
violence against the government (and to a lesser extent, against Christians), they fall 
far short of offering an acceptable explanation as to why Boko Haram has been so 
intent on killing fellow Sunni Muslims. However, even a cursory understanding of the 
group’s takfiri doctrine adds considerable clarity. 
Another example is al Shabaab’s transnational attacks in Kenya and Uganda. 
To suggest that systemic factors alone are behind these retaliatory attacks is absurd. 
At the other extreme, to focus solely on a cost-benefit analysis of the tactical use of 
violence is naïve at best. A target in Uganda is by no means the most cost-effective 
option available to a group based in Somalia. Even though al Shabaab has been 
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actively recruiting and has cells operating in these countries, one has to question why 
it has gone to the considerable trouble and expense of doing so in the first place 
(Solomon 2015). 
Rather than attempting to understand militant groups such as al Shabaab and 
Boko Haram via the suspected causes of terrorism, a more productive approach would 
be to consider the strategic value of terrorist violence in relation to the groups’ 
respective long-term goals.  
Still, most practitioners continue to ignore the many other tools available to 
them in favor of their cherished hammer with which they bludgeon the facts into 
conformity. Thus, reminding us of another proverb: “If you torture the data enough, it 
will confess to anything.” And so it is. Despite the many different approaches to 
understanding terrorism which should be used to complement one another, the 
majority of literature on the subject treats these approaches as mutually exclusive and 
tends to apply one of two generic theoretical models: either a systemic-level model or 
a lower-level model.  
 
 
2.5: Conclusion 
 
In this section, I explored the limitations of both systemic and lower-level 
theories, as well as the limitations associated with the use of theoretical models. They 
are useful to a degree, as they allow analysts to parse out various facets of a 
phenomenon and examine them independently. However, this approach involves a 
trade-off, offering a measure of parsimony and greater generalizability at the expense 
of accuracy. For those who desire more accuracy, their models must be more 
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complex, and therefore, generate less generalizable results. What is more, the 
deductive process becomes increasingly more difficult as theoretical models increase 
in complexity.  
Take systemic models, for instance. In their simplest form, systemic models 
specify a systemic factor (e.g. poverty) as the independent variable and a particular 
outcome (e.g. terrorist violence) as the dependent variable. However, such simplistic 
models rarely reflect reality in its fullness. Analysts can increase the accuracy of 
systemic models by arguing that systemic forces shape preferences which, in turn, 
influence actions. Such a model would be more elaborate, specifying systemic factors 
as the independent variable and preferences as the intervening variable. However, 
even this model would be incomplete as it would fail to address the impact that 
individual and collective choices have on the world around us. To address this 
deficiency, one could add a feedback loop to include the effects of human agency, but 
even this model would be insufficient to capture the complexity of the problem for it 
would lack other necessary considerations such as individual and group perceptions of 
reality, bounded versus unbounded rationality and real versus perceived preferences 
(to name just a few).  
Put more simply, theoretical models are useful for measuring the relationship 
between a specific independent variable and the dependent variable under 
examination. However, they are not particularly useful for explaining a phenomenon 
such as terrorism in all its complexity. Nor are they the most efficient means of 
arriving at such an explanation even if they were able to produce such results. 
The strategic approach offers a much more efficient process. Tracing the 
decision to engage in terrorism to an actor’s strategic goals necessitates the inclusion 
of all these other considerations as well. Therefore, in addition to determining whether 
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the use of violence was strategic in relation to the actor’s goals, strategic theorists also 
learn a great deal about why a particular actor engaged in certain acts of violence in 
the first place.  
Perhaps systemic factors set the stage, and a grievance or social dislocation 
provides the impetus to act. It is possible that violence is the most cost-effective 
alternative available. Maybe the actor is insane or driven by moral deficiency. More 
likely, however, it is a combination of causes as in the case of al Shabaab’s vision of 
Greater Somalia.  
One thing is certain. Terrorist violence is never generic. There is always a 
unique context in which it occurs complete with actors, grievances (both imagined 
and real), emotions, ambitions, allies and enemies. Simply superimposing a generic 
theoretical model that is not theoretically informed by the data will invariably produce 
incorrect answers and lead to ineffective solutions.    
I will now examine some of the many problems encountered when attempting 
to define and theoretically contain the phenomenon of terrorism via traditionally 
accepted explanations and models. 
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Chapter Three: Welcome to the Jungle                                                                                                         
Definitions, Typologies, and Various Explanations for Terrorism 
 
 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
 This chapter addresses the many challenges faced by academics and 
policymakers alike when attempting to define terrorism, categorize it, and identify its 
causes. The title of the chapter refers to Upton Sinclair’s classic 1906 novel depicting 
the harsh economic, cultural and institutional realities of life for immigrants in 
Chicago at the turn of the century. These same realities still exist on a global scale, 
and more often than not (particularly with the growing migrant crisis), they are cited 
as potential root causes of terrorism. While it is not possible to explicitly discuss 
every definition, typology and suggested cause of terrorism within the space allotted, 
the main theoretical constructs are represented.  
 
3.2: Establishing a Working Definition of Terrorism 
 
As Smith (2005 p.29) so aptly states, “if one cannot define and articulate 
precisely the object of one’s inquiry, then plainly the effort to describe the essence of 
a particular kind of strategic practice is likely to be flawed.” Speaking of terrorism, 
Stern (2000b, pp. 12-13) states that the “definition inevitably determines the kind of 
data we collect and analyze, which in turn influences our understanding of trends and 
our prediction about the future…How we define it profoundly influences how we 
respond to it.” Therefore, it behooves us, whenever possible, to distinguish between 
terrorism and other types of violence. 
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Sánchez-Cuenca (2014) laments that scholars have collected more concrete 
knowledge about interstate war, civil war, genocide and ethnic conflict than they have 
about terrorism and blames this shortcoming on the ambiguity of the concept. 
Similarly, Wilkinson (1974) contends that there is not even a theory of political 
instability or civil violence, much less a theory of terrorism. Laqueur (1977a) goes 
even further to suggest that there is no reason to assume a connection between 
instability, civil violence and terrorism.  
Levitt (1986) compares the endeavor to arrive at a common definition to the 
quest for the Holy Grail. The past four or five decades have witnessed an explosion of 
multidisciplinary literature in terrorism studies, spanning the fields of political 
science, criminology, sociology, media studies, history, psychology and many others.  
Silke (2008) estimates that in the English language alone, a new book is 
published with terrorism in the title every six hours. Likewise, Neumann and Smith 
(2005, p. 571) observe that, particularly since September 11, 2001 (9/11), there has 
been a “flood of (often forgettable) books” on the subject. And yet very few of these 
publications agree as to what terrorism actually is. 
Silke (2014) suggests that the concept of terrorism is so difficult to define 
because the term is so politically charged. However, given the political climate 
created by the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), some basic international 
consensus concerning what constitutes terrorism versus other forms of violence would 
be extremely beneficial (Richards 2014). Unfortunately, no such consensus exists.  
By relegating non-conventional war to the ungoverned spaces outside the 
civilized conventions of inter-state warfare, strategic theorists have clung to 
antiquated battle plans and outdated realities (Sitaraman 2009; Honig 2015). 
Meanwhile, terrorism scholars and policymakers alike have been busy creating a 
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preserve for the irrational, the unpredictable and the inhuman…a jungle where only 
the most marginalized, debased and immoral creatures dwell. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will examine a representative sample of this vast body of literature. 
 
3.3: Welcome to the Jungle 
 
The explosion of multidisciplinary literature in terrorism studies, while 
positive in many respects, has also contributed to what appears at face value to be a 
very disjointed and chaotic body of literature- what Ramsay (2015, p. 212) calls a 
“cacophony of competing definitions.” For example, there are over 200 definitions of 
terrorism currently in existence in the broader terrorism literature (Jackson 2010).  
Jongman and Schmid (1988 & 2005) cite 109 definitions of terrorism obtained 
from surveying leading academics in the field. They came away with the following 
data: 83.5% of those surveyed included violence or force in their definition; 65% 
defined terror as a political act; 51% included fear or an emphasis on terror; 47% 
included threats as an act of terrorism; 41.5% considered the psychological impact of 
terrorism in their definition; 37.5% noted the difference between victims of terrorism 
and its intended target audience; 32% defined terrorism as planned, intentional, or 
otherwise organized and systematic; and 30.5% focused on methods of combat, 
tactics and strategies in their definition.  This diverse assortment of definitions is an 
example par excellence of the blind men describing an elephant. All are basically 
correct. However, they differ according to the unique quality of the incidences they 
reflect.   
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Definitions of terrorism range from the minimalist, but highly-regarded 
characterization, “terrorism is theater,” offered by Jenkins (1985) to the convoluted 
amalgamation of the 109 definitions referred to above: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method 
of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual group or 
state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby—in contrast 
to assassination—the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human targets of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively 
(representative or symbolic targets) from 
a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and violence-based 
communication processes between 
terrorists, (imperiled) victims, and main 
targets are used to manipulate the main 
target (audience(s)), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a 
target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion or propaganda is 
primarily sought (Badey 1998).17 
 
From just these two extreme examples, one can see how arduous the effort to 
define terrorism has become. The United States, for example, faced tremendous 
opposition from several European states for its labeling of Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization primarily because they insist on a more precise definition (Norton 
2007b). Clearly, some universal definition that can be deductively applied is 
desirable. However, to date such a definition remains beyond our reach.  
                                                 
17 So many scholars have cited Jongman and Schmid’s work that it has become both a scholarly 
necessity for any comprehensive literature review and redundant at the same time. See for example 
Ganor (2002); Crenshaw (2010); Chesney et al. (2011). 
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Interestingly, Ramsay (2015) argues that the scholarly debate over a lack of 
consensus on the definition of terrorism is largely exaggerated. According to Ramsay, 
the debate is “premised on unrealistic assumptions about what level of scholarly 
agreement can be expected on any key social or political concept.” Similarly, Gibbs 
(1989, p. 330) reflects that, “it is inconsistent to grant that human behavior is complex 
and then demand simple definitions of behavioral types.” 
Most analysts agree that terrorism essentially consists of at least two distinct 
components: 1) terrorism targets civilians, and 2) the goal of terrorism is to instill fear 
in a target audience. Beyond these two basic characteristics, however, there is 
widespread disagreement over the specific components to be included in the 
definition of terrorism. For example, the European Union (EU) has established a 
rather comprehensive definition of terrorism while the United Nations (UN) has not 
(Tiefenbrun 2002; Rosand 2003; Keohane 2005; Saul 2005).18  
Therefore, there is broad disagreement over what terrorism essentially is. For 
instance, terrorism is not explicitly listed as an offence under International Criminal 
Court (ICC) statutes (Sampson and Onuoha 2011). While many agree that a more 
coherent approach is needed, few are in agreement as to what that coherent approach 
should be. 
The lack of consensus over what constitutes terrorism also causes 
discrepancies regarding data collection and contradictions in the actual number of 
terrorist incidents that have occurred. A quick look at the Global Terrorism Database, 
for instance, lists Burkina Faso as having had five separate incidents of terrorism 
                                                 
18 A 20-year-old draft of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism defines terrorism but 
has not been adopted (Hmoud 2006). 
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since independence with a total of three fatalities and two injuries (GTD 2016a), and 
Ghana as having 25 separate incidents of terrorism since independence with a total of 
31 fatalities and 25 injuries (GTD 2016b). Meanwhile, Rand’s Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and Maplecroft’s Terrorism Index both record zero 
incidents for either country (RDWTI 2016; Maplecroft 2011).  
Finally, this ambiguity leaves room for discrepancies when prosecuting acts of 
terrorism. Amnesty International (AI) has criticized the United Kingdom’s Terrorism 
Act 2000; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005; Terrorism Act 2006; and Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 on the basis that all 
allow for potential human rights violations. For instance, AI claims that the definition 
of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 is too broad and potentially allows for the 
prosecution of individuals who are merely exercising their rights as protected under 
international law (AI 2010).  
One response to these issues has been growing interest in the field of critical 
terrorism studies (e.g. Chomsky and Herman 1979; George 1991; Zulaika and 
Douglass 1996 & 2008; Jackson 2005b, 2007, 2008 & 2010; Blakeley 2007; Gunning 
2007a; McDonald 2007; Booth 2008; Burke 2008; Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Jarvis 
2009; Joseph 2009; Sluka 2009; Altheide 2010; Bryan 2012; Ramsay 2015; Solomon 
2015) as well as reactions to it (e.g. Horgan & Boyle 2008; Weinberg and Eubank 
2008; Egerton 2009; Jones and Smith 2009; Stokes 2009; Lutz 2011).19  
Maintaining that terrorism is as much a social construct as it is a physical act, 
critical terrorism studies (CTS) embraces terrorism from a much broader sociological 
                                                 
19 Lutz (2011) offers a balanced discussion regarding the claims made by critical terrorism scholars 
concerning the narrow, ethnocentric, non-state actor focus of traditional terrorism studies. See also 
Jones and Smith (2009) who conclude that the critical approach is obscure and pedantic.   
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and historical perspective than most mainstream orthodox approaches. Focusing on 
the unequal distribution of power and resources and the hegemony of the West, CTS 
explores the multi-causality of terrorism in all its complexity (Hocking 1984; Jackson 
2007; Walklate and Mythen 2014; Solomon 2015).  
CTS also challenges the epistemological and ontological assumptions made by 
orthodox terrorism scholars. Namely CTS opposes the state-centric perspective of 
most mainstream approaches to terrorism studies and instead advocates the 
emancipation of people from both physical and social constraints.20 McDonald (2007) 
argues that by focusing on emancipation, CTS invites dialogue that has the potential 
to both minimize non-state actor violence as well as violent state responses.21   
Furthermore, CTS generally insists that any discussion of terrorism must be 
interdisciplinary in scope, considering specific relevant social, political, historical and 
ideological power structures in order to truly understand why actors choose violence 
over the status quo (Gunning 2007a; Booth 2008). CTS also acknowledges the 
subjective nature of knowledge and rejects the default to superficial quick fixes in lieu 
of more lasting solutions.  
Africa offers a classic example. As Solomon (2015, p. 224) observes, “the 
legitimacy of the political elites in Abuja, Bamako or Mogadishu never comes under 
scrutiny in traditional terrorism studies—rather the focus is on Boko Haram, Ansar 
Dine and Al Shabab entirely.” However quick fixes do not address the underlying 
                                                 
20 See for example, Toros and Gunning (2009) who advocate a shift from focusing on the security of 
the state to the security of individuals, families and communities. See also Herring (2008) who in 
addition to advocating for a more emancipatory practice, calls for minimizing the use of knowledge to 
maintain the hegemony of powerful elites and therefore, the status quo. 
21 Buzan (2006) criticizes the Bush administration for its zero-sum approach to counterterrorism 
because it leaves no room for dialogue or positive-sum alternatives. 
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issues, which often times have as much to do with the regime as they do the actors 
opposing it. 
Finally, CTS opposes any definition of terrorism that empowers elites, 
marginalizes women and other vulnerable populations, neglects key areas of study 
(such as states) and perpetuates Eurocentric or masculinized constructions of 
knowledge. For instance, Jackson (2005a) notes that the term, ‘war on terror’ is value-
laden and frames war as something desirable.  
As Gunning (2007b) puts it, “a critical turn within terrorism studies is 
necessary” because the orthodox approach often produces an “a-historical, de-
politicized, state-centric account of ‘terrorism’ that relies heavily on secondary 
sources and replicates knowledge that by and large reinforces the status quo.” In other 
words, CTS scrutinizes orthodox terrorism literature, the discourse it generates and 
the institutions that produce it (Joseph 2009). On the other hand, Gunning (2007b, 
p.237) also insists that CTS needs to acknowledge the expertise of many traditional 
terrorism scholars and, to be inclusive, it needs to converge with the “more rigorous 
traditional, problem-solving perspectives.” 
Richard Jackson (2010) is highly critical of the current state of terrorism 
studies, and he advocates (among other things) a less subjective definition. Observing 
that many common definitions of terrorism include components such as illegitimate 
violence committed against innocent civilians intended to terrify a group of people 
toward the advancement of a political goal, Jackson argues that the subjective nature 
of terms such as illegitimate, innocent, intended, and political perpetuate the 
conceptual incoherence so common among definitions of terrorism.  
For example, Rapoport and Alexander (1982) define terrorism as the threat or 
use of violence intended to coerce a group toward a political, religious or ideological 
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end. This definition is one of the more objective descriptions of terrorism, but still it 
possesses ambiguous terminology.  
The problem, as Jackson sees it, lays not in the definitions of terrorism but in 
the very nature of terrorism itself. Jackson argues that terrorism cannot be objectively 
defined as it is a socially constructed concept. To bolster his position, Jackson points 
to Nobel Peace Prize winners Nelson Mandela, Menachim Begin, Yassir Arafat, and 
Sean McBride—all once denounced as terrorists—as examples of the ontological 
instability of the phenomenon.  
A similar point can be made concerning the Afghan mujahidin, who were 
widely described as freedom fighters in the 1980s, but later became known as Islamic 
terrorists (Livingston 1994).22 Clearly, no group considers itself a terrorist 
organization, which is perhaps the best example of the subjectivity of the term. In the 
words of Eqbal Ahmad (2011, pp. 12-13), “The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of 
today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today.” Of course, it is 
entirely possible to be both at the same time (Smith 2011). 
 
3.3.1: Four Common Approaches to Defining Terrorism 
 
Jackson (2010) identifies four common approaches used by scholars and 
policymakers when dealing with the conceptual quagmire known as terrorism. First, 
due to the negative connotation of the term, a growing number of scholars simply 
choose not to define terrorism at all. Second, it is popular among politicians and 
security professionals to refer to terrorism as an ideology. Third, terrorism is defined 
                                                 
22 Mujahidin (sometimes transliterated as mujahideen) is plural for mujahid, meaning one who 
struggles (Bassiouni 2007). 
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according to the parties that engage in it. And finally, a majority of scholars define 
terrorism by the deed itself. In the pages that follow, I will explore these concepts 
more fully. 
 
3.3.1.1: To Define or Not to Define? 
One issue that has emerged is whether to define terrorism or not. On the one 
hand, as noted earlier, a universal definition would aid in more accurate data 
collection, more consistent reporting and a more unified body of scholarship (Schmid 
and Jongman 1988; Coady 2004; Meisels 2006). More importantly, it would require 
more accountability on the part of those engaged in it as well as their supporters 
(Ganor 2005).  
On the other hand, no actor views the violence that it commits as terrorism, 
but most actors are quick to label the violence committed by their enemies as 
terrorism (Jackson 2011; Bryan 2012; Ramsay 2015). Due to the subjectivity and 
political misuse of the term as well as close organizational and ideological ties 
between state institutions and prominent researchers- what Burnett and Whyte (2005) 
label ‘embedded expertise’- others have elected not to seek a common definition.23  
A classic example is the deliberate decision not to define terrorism by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to obtain consensus on Resolution 
1373. Rather the UNSC opted to allow each member state to arrive at its own 
definition (Rosand 2003; Saul 2005).  
                                                 
23 Representative of Burnett and Whyte’s (2005) concept of ‘embedded expertise’ is Huntington’s clash 
of civilization theory. The phrase was originally coined by Bernard Lewis (1990), and the theory 
resonated so well among various high ranking officials within the Bush administration that Lewis 
became quite influential in Washington (Frum 2003). In a 2002 article entitled, Time for Toppling, 
Lewis advocates regime change in Iraq. His advice was obviously taken seriously. 
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Interestingly, arriving at a common definition has not been the main obstacle 
for the EU. What has proven to be insurmountable are various other challenges such 
as vastly different threat perceptions among EU member states, a resistance to true 
integration of national counterterrorism efforts in favor of cooperation between them, 
and ineffective implementation of policies (Monar 2007, Coolsaet 2010). 
Finally, Ramsay (2015) suggests that terrorism should not be defined because 
such a definition could not be correctly applied to the many diverse instances of 
political violence which bear little, if any, resemblance to one another. Thus, a 
common definition would serve to blur rather than sharpen our understanding of the 
term. Furthermore, Ramsay insists that the opposite is also true. When states engage 
in tactical violence that is covert and non-conventional, it is called special operations. 
However, when non-state actors engage in the very same type of activity, it is called 
terrorism. 
 
3.3.1.2: Terrorism as an Ideology 
 
Terrorism has been around since antiquity. The Jewish Zealots employed 
terrorism against the Romans, the Thuggees engaged in acts of terrorism against the 
British in India, and it is a tactic that is still in use today. In this respect, one could say 
that terrorism changes little over time. However, scholars have noted an ideological 
cleavage in recent decades between what many refer to as “old terrorism” and “new 
terrorism.” As with any definition of terrorism, however, this categorization is also 
debated (Lesser et al. 1999; Merari 1999; Juergensmeyer 2000; Laqueur 2000; 
Duyvesteyn 2004; Kurtulus 2011; Harmon 2013).  
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Old terrorism has taken several forms throughout history (anti-imperial, anti-
colonial, etc...); however, it has typically been perpetrated toward the liberation of 
some group. Even between 1960 and 1980, transnational terrorism (which was 
primarily driven by Marxist ideology, nationalism, separatism, and nihilism) 
attempted to liberate oppressed peoples. Right-wing terrorism, on the other hand, is 
usually waged against ethnic minorities rather than on their behalf (Heitmeyer 2005). 
However with the emergence of religious extremist groups, some scholars contend 
that a “new face of terrorism” was born (Sampson and Onuoha 2011, p. 36). What is 
this new face, and what makes it so different from the terrorism that came before it?  
A major facet of new terrorism is that it is fundamentally religious in nature 
(Roy 1994). Hoffman (2013) defines a religious terrorist group as one that has 
religiously motivated goals (as opposed to politically motivated ones). Hoffman 
(1997) also points out that by 1995, religious terrorism had increased from two out of 
64 active groups to roughly 29 out of 58 active terrorist groups.   
Moreover, Hoffman (1999) draws our attention to the connection between 
religious terrorism and increased lethality. For example, between 1982 and 1989 Shia 
Islamic terrorist groups perpetrated a mere eight percent of all international terrorist 
incidents. However, in that same period they accounted for 30 percent of the 
casualties. 
White (2003) agrees that violence has substantially increased with religious 
terrorism. This marked increase in casualties associated with the rise of religious 
terrorism is evident in the fact that prior to 9/11 no single terrorist incident resulted in 
the death of more than 500 people. 
How to explain this increase in casualties associated with the rise of religious 
terrorism? Hoffman (1995) argues that the apocalyptic conviction of religious 
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terrorists makes them more focused on the life to come and, therefore, inclined to 
view human life in this world with relatively less importance.  
Wilkinson (2014) argues that terrorists in the Marxist/nationalist/separatist 
vein maintained a constituency and hence, had a vested interest in keeping casualties 
to an acceptable level. However, religiously motivated terrorist groups such as al 
Qaeda view violence against apostates as a duty, and therefore they are motivated to 
increase casualties rather than to limit them. Wilkinson supports this line of reasoning 
with examples such as al Qaeda’s Second Fatwa, issued on February 23, 1998, 
encouraging all Muslims to kill Americans wherever they can be found.  
Wilkinson differs with Hoffman however, in that; in Wilkinson’s view 
American lives can be sacrificed with little or no account while Hoffman suggests that 
the apocalyptic vision of religious terrorists casts all human life as expendable given 
the impending doom of the human race itself.  
One problem with Hoffman’s explanation is that not all so-called religious 
terrorists subscribe to an apocalyptic vision. Of those who do, many are more 
nationalist than apocalyptic which leads to contention over whether they are indeed 
fundamentally religious or secular (Juergensmeyer 1993).  
A similar problem presents itself regarding Wilkinson’s argument: not all 
scholars agree that groups such as al Qaeda are fundamentally religious in nature 
(Rapoport 1984; Benjamin and Simon 2002; Bergen 2002; Kepel 2006).24 
                                                 
24 A second problem with Wilkinson’s explanation is the substantial popular support al Qaeda enjoyed 
as a result of the sheer unpopularity of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world. Furthermore, groups such 
as al Qaeda clearly engaged in a propaganda war in an effort to win popular support (Norton 2007b; 
Leuprecht et al. 2010). This suggests that the group is concerned with a constituency of sorts, even if it 
is not an electorate in the traditional sense of the word. 
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However, the main problem as I see it, is the descriptive nature of the theories 
themselves. While both theories essentially describe the terrorism that they identify, 
each of them also ignores the strategic objective of the actors involved and focuses 
entirely on motive.  
For instance, Wilkinson conflates al Qaeda’s religious motivation with the 
duty to kill Americans. But, of course, the two have nothing to do with one another. 
Bin Laden’s justification for killing Americans is not the fatwa he issued, but the fact 
that the United States government has killed so many Muslims. The fatwa just 
represents the authority behind the proclamation (much like Bush put the authority of 
the United States’ government behind the military’s mandate in the war on terror). To 
say that al Qaeda kills Americans because it is religiously motivated to do so is 
comparable to claiming that America kills “terrorists” because they are Muslim.    
Likewise, Hoffman conflates apocalyptic vision with the fact that all life is 
expendable. However, a quick comparison of al Qaeda and Islamic State reveals 
otherwise. While both groups share the same religion and apocalyptic vision, al Qaeda 
demonstrates a basic concern for all Muslim lives (as demonstrated in bin Laden’s 
concern over Zarqawi’s slaughtering of them), and IS only demonstrates disdain for 
apostate Muslims. Neither group considers all life expendable. If they did, who would 
populate the Islamic caliphate that both groups share as a strategic objective? 
Others, such as Kurtulus (2011) and Brown and Rassler (2013), argue that 
religion is just one of several factors to consider regarding new terrorism (e.g. 
horizontal organizational structure, the desire to use weapons of mass destruction, 
indiscriminate killing of civilians, etc.).  
Sedgwick (2004) contends that the confusion over whether a group is 
fundamentally religious or secular derives from the fact that religious terrorists 
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employ political tactics toward the attainment of a more far-reaching religious goal. 
While Sedgwick’s approach purports to distinguish between a group’s strategic 
objectives and its behavior, it still does not explain why some individuals and groups 
who subscribe to a particular ideology resort to violence to achieve their ends while 
others do not. 
So is new terrorism new? Duyvesteyn (2004) argues that it is not. After 
discussing the supposedly new aspects of terrorism such as its transnational nature, 
religious ideology and indiscriminate targeting of victims, Duyvesteyn maintains that 
there are more similarities than differences between the old terrorism and the new. 
Similarly, Juergensmeyer (2003) suggests that rather than representing 
something new, religious terrorism is just old terrorism wrapped in a new package. 
Furthermore, Juergensmeyer views religious terrorism as a public act performed out 
of desperation. Religion simply offers a framework that justifies such violence, and it 
provides the symbols that communities can rally around. Juergensmeyer offers a 
compelling argument that accounts for the rise of religious terrorism in predominantly 
desperate communities.  
However, Juergensmeyer does not explain religious terrorism of the 9/11 
variety. If religious terrorism is essentially a public outcry engaged in by the 
politically marginalized and disadvantaged poor, how does one explain the 19 
educated, financially well-off young men who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks? Even 
more importantly, what explanation accounts for the numerous (and equally religious) 
desperate communities around the globe that do not engage in religious terrorism? 
Furthermore, Juergensmeyer’s explanation does not consider the religious violence 
perpetrated by groups such as Islamic State, al Shabaab and Boko Haram that are 
clearly motivated by the takfiri doctrine, not inequality. 
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The debate surrounding old and new terrorism is largely symptomatic of the 
lack of cohesion in the field of terrorism studies as a whole, as well as the inclination 
to lump disparate groups together under a common label.  
As becomes evident, the current lack of consensus within the field of terrorism 
studies makes the task of defining terrorism by ideology difficult. Even more difficult 
is the challenge of distinguishing between secular terrorism and religious terrorism, if 
such a distinction can in fact be made at all. The complex network of terrorist 
organizations with its diverse membership and cobwebs of alliances makes such an 
undertaking problematic (Arquilla et al. 1999).  
 
3.3.1.3: Terrorism Defined by the Actor 
 
This definition of terrorism is usually applied to national separatist groups and 
other non-state actors (Reinares 2005). The main justification for this approach is that 
focus on the actor results in less focus on the behavior- which tends to produce 
normative analyses (Lizardo 2015).  
The most well-known defender of this definition is the U.S. State Department. 
Title 22 of the United States Code defines domestic terrorism as “premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” 
Alternatively, the U.S. State Department defines international terrorism as “terrorism 
involving citizens or the territory of more than one country" (U.S. Department of 
State 2006). As is evident, both definitions exclude states. 
One main problem with this approach is that it has led to considerable 
selection bias. The actor-based definition largely singles out non-state actors and 
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ignores state terrorism altogether (Blakeley 2007; Jackson 2008). As Richardson 
(2005) argues, those who adhere to the actor-based definition (such as various U.S. 
administrations) largely only consider rogue states as culpable of acts of terrorism and 
even then, usually only through their terrorist clients such as with Iran and Hezbollah. 
Of course, this is completely absurd as many of the actions of the United States during 
the Cold War alone plainly demonstrate (Gareau 2004). In fact, the concept of nuclear 
deterrence was based entirely on the threat to annihilate mass numbers of non-
combatant civilians in order to restrain the actions of the two superpowers.  
While the exclusion of state terrorism from the definition naturally leads to the 
exclusion of states from the study of terrorism, other scholars (who recognize that 
states can and do commit acts of terrorism) still choose not to focus on states in their 
research. This decision may be for financial reasons as states may or may not be 
willing to finance research on their own atrocities (Hayner 2001), for theoretical 
reasons as states have considerably greater resources at their disposal (as well as 
greater accountability) and thus are difficult to compare with most non-state actors 
(Pape 2003), or for reasons of preference or academic interest (Laqueur 1977b; Ganor 
1998; Carr 2003; Black 2004; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004). 
Perhaps the most obvious reason for excluding states from the study of 
terrorism is the subjective nature of the term itself. No actor considers itself a 
“terrorist” or a “terrorist organization,” nor do their supporters. For instance, a 
significant number of Palestinians do not consider attacks against Israeli citizens to be 
terrorism because they perceive Israel as their enemy (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002).     
Given that terrorism is often defined by one’s enemies, Hülsse and Spencer 
(2008) suggest a discourse-centered perspective rather than an actor-centered 
approach. Zulaika and Douglass (1996), on the other hand, claim that society actually 
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empowers those who engage in terrorism by its discourse. Similarly, Stokes (2009) 
argues that CTS actually places too much emphasis on discourse and tends to ignore 
other geopolitical factors such as the world’s economic dependence on oil, the 
strategic value of military bases and the West’s desire to maintain hegemony by 
controlling resource-rich areas of the planet. Hence actors are important.  
Dalacoura (2009) takes a third path, suggesting that much of what is called 
state-terrorism is actually an emotive or polemic distortion of the facts. She advises us 
to build stronger links between area studies and terrorism studies to take advantage of 
the former’s area-specific expertise and the latter’s theoretical capacity. Likewise, 
English (2010) distinguishes between analytical shortcomings and real practical 
problems involving terrorism and observes that the latter are usually related to the 
former. Noting that our analytical shortcomings involve shortsightedness and an even 
shorter historical memory, English recommends that the West re-think its policies of 
ill-conceived legislative measures and overwhelming but counterproductive military 
solutions. 
Finally, the perception of Western duplicity (condemning others for the very 
acts it does itself) and ethnocentrism shared by much of the rest of world is a 
credibility problem for those who would attempt to deny, ignore or otherwise 
downplay state terrorism in the current political climate of the Global War on Terror 
(Lewis 1990; Kagan 2004; Byman 2005; Kohut 2005; Carothers 2006).  
Grosscup (2006) maintains that a problem with the actor-based definition is 
the perceived hypocrisy in labeling incidents such as the 9/11 attacks acts of terrorism 
while calling the intentional bombing of entire cities acts of war when the strategic 
objectives in both are clearly to coerce political concessions from a target 
government. Similar criticism has been raised against counterterrorism measures that 
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fail to differentiate between the innocent and the guilty and are, in fact, intended to 
terrorize an entire population into submission (Goodin 2013). This is particularly 
relevant in Africa “where counter-terrorism policies would have us defend the 
predatory African state” (Solomon 2015, p. 221). 
Still others criticize the tendency to ignore acts of terrorism committed by 
groups supported by Western states such as anti-Castro groups, the Contras, certain 
Afghan and Iraqi groups, and factions in Mozambique and Angola while focusing on 
acts of terrorism committed by groups that have not secured such support (Krasner 
1999; Acharya 2007).  
Of course, not all terrorism research ignores state actors. For instance, Stohl 
(2004) concludes that states resort to acts of terrorist violence when it is the most 
efficient and cost-effective means of governance at their disposal. Likewise, Neumann 
and Smith (2005) clearly contend that states have historically relied upon the tactic of 
terrorism when it served their purposes. 
To sum it up, the main difficulty involved in defining terrorism by the actor is 
the fact that no group considers itself to be a terrorist organization, while most groups 
are quick to label their opponents as terrorists. States can be especially culpable in this 
regard. Because of this reality, definitions of terrorism based on the actor tend to lead 
to selection bias, discrepancies in data collection and controversies over whether a 
given event was an act of terrorism or a legitimate act of war.25  
 
                                                 
25 Contentions surrounding Israel and the Intifadas are a classic example.   
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3.3.1.4: Terrorism Defined by the Deed 
 
Jenkins (1974) points out that most terrorist activity involves six basic tactical 
operations: kidnappings; hostage-takings; bombings; hijackings; armed attacks and 
assassinations. But if this is the case, how to differentiate between terrorism and other 
acts of political violence and crime? Neumann and Smith (2007, p. 16) suggest that a 
differentiation of this sort can be “highly contentious,” especially in times of 
insurgency or war. “Who defines what does or does not constitute political violence 
may itself be a deeply political act.” And, indeed, it usually is. However, several 
scholars have considered this very distinction nonetheless (Dishman 2001; Ruby 
2002b; Shelley and Picarelli 2002; Jamieson 2005).  
For instance, Dishman (2001) has taken an interesting look at the relationship 
between terrorist organizations and criminal organizations. Dishman concludes that 
while terrorists engage in illegal activities and may even collaborate with criminal 
organizations, terrorists are driven by a particular objective, not just the pursuit of 
profit. Ruby (2002b) asserts a similar point when he distinguishes between criminal 
acts that are aimed at the achievement of a personal objective and acts of terrorism 
intended to induce a government to make political concessions. 
Jamieson (2005) observes a somewhat clearer distinction between terrorism 
and organized crime. She argues that terrorists are revolutionaries bent on the 
overthrow of the existing political order, while organized crime tends to be 
conservative and seeks to maintain the status quo. However, Jamieson’s definition 
flies in the face of Neumann and Smith’s (2005) terrorism/insurgency dichotomy that 
suggests insurgents want to overthrow the existing regime whereas acts of terrorism 
are intended to coerce the regime into making certain concessions. 
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Beyond the academic interest in determining between criminal acts and acts of 
terrorism, there are practical advantages as well. Clearly distinguishing one from the 
other affords policy makers a more accurate perspective of the severity of the problem 
and allows them to properly prioritize security initiatives. For instance, between 1965 
and 2001, 64,246 Americans were murdered by other Americans in New York alone 
(Disaster Center 2010). This constitutes an annual average of 2,471 deaths for the 26 
year period leading up to and including 2001. When one compares this to the 3,031 
people killed in the 9/11 attacks, it doesn’t minimize the attacks; but it does 
demonstrate that crime is a statistically more persistent challenge than terrorism.  
In addition to the body of scholarship attempting to differentiate between 
terrorism and crime, there is also an abundance of literature that focuses on the 
similarities between terrorism and war (Hyams 1975; Silke 1996; Tilly 2004; Bergen 
2006; Neumann & Smith 2005; Morag 2006).  
For example, Tilly (2004) discusses the difficulty of distinguishing acts of 
terrorism from other types of military aggression, particularly when such aggression 
targets government security personnel and/or military actors as fundamentally part of 
a larger political/military struggle. Likewise, Silke (1996) defines terrorism as nothing 
more than a subset of guerrilla war, while Wilkinson (1974) categorizes terrorism as a 
tactic used by guerrillas. Bergen (2006) argues that the 1993 attack on the World 
Trade Center cost only a few thousand dollars while the 9/11 attacks cost roughly 
$200,000, making terrorism a very inexpensive class of warfare.  
Morag (2006) agrees that, from a purely economic standpoint, terrorism is an 
extremely cost-effective variety of warfare for the terrorists. Morag adds that, in 
addition to fear, chaos and loss of human life, terrorism can also cause substantial 
economic damage to the target community. For example, WWII cost the United States 
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roughly $296 billion (in 1941-1945 dollars). The attacks of September 11, however, 
cost the U.S. approximately $27.2 billion in direct losses and nearly $500 billion in 
indirect losses (lost income, increased insurance premiums, increased defense 
budgets, etc.). Even considering the difference between the value of money in 1941 
and 2011, the fact that an organization could cause that much damage with such a 
minimal investment of resources (19 men and $200,000) is truly staggering.  
But again, facts such as these offer no more of a consensus on the difference 
between terrorism and war than exists on the difference between terrorism and crime. 
Given the rapidly changing face of warfare today and the increasing number of non-
state actors involved in warfare, it will only become increasingly more difficult to 
parse out acts of terrorism from acts of war. Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 572) make 
this very point, and they insist that any credible theoretical framework must address 
terrorism “as a bona fide method for distributing military means to fulfill the ends of 
policy.”  
Still others distinguish between terrorism as an incident and terrorism as a 
process. For instance, Rapoport (1971) defines assassination as an incident but 
terrorism as a process as it requires a lifetime of dedication and discipline. Of course, 
one could make the opposing argument that it takes a great deal more discipline to 
become a skilled marksman than it does to strap on some explosives and push a 
plunger. 
In addition to the difficulties associated with defining terrorism by the deed 
and distinguishing it from other phenomena such as acts of war and crime, there are 
also challenges involved in analyzing acts of terrorism. For example, Kruglanski and 
Fishman (2006) contrast terrorism as a syndrome with terrorism as a tool. According 
to Kruglanski and Fishman, terrorism as a syndrome suggests that terrorists can be 
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identified apart from non-terrorists. It views terrorism as the product of certain 
personality traits or predispositions of character. To be useful, however, this 
understanding of terrorism presupposes the ability to psychologically profile 
terrorists; which as stated above, is dubious.  
Terrorism as a tool, on the other hand, views terrorism as a strategic means to 
a desired outcome. Kruglanski and Fishman suggest that approaching terrorism from 
this perspective allows experts to focus on countering the strategy of terrorism 
without having to necessarily understand the mindset of the terrorist. However, as 
Harris (2006) makes clear, the strategic approach requires an understanding of an 
actor’s preferences and therefore, an understanding of their mindset. 
When defining terrorism, it is absolutely crucial to keep in mind that terrorism 
is a strategy to be countered, and not an enemy to be defeated (Crocker 2005; 
Neumann and Smith 2005). However, Washington's GWOT and the aid it offers those 
who join it has greatly exacerbated the misuse of the term to denounce one's political 
opponents. The obvious cure for this malady is to remove the stigma associated with 
the label “terrorist.” This study adopts Neumann and Smith’s (2005) definition of 
terrorism as a military strategy aimed at three objectives:  
 
1) Disorientation: to alienate the authorities from 
their citizens, reducing the government to impotence 
in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to 
induce a target to respond in a manner that is 
favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining 
legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the 
violence to insert an alternative political message. 
 
Thus, terrorism is just one of several military means employed to obtain a 
desired political end. As such, it can be carried out in a wide variety of ways and by a 
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wide variety of actors—including states (Rummel 1998).26 As Neumann and Smith 
(2005) aptly contest, terrorism is not always a weapon of the weak, nor is it always 
employed by illegitimate actors. 
 
3.4: Traditionally Accepted Explanations of Terrorism  
 
Beyond Jackson’s four-part typology, a host of other attempts have been made 
to categorize and explain the various root causes of terrorism. For example, Taylor 
(1988) suggests a 3-part typology based on legal, moral and behavioral definitions. 
Others suggest that terrorism occurs in waves. 
The wave analogy is common among social scientists. For instance, 
democratic transition has been referred to as occurring in waves (Huntington 1993b; 
McFaul 2002). Economic cycles are also often referred to as waves (Goldstein 1985). 
Scholars have used the wave analogy to categorize periods of terrorist activity as well 
(Rapoport 2004; Shughart 2006). The most famous use of the wave analogy 
pertaining to terrorism is Rapoport’s (2004) four waves of modern terrorism typology, 
which breaks the periods of modern terrorism into four categories: (1) anarchist, (2) 
national liberation and ethnic separatism, (3) left-wing, and (4) religious.  
According to Rapoport, the terrorist organization known as Narodnaya Volya 
(People’s Will) sparked the first wave of terrorism in 1878. This “Anarchist Wave” 
spread outward from Russia to Western Europe, Asia, the Balkans, and even America. 
Also known as the “Golden Age of Assassination,” the first wave peaked in the 1890s 
                                                 
26 When compared with the terrorism perpetrated by states (Stalin killed 42 million, Mao killed 37 
million and Hitler killed 20 million), non-state actors pale in comparison (Rummel 1998).  
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but extended well into the 1920s. Rapoport includes the assassination of the American 
president, William McKinley, in September, 1901 in this wave. 
Rapoport’s second wave lasted from the 1920s to the end of WWII.  The 
terrorism in this wave was marked by anti-colonial sentiment fueled by the resentment 
of ethnic and religious groups suffering political marginalization due to the creation of 
purely artificial nation states. Arbitrary borders were drawn by the victors of WWI as 
they carved up the former Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires, and also 
the African continent and elsewhere. Ironically, Wilson’s doctrine of self-
determination was ultimately only applied to “hitherto sovereign countries conquered 
by Germany, Italy and Japan” (Hoffman 2013, p.47). Colonies such as Algeria, 
Cyprus, Cochin China, Ireland and others were excluded. As a result, nationalist and 
ethnic separatists in these regions resorted to terrorist tactics, demanding the self-
determination that they were denied by the great powers. 
Rapoport defines the third wave of terrorism as new left terrorism, which 
spanned from the end of WWII to 1979.  This wave is primarily marked by the 
terrorism of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and PLO-affiliated groups. 
It was during the third wave that international terrorism entered its heyday. 
Opposition to the war in Vietnam created strong anti-American and anti-establishment 
sentiment, causing left-wing terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades and the Red 
Army Faction in Europe, and the Weathermen in America, to wage terrorist 
campaigns consisting of bombings, hijackings and political assassinations.   
Finally, the fourth wave in Rapoport’s typology consists of religious terrorism. 
This wave began with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and continues to this day. It is 
popularly associated with the pan-Islamic vision of the late Osama bin Laden. More 
accurately, however, while bin Laden’s international franchise has definitely 
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contributed to the terrorism of this period, local and regional groups such as those in 
Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, and 
Chechnya commit the lion’s share of terrorist attacks. Given that these groups are 
local in purpose and vision, international terrorism comprises only a very small 
percentage of total terrorist activity in the fourth wave. 
Siddique’s (2009) analysis is useful here. Dividing terrorist extremism in 
Pakistan according to target of attack, Siddique creates a four-part typology of 
terrorist organizations in Pakistan. Type I organizations mainly target the West, Type 
II target Afghanistan and India, Type III target the government and security forces of 
Pakistan itself, and Type IV organizations are sectarian. Siddique found that the 
greatest focus among groups operating in Pakistan is on local and regional targets.  
 Tinnes (2010) observes a similar focus on domestic targets in her study of 
contemporary terrorist organizations throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Saudi Arabia. Tinnes notes that while the presence of American troops in this region 
has brought the far enemy much closer to home, it has also brought to light the many 
key doctrinal and strategic differences between the various local jihadist groups that 
have assembled to fight that enemy. Since most groups’ tactical and strategic goals 
are localized, these clashes have resulted in minimal cooperation between groups, if 
any. Thus, according to Tinnes, the threat of a unitary, pan-Islamic breed of terrorism 
is not as great as was perhaps once believed. 
 Hegghammer (2010) largely agrees with Tinnes. He compares and contrasts 
Saudi Islamist militant groups with a variety of other jihadist movements and 
concludes that most are locally focused and share little in common with one another. 
Hegghammer's assertion is largely supported by the fact that Salafist groups such as 
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Islamic State (IS) view the purging of Islam as the first step in global jihad. 
Therefore, the elimination of groups they view as apostate is a priority (Wood 2015).  
The ongoing differences between IS and al-Qaeda demonstrates the local and 
territorial nature of these groups. Hegghammer’s argument is also supported by al 
Shabaab and Boko Haram, which though claiming to be loyal to either (or both) al 
Qaeda and IS, have demonstrated no practical working relationship with them. 
Furthermore, both al Shabaab and Boko Haram continue to experience infighting and 
division over issues of power and control of territory and resources.      
Sedgwick (2007) builds upon Rapoport’s typology by proposing that increases 
in certain types of terrorism at certain times (Rapoport’s waves) can be explained by 
the diffusion effect. Simply put, the perception that terrorism is successful leads other 
rational individual utility maximizers to engage in it toward the achievement of their 
own goals.  
The diffusion effect offers a round-about explanation as to why both al 
Shabaab and Boko Haram have pledged allegiance to groups such as al Qaeda and 
Boko Haram yet appear to have little or no real working ties to either. The simple 
perception of affiliation may serve to translate success for one as success for the 
other. This, of course, is not the copycat effect that Sedgwick refers to, but it is related 
to it.  
The obvious question that Sedgwick’s assertion creates is if the perception that 
terrorism is successful leads rational individual utility maximizers to engage in it, why 
have such a relatively few chosen such a path?  
Both Rapoport and Sedgwick offer useful descriptive analyses of the history 
of terrorism. However, neither offers much in the way of explanatory or predictive 
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insight regarding why such a relatively small number of terrorists choose to break 
with the status quo while the majority of the population does not.  
While the question of why an actor engages in violence (i.e. motive) is not as 
important to the strategic theorist as what that actors hopes to achieve (strategic 
objective), a potential bridge between the two is the Machiavellian concept that the 
ends justify the means. No doubt, in addition to Rapoport’s waves and Sedgwick’s 
diffusion effect, the majority of actors also simply justified their violence by the ends 
that they ultimately pursued (Bassiouni 1975). Again, while strategic theory bypasses 
the need to justify violence altogether, it suggests that scholars address the question of 
how well the means serve the ends on a case by case basis rather than as a 
generalization. 
Another well-known typology is the grievance typology, which loosely 
structures the causes of terrorism into broadly defined categories such as socio-
economic marginalization, social-identity marginalization, religious fanaticism, and 
political grievance (Leuprecht et al. 2010).  
Piazza’s (2011) work, which explores the link between minority economic 
discrimination and domestic terrorism, is a prime example from the body of 
scholarship on socio-economic marginalization. Piazza concludes that poverty per se 
is not the critical factor, but economic discrimination against minority groups that 
sparks them to choose terrorism over the status quo. The terrorist violence in the 
Niger Delta fits within this category. 
A representative piece of social-identity marginalization literature is 
Brinkerhoff’s (2008) study investigating the potential for violence in socially 
marginalized diaspora groups. Brinkerhoff concludes that there is a strong potential 
risk among the most socially marginalized members of diaspora groups to join 
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terrorist organizations. Bryden (2014) suggests that al Shabaab was particularly 
successful in attracting young Somalis from the diaspora for this reason.  
Hoffman (1995) offers a compelling discussion of religious fanaticism and 
terrorism, concluding that religion offers a much more palatable justification of 
violence than any political position ever could. Beyond mere justification, however, 
Hoffman also points to the apocalyptic vision that drives some religious fanatics to 
commit violence because they prioritize eternal life over temporal human life here on 
earth.  
In the case of Islamic terrorism, however, scholars and policy makers need to 
acknowledge the difference between Islamists who seek the return of the caliphate 
(often through the democratic process) and jihadists who reject the idea of separation 
between religion and politics (Turner 2012; McCants 2015). A proper understanding 
of the religious ideology that drives al Shabaab and Boko Haram reveals much more 
about their respective political objectives (as well as why these two groups have 
chosen to employ violence to obtain them) than a mere political analysis alone. 
This is not to say that religion explains everything, however. As Heck (2007, 
p.8) asks, “is it fair to blame 1.4 billion Muslims and more than 200 million Arabs for 
the malevolent handiwork of an ideologically deviant few?” The answer is, of course 
not. Not only is it unfair, it makes for poor scholarship as well. 
For example, it was political grievances that sparked Boko Haram’s terrorist 
violence in the first place. One of many resources linking terrorism to political 
grievances is McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) who conclude that political 
radicalization stems more from the perceived political grievances of groups than from 
individual political dissatisfaction. 
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There is an abundance of literature linking a myriad of grievances to acts of 
violence and terrorism. Stern (2003b), for example, explores the various grievances 
that induce individuals to choose terrorism over the status quo such as poverty, 
unemployment, lack of better opportunities, exploitation, etc. Stern also reveals the 
disillusionment faced by many young recruits as they become aware of the practical 
realities of militant organizations such as ambition, corruption and the criminal 
activities that fund them and allow them to thrive.  
The benefit of the grievance typology is that it attempts to identify a reason for 
discontent. In this respect it is a bit more explanatory than Rapoport’s wave typology 
which descriptively divides terrorist violence into four dispensations. However, one 
would naturally assume that most individuals who choose to engage in acts of 
violence have compelling reasons to do so. Critical to any analysis of terrorist 
violence is not necessarily the perpetrators’ grievance, but identifying the strategic 
objective and assessing whether violence offers a sound strategy to address it. 
The main problem with the typologies listed above is that they employ 
theoretical models that artificially separate terrorist violence into very broad 
classifications that are highly oversimplified. The real world is never so neatly 
compartmentalized. Therefore, pinpointing specific root causes of terrorism remains 
an elusive endeavor.  
As Richardson (2007) puts it, there are two reasons why terrorism is so 
difficult to explain. One, there are so many terrorists, and two, there are so few 
terrorists. On the one hand, individuals who engage in terrorism come from such 
diverse backgrounds that it is difficult to generalize about them with any assurance of 
accuracy.  
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There are scholars who maintain that those who engage in terrorist violence 
tend to be younger (Russell and Miller 1977; Combs and Hall 2003), poorer (Kepel 
1985), and less educated (Bergen and Pandey 2005) today than they were in the 
1960s. However, even basic demographic generalizations such as these require, at 
minimum, a common agreement on what constitutes an act of terrorism.  
In Chapter Two, I introduced systemic and lower levels of analysis. In the next 
section I will slice the data somewhat differently to look at four broad categories of 
factors that are often cited as causes of terrorism: structural, cultural, institutional and 
rational.  
 
3.4.1: Structural Explanations of Terrorism 
 
Viewing individuals as embedded in socio-economic forces, structuralists look 
for causal mechanisms in large socio-economic forces rather than in the preferences 
of individual actors (Hay and Wincott 1998). By far, the most common alleged 
structural cause of terrorism is poverty. And while this claim resonates intuitively 
with most reasonable individuals, it does not hold up empirically.  
For instance, Krueger and Malečková (2003) explore poverty and poor 
education as root causes of terrorism among Palestinian suicide bombers and find 
that, not only were the bombers themselves from diverse socio-economic and 
educational backgrounds, but those who expressed support for suicide bombings as a 
response to Israeli occupation were as well.  
Ahmed (2005) supports this conclusion by observing that the overall sense of 
humiliation, bitterness and anger among Palestinians transcends income, education 
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and social class. Ahmed contends that suicide bombings are largely viewed by the 
Palestinian public as justified given the barbaric conditions of Israeli occupation.  
Krueger and Laitin (2008) consider poverty and civil liberties as root causes of 
terrorism. They conclude that in states with equal civil liberties, poor states do not 
experience higher rates of terrorism than wealthy states. Rather they suggest that 
political repression generates terrorists who then, in the case of suicide bombers, often 
target wealthier and more democratic states.  
Abadie (2004) argues that poverty is not a statistically significant variable but 
level of political freedom is. Abadie also points out that domestic terrorism continues 
to account for the lion's share of attacks. For example, in 2003 international terrorism 
constituted only 240 out of a total of 1,536 terrorist attacks. Of course, how one 
defines terrorism is critical in this type of data collection.  
Piazza (2006) looks at ninety-six countries between 1986 and 2002 and finds 
that, rather than poor economic development, “social cleavage theory” offers a better 
explanation of terrorism.27 Piazza uses the theory to measure the level of social 
division in a society. The greater the number of political parties, the more social 
division and hence, the more likely political violence will be.  
In another study, while conceding that there is no evidence of a direct causal 
relationship between structural factors and individual acts of terrorism, Piazza (2010) 
notes a correlation between an overall reduction in global poverty and a 
corresponding reduction in global terrorism. Piazza therefore suggests that there is a 
positive correlation between poverty and terrorism at the systemic level even if no 
                                                 
27 Social Cleavage Theory proposes that political parties emerge out of basic social cleavages in society 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
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evidence can be found to consistently link individual acts of terrorism to poverty at 
the sub-systemic level. Similarly, Robison, Crenshaw and Jenkins (2006) find a 
positive correlation between increased foreign direct investment and a long-term 
overall reduction in terrorism.  
Berman’s model (2003) also suggests that systemic poverty and economic 
inefficiency play indirect roles in that they allow terrorist organizations to win the 
allegiance and loyalty of their members through the provision of economic benefits 
that would not otherwise be available. The poorer the market opportunities and 
government provision of public goods, the easier it is for terrorist organizations to 
secure such loyalty.  
According to Berman, individual and collective loyalty to such groups in 
exchange for economic benefits is rational. And while groups that benefit from such 
loyalty may then attract other members who are not desperate for economic benefits 
(e.g. the nineteen hijackers in the 9/11 attacks), these latter members constitute the 
elite among the group rather than the rank and file. They are the exception rather than 
the rule. As Berman points out, al Qaeda would hardly send illiterate members to 
flight school in America when it had more qualified individuals at its disposal. 
Therefore, according to Berman’s model, the single most effective way to eliminate 
popular support for terrorism is to improve the economic opportunities of local 
populations so as to reduce their dependence on the benefits provided by terrorist 
organizations.  
Berman’s model is also applicable to wealthier states with rapid population 
growth such as Saudi Arabia. Though wealthy now, the population in Saudi Arabia is 
projected to increase from its current level of approximately 27 million to over 41 
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million in 2025 and 60 million in 2050, making its abundant resources increasingly 
scarce (Ehrlich and Liu 2002).  
While both al Shabaab and Boko Haram have benefitted from poor economic 
conditions by recruiting from among the desperate and unemployed, neither group 
would likely elect to lay down their arms should economic realities improve in their 
respective regions as their strategic goals are focused upon the implementation of 
sharia rather than a larger slice of the economic pie. 
Utilizing a more localized group level of analysis, other scholars have noted a 
correlation between economic downturns and increases in terrorism (Angrist 1995; 
Honaker 2004; Blomberg et al. 2004). For example, Angrist (1995) notes that the 
early 1980s witnessed a significant rise in education among Palestinians. However, 
economic downturns also caused a significant increase in unemployment across socio-
economic levels. High levels of unemployment led to dissatisfaction and social unrest. 
Is it a mere coincidence that this economic downturn coincided with the First 
Intifada? Honaker (2004) draws a similar correlation between unemployment and 
terrorism in Northern Ireland. Ehrlich and Liu (2002) and Urdal (2006) find a positive 
correlation between population growth and terrorism, particularly when increasing 
numbers of unemployed youth are involved. Finally, Bowman (2008) reports that the 
U.S. military paid former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) detainees roughly $200 per month 
after their release in an effort to deter them from returning to AQI. Most were young, 
unemployed males who accepted jobs with AQI purely for the money rather than for 
political ideology or religious conviction.  
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) utilizes an individual level of analysis to parse out 
the various causal factors involved in this complex phenomenon. While agreeing that 
economic factors play a significant role, Bueno de Mesquita argues a more complex 
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relationship than the standard linear correlation. Acknowledging that individuals on 
the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder are more inclined to volunteer for 
terrorist missions—particularly those individuals harboring discontent towards the 
government—Bueno de Mesquita argues that terrorist organizations only want to 
recruit the most qualified individuals. When economic contractions increase 
unemployment, terrorist organizations have a more qualified pool of volunteers to 
choose from.  
This inexpensive pool of highly-qualified candidates leads to an increased 
number of attacks until either (A) the shock value reaches a point of diminishing 
returns, or (B) government counter-measures drive the cost of attacks to prohibitively 
expensive levels. But harsh government crackdowns also often generate popular 
support which offsets the cost of future attacks through a fresh surplus of donations 
and recruits, and the cycle continues.  
Hence according to Bueno de Mesquita, it is not poverty per se that drives 
terrorism, or even economic inequality, but economic downturns that create a surplus 
of highly qualified individuals who are angry enough and desperate enough to view 
terrorism as a viable alternative to the status quo. The question remains, however, 
how does one explain terrorism during periods of economic boom? 
 As this section demonstrates, the structural approach to explaining terrorism 
focuses on economic conditions that are largely beyond the control of individual 
decision makers. These conditions no doubt escalate frustration and increase 
desperation for the multitudes they affect. Economic conditions also directly affect the 
choices individuals make by limiting the alternatives available to them. Finally, those 
who engage in terrorism may use economic realities to justify their actions or take 
advantage of desperate economic conditions to further their own agenda as otherwise 
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law-abiding citizens may be tempted to pursue illicit alternatives during cycles of 
economic downturn. However, economic conditions alone do not fully explain why 
some choose terrorism over the status quo while others do not. I will now examine the 
cultural approach to understanding terrorism. 
 
3.4.2: Cultural Explanations of Terrorism 
 
Culturalists strive to understand the social context from which values, norms, 
and identities that govern human behavior emerge. Therefore, culturalists argue that 
an understanding of political processes first requires an understanding of cultural 
factors (Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965; 
Dawson et al. 1969).  
Culturally speaking, the two largest common denominators shared by people 
are language and religion. While language has been a source of conflict in isolated 
incidents (such as the war between East and West Pakistan where Urdu was 
proclaimed as the national language despite the prevalence of Bengali in the East), 
religion has played a more vital (if not a central) role in armed conflict throughout 
history (Fox and Sandler 2005; Silberman et al. 2005: McCormick 2006) 
Culturalists suggest that religion can sometimes be absolute and unyielding, 
and it is often in these occasions that religious convictions (particularly those 
associated with monotheistic religions) can actually spark violence when confronted 
with contrary belief systems or practices.28  
                                                 
28 In the cases of al Shabaab and Boko Haram (and indeed, many other jihadist groups), one obvious 
explanation for the increase in violence is the strong belief that democratic forms of government are 
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When dealing with terrorism, culturalists search for social conventions that 
might serve to institute violence as a culturally viable option (e.g. Silverman 2002; 
Juergensmeyer 2003; Arena and Arrigo 2006). With the increasing prevalence of 
Islamic terrorism over the past several decades, there has been a surge of interest in 
Islamic culture in the search for cultural explanations of the phenomena (e.g. Omar 
2003; Milton-Edwards 2006; Etienne 2007).  
Since September 11, 2001, the body of literature on religion's relationship to 
terrorism has grown exponentially (e.g. Bergen 2002; Kulwicki 2002; Armanios 
2003; Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003b; Kepel 2004; Roy 2004; Kalu et al 2005; 
McCormack 2005; Bergen and Pandey 2006; Ahmed 2006; Haynes 2007 & 2009; 
Venkatraman 2007; Yates 2007; Selengut 2008; Hegghammer 2010; Kean 2011; 
Sageman 2011).29    
Fukuyama (2001), for example, suggests that perhaps the Muslim world is 
more prone to terrorism than other regions of the world because of the great 
disappointment it has experienced in falling so far behind the Western world.  
Taylor (1988) asserts that as far back as the sixteenth century, Muslims faced 
two choices: either embrace those aspects of the West that made it so successful or 
return to the pure faith of the past. According to Taylor, adherents of the two 
alternatives have been at odds ever since. In more contemporary times, the twentieth 
century witnessed the rise of secular nationalism and the neo-fundamentalist ideology 
that opposed it.30  
                                                 
haram (prohibited) under sharia (Schacht 1959). Thus, when this foreign and (in their eyes) unlawful 
institution is imposed upon them, they rebel.   
29
 For an excellent bibliography see, Haynes (2005). 
30Ajami (1978) offers an excellent discussion of secular nationalism and pan-Arabism in the wake of 
the Six Day War.  
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Payne (1989, p. 121) insists that “violence has been a central, accepted 
element, both in Muslim teaching and in the historical conduct of the religion. For 
over a thousand years, the religious bias in the Middle Eastern Culture has not been to 
discourage the use of force, but to encourage it.”  
Unfortunately, moral majority leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Franklin Graham 
and Pat Robertson advance this misguided view of Islam by asserting that Islam itself 
is inherently evil, and therefore, the source of modern-day jihadist violence. However, 
this position is fairly easily discredited for anyone who wishes to look at the facts 
objectively.  
Like all religions, Islam can be a strong unifying force. But of course, not all 
variants of Islam are the same, so Islam can also be a powerful dividing force as well. 
However, this doesn’t make it evil. Nor is all so-called “Islamic terrorism” motivated 
by religion (Esposito 2003).  
Kepel (2004) contends that this phenomenon is largely divided between the 
nationalist Islamist political parties in predominantly Muslim states and the 
internationally-oriented Islamists living elsewhere. According to Kepel, most Islamist 
movements in predominantly Muslim states have adopted a more nationalist agenda 
since the end of the Cold War, and therefore religiously-motivated violence in these 
regions has increasingly been replaced by more politically-motivated violence. In 
contrast, Kepel insists that religiously-motivated Islamist violence has increased over 
the same period in the Diaspora, and particularly in the West, where some ten million 
Muslims reside in Western Europe alone.   
Roy (2004) attributes this increase in politically-motivated violence in 
predominantly Muslim states to the highly politicized terrorism of al Qaeda, whose 
individual conception of jihad breaks with the more traditional notion of jihad as a 
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collective, and primarily defensive, duty.31  Roy also points to the increasingly 
individual nature of Islam in the West. Roy maintains that while Western Islam may 
not be as highly politicized as its Middle-Eastern counterpart, its increasing focus on 
individualism lends itself to radical views.  
Venkatraman (2007) argues that according to the Quranic principle of ijtihad, 
Muslims are free to interpret Islam individually and choose their own Islamic 
practices provided they seek the will of God within an Islamic community. So 
whether it is due to the politicization of Islam in predominantly Muslim states or the 
influence of individualism in the West, many scholars agree that there has been both 
an increase in politically-motivated violence in Muslim states and an increase in 
religiously-motivated Islamist violence in the West.32  
An excellent example is al Shabaab which initially opposed Ethiopian military 
forces, the Somali forces Ethiopia propped up, and any outside military forces that 
assisted them. While the group espouses a religious ideology, al Shabaab’s fight was 
at one time primarily a nationalist cause- though it has successfully drawn Muslims 
from other states around the world to fight the “infidel crusaders” who have invaded 
Muslim soil (Vidino, et. al. 2010). 
Others consider the practice of honor killing as a culturally-specific social 
convention that institutes violence (Kulwicki 2002). While this practice is horrific, it 
in no way represents an exclusively Muslim disposition towards violence as domestic 
violence against women is a global problem (Watts and Zimmerman 2002).  
                                                 
31 For more on the individual conception of jihad, see Lahoud (2010). 
32 Selengut (2008) offers a comprehensive treatment of the rise of religious violence. 
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Examples of religiously motivated violence abound from the Christian 
Crusades to Muslim/Hindu conflicts and even Buddhist/Hindu conflicts. Scholars can 
hardly claim any one religion as the exclusive domain of violence, nor can they 
conclusively demonstrate that any religion causes violence (Martin 1997).  
Furthermore, religious violence in any society is almost always accompanied by some 
level of ethno-political tension and/or struggle over limited resources, making this 
type of analysis particularly problematic (Barber 2001).  
Despite the increase in Islamic terrorism, it is extremely difficult to 
demonstrate a direct correlation between the religion of Islam and extremist violence. 
Pearce (2005) concludes that no religion displays a significantly higher or lower 
propensity to violence than the others. Rather than attribute terrorism to any one 
religion, Wade and Reiter (2007) find a positive correlation between the number of 
religious minority groups in a given state and its overall level of terrorist activity. 
Thus, the search for culturally-specific causes of terrorism remains elusive. 
 In addition to citing specific cultures as prone to terrorist violence, others 
maintain that cultural differences produce conflict. The most famous of these is 
Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory which maintains that, since the 
end of the Cold War, intrastate war along cultural lines has supplanted interstate war 
across state borders. While his general observation concerning the rise of intrastate 
war is accurate, Huntington's theory has been attacked for a number of reasons (Perry 
2002). Of primary concern to most critics is Huntington's focus on cultural factors 
over other considerations such as socio-economic and geopolitical realities (e.g. 
Appleby 1999; Gopin 2000; Laue 2000; Haynes 2003; Juergensmeyer 2003).  
Turner (1993, p. 412) warned that by attempting to equate culture with clearly 
delineated boundaries, scholars “risk essentializing the idea of culture as the property 
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of an ethnic group or race.” Similarly, Benhabib (2002, p.5) warns against such a 
reductionist approach to understanding culture. She reasons that the attempt to 
conceive of culture as a “clearly delineable whole” is derived from the desire to not 
only understand outgroups, but also to control them. Benhabib contrasts this approach 
with how most people view their own culture, not as an undisputed reality, but more 
as “a horizon that recedes each time one approaches it.” From this perspective, culture 
is an elusive concept and one that cannot be applied en masse to rigidly defined 
groups of people. 
 Huntington’s concept of “cleft” countries is particularly salient to a cultural 
analysis of conflict in states such as Nigeria and Sudan (during its civil war years). 
Huntington defines cleft countries as states divided between civilizations. Conflict 
occurs when those belonging to one civilization attempt to impose their norms, mores 
and laws upon those belonging to another. According to Huntington's theory, the civil 
war in Sudan between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South could be 
attributed to Sudan's status as a cleft state. Likewise conflict in Nigeria could arguably 
be viewed as a result of tensions between its Christian South and Muslim North. 
 However, even in religiously dichotomous states such as Nigeria and the 
former state of Sudan, such simplistic explanations prove insufficient. Closer analysis 
reveals that in both states the North/South divide is just the tip of the iceberg. Each 
state has also witnessed a number of struggles between groups of very similar cultural 
and religious identities.  
 In Nigeria for example, local groups have clashed with each other over control 
of resources for decades. Also during the civil war in Sudan, Southerners battled each 
other just as fiercely as they fought the Northern forces over the question of 
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unification or independence. Therefore, cultural differentiation and ethno-religious 
fragmentation are not always the cause of conflict.  
 Nor does the absence of such diversity guarantee peace.  For example, serious 
conflict has plagued Somalia- a largely ethnically and religiously homogenous state.33 
One would be hard-pressed to explain Somalia's inter-clan conflict and interstate 
border disputes via Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory (or via Wade and 
Reiter’s findings for that matter).  
In fact, there is increasing skepticism concerning whether we can even 
consider discrete ethnic groups as the basic building blocks of society. There has also 
been growing attention on the institutional origins of ethnicity and ethnic violence 
(Lieberman and Singh 2010 & 2012). A more satisfactory explanation suggests that 
stable effective governance has more to do with peace than an absence of cultural 
diversity (Zubaida, 1989). 
If ethnic or religious fragmentation were a significant cause of conflict, one 
could expect to see more consistent results. But the fact is, Angola, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo and 
Uganda all score high for either ethnic fragmentation, religious fragmentation or both 
(Lane and Ersson 1994). Yet, all have experienced very mixed results concerning 
violence within their borders.  
Therefore, given that there has always been−and there continues to be−conflict 
and violence in every culture (both across cultural lines and within them), cultural 
                                                 
33 This is not to claim that there are not linguistic and other basic differences that diversify the Somali 
population. For example, see Solomon (2015). 
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explanations alone offer limited understanding as to why acts of terrorism occur in 
one place and not in another.  
 Finally, any discussion of a correlation between cultural factors and terrorism 
needs to address the hegemony of discourse contested by critical thinkers such as Said 
(1978, 1985, 1997), who argue that Orientalism was originally devised to establish 
European imperial domination, and despite its claims of neutrality, the Academy 
continues to perpetuate a mere caricature of the East as inferior to the West rather 
than a true representation of the East as simply different from the West (see also 
Derrida 1974; Deleuze and Guattari 1977; Foucault 1980; Bhabha 1983; Fairclough 
2013).34  
As an American who has lived and taught in the Middle East, Southeast Asia 
and Central Asia, I can attest from my own experience that many university students 
in these regions have been fed a steady diet of neo-Orientalism from their youth. 
Thus, many readily accept an international hierarchy that places them at the very 
bottom. Western scholars are no less susceptible. Indeed, as fish in water, Westerners 
are often so immersed in neo-Orientalism that many hardly notice its existence. Given 
this vulnerability, scholars need to be particularly careful when applying cultural 
explanations to terrorism as they are often laden with stereotypes on the one hand and 
a slew of unanswered questions on the other. In the next section, I will discuss 
institutional explanations of terrorism. 
 
                                                 
34 Consider Said’s academic (and what appeared to be personal) tit for tat with Bernard Lewis (e.g. 
Said 1976; Lewis 1982). 
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3.4.3: Institutional Explanations of Terrorism 
 
Institutionalism asserts that institutions shape both the preferences of 
individuals as well as the acceptable means for attaining those preferences 
(Wildavsky 1987; Koelble 1995; Bowles 1998; 1999; Persson 2002). Institutions can 
be formal such as a state's laws, regulations, educational systems, economic policies 
and government (Stiglitz 2000; Bratton 2007). Institutions can also be informal 
arrangements of all kinds to include corruption, clientelism or something as simple as 
people allowing pregnant women and the elderly to go to the front of the line at the 
bank (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2010). As is the case with other 
systemic factors, institutional explanations for terrorism abound.  
 
3.4.3.1: Political Explanations for Terrorism 
There is broad disagreement concerning which type of political regime is more 
likely to experience terrorism. Some studies link terrorism to democracies while 
others tie it to authoritarian regimes. One view is that due to increased political 
representation and participation, democracies are less likely to spawn terrorism than 
authoritarian regimes (Schmid 1992; Gurr 2003).  
Others conclude just the opposite, however, arguing that political rights and 
civil liberties are positively correlated with terrorism (Ross 1993; Eubank and 
Weinberg 2001). Drakos and Gofas (2006) argue that non-democracies likely only 
appear to experience fewer terrorist incidents due to underreporting. 
Eyerman (1998) finds that new democracies are especially prone to terrorism 
because they reduce both the cost and risk, while Li (2005) claims that democracies 
with proportional representation experience fewer incidents of terrorism than 
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democracies with majoritarian or mixed electoral systems because proportional 
representation generally creates more political space for new parties than majoritarian 
or mixed electoral systems. Li's conclusion largely contradicts Piazza's (2008) 
findings (mentioned above) that tie terrorism to social cleavages. 
 Data from empirical studies also suggest an inverted U-shaped correlation 
between terrorism and both authoritarian states and democracies (Abadie 2004). This 
correlation is known as the democracy curve. It is premised upon the idea that while 
authoritarian states are largely able to crush internal threats, democracies tend to 
experience less threats to begin with. This is not to say that authoritarian states 
effectively deal with all forms of terrorism or that democracies never face the scourge 
of terrorism, for one would have to ignore a myriad of realities to make such an 
assumption (e.g. the Chechen Wars, the Uighurs, 9/11 and the resulting decade-plus 
GWOT).  
 Rather, the democracy curve simply notes an increasingly negative correlation 
with terrorism the further a state advances toward either democracy or 
authoritarianism. This leads some to conclude a positive correlation between semi-
democracies and terrorism due to a lack of basic civil liberties such as freedom of the 
press (Sawyer 2005) and transparent legal systems (Kreimer 2007).   
Beyond regime type, other institutional phenomena that are purported to open 
the door for terrorist influences are poorly institutionalized party systems and endemic 
corruption. In Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah has been able to take advantage of the 
fact that there are few institutionalized political parties in the country (Norton 2007a). 
In contrast, the endemic corruption of the highly institutionalized Fatah opened 
political space for Hamas in Gaza (Milton-Edwards 2007). But again, poorly 
institutionalized party systems and endemic corruption merely represent opportunities 
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for terrorists to exploit (Shelley 2004; Shinn 2004). Neither demonstrates a consistent 
correlation with terrorism. In fact, many developing states possess both phenomena 
without experiencing a high incidence of terrorism (Diamond 2002). 
Mohammad (2005) looks instead at a regime’s overall legitimacy as the 
primary factor for terrorism among Arab states in the Middle East. After testing for 
other factors such as literacy rates, socio-economic development, regime type and 
popular support for Islamic extremism, Mohammad concludes that none contribute to 
violence as consistently as the perception that a regime is propped up by the West and 
that it is supportive of American foreign policy. Similarly, Savun and Phillips (2009) 
maintain that states are more likely to experience terrorism depending upon the type 
of foreign policy they pursue. The more isolationist the foreign policy, the lower the 
probability that a state will experience terrorist violence. 
 
3.4.3.2: The Mass Media as an Explanation for Terrorism 
The mass media is another institution that has been linked to terrorism as it 
sometimes serves the interests of terrorists (Nacos 2016). Exposure through the mass 
media is perhaps the most critical asset terrorists enjoy when it comes to generating 
popular support and attempting to propagate their ideology (Hoffman 2013). Without 
media coverage, terrorists would fail to publicize their actions beyond the immediate 
victims. Without an audience, terrorism is largely reduced to acts of random violence 
(Nacos 2007).  
Take the recent media coverage of the Islamic State (IS) for instance. The 
group is, without doubt, a serious threat. However, IS has been active since 1999 
under a variety of names with little global attention since the death of al-Zarqawi. 
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(Zelin 2014). The recent events concerning IS are no doubt newsworthy, however, 
one also has to take into account the tremendous benefit that IS gains from the added 
publicity it receives (Giroux 2016).  
Wilkinson (1997) asserts that in democracies, where freedom of the press is 
supposed to be upheld, a symbiotic relationship often develops between the terrorist 
organizations seeking publicity and the media outlets that profit from sensational 
news stories. This is offered as one reason why terrorism thrives in democracies more 
so than in authoritarian states.  
Wieviorka (1988) denies the existence of such a simplistic, straightforward 
relationship, pointing to instances where terrorist organizations have targeted 
journalists and news outlets.35 And while democratic governments are usually slow to 
resort to censorship, many have enacted anti-complicity statutes that prohibit media 
organizations from lending support to terrorist organizations through publicity. 
Others point out that such publicity has a mixed record regarding the amount 
of popular support it actually generates (Murphy et al. 2004). Not only do mass media 
outlets publicize the terrorists’ cause, they also expose the atrocities committed by the 
group and such “publicity” often backfires. For instance, Funes (1998) examines how 
media coverage of the attacks perpetrated by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna “Basque 
Homeland and Liberty” resulted in a significant loss of popular support for the group.   
Some scholars argue that terrorists do not need their actions to be publicized 
as government reactions to terrorist attacks are often enough to incite public outrage. 
For instance, Bloom (2004) discusses how the media coverage of the harsh retaliatory 
                                                 
35 Interestingly enough, IS has recently threatened Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, and Twitter 
CEO, Jack Dorsey, for their efforts to deny the group and its affiliates space on their respective social 
media sites (Moore 2016). 
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crack-downs initiated by the Israeli government and military forces has served to 
outrage the Palestinian public, thus generating widespread popular support for 
Palestinian terrorist activity. 
So while terrorist organizations attempt to use the mass media to raise 
awareness and popular support, regimes attempt to publicize the criminality of 
terrorism and thereby delegitimize the group in the eyes of the public. Both, however, 
run the risk of losing public support for their use of violence.  
 
3.4.3.3: Madaris as an Explanation for Terrorism 
Another debatable issue surrounding institutions is that of madaris (plural for 
madrasa) and the radicalization of school-age children. For example, the 9-11 
Commission describes madaris as “incubators of violent extremism” (Commission 
2004, p. 367). However, this depiction is inflammatory and not entirely accurate. 
“Madrasa” is simply the Arabic word for “school.” Many madaris serve the 
impoverished, and as charitable organizations, prove to be harmless. In Somalia, for 
example, the formal education system ceased to function after 1991. Privately funded 
madaris were largely the only option available for low-income Somali children 
(Botha and Abdile 2014).  
Much of the concern over the perceived link between madaris and Islamic 
terrorism stems from the fact that as many as 10,000 madaris in Pakistan, and 
thousands more around the world, are funded by Saudi Wahhabi groups (Armanios 
2003; Benoliel 2003). However, emphasis needs to be placed on the quality and type 
of the education delivered rather than simply the source of the funding (Botha and 
Abdile 2014). 
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Since the 9/11 attacks, madaris have received a disproportionate amount of 
attention among Westerners as training centers for radical jihadists. However, 
Siddique (2009) argues that there are only very limited grounds for this conception. 
While it is true that madaris are known to offer religious education, by and large 
according to Siddique, militant madaris are the exception rather than the rule. 
Siddique concludes that to the extent that madaris are militant at all; they are much 
more likely to support local and regional extremism rather than international.36 
Bolstering Siddique’s finding is the interesting fact that none of the nineteen 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were educated at madaris. 
Similarly, Bergen and Pandey (2006) examine the profiles of 79 terrorists 
involved in the five worst anti-West terrorist attacks in recent history (the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks against the two U.S. embassies in Africa, 
9/11, the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, and the 2005 London bombings). They 
conclude that, unlike the average terrorist engaged in attacks against domestic/cross-
border targets, the average global terrorist is highly educated. Bergen and Pandey 
further determine that the level of technological sophistication required to orchestrate 
a major terrorist attack against a Western target is simply not supported in most 
madaris. 
Puri (2010) also concludes that militant madaris in Pakistan play a relatively 
minor role in the overall equation of cause and effect. Not only are a very small 
proportion of Pakistani students exposed to such madaris, like Bergen and Pandey, 
Puri points out that those who are exposed to militant madaris receive an education 
                                                 
36Siddique’s four-part typology of terrorist organizations in Pakistan is discussed more fully later in 
this chapter under Typologies of Terrorism.  
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that poorly equips them with the skills necessary to engage in high-tech terrorist 
attacks.  
Stern (2000a) insists, however, that the relatively few militant madaris in 
Pakistan were encouraging their students to engage in jihad and sending them to jihad 
training camps. Likewise, Magouirk et al. (2008) report that madaris proved an 
integral part of the equation in securing recruits for Jemaah Islamiyyah.  
While many madaris around the world are funded by Saudi sources, Coulson 
(2004) argues that the real blame for the existence of militant madaris in Afghanistan 
is to be laid at the feet of the Reagan administration which invested some $51 million 
towards text books that incite religious jihad against Soviet troops. These textbooks 
depicted extremely violent “lessons” such as math problems asking students to 
calculate the length of time it will take a mujahid’s bullet to reach a Russian’s head. 
This covert plan to indoctrinate, fund, and arm the mujahidin was part of the larger 
$3.2 billion Operation Cyclone (Davis 2002). After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the 
Taliban movement emerged and was mainly comprised of students (the word 
“taliban” is Pashto for “students”) influenced and trained by the very mujahidin the 
U.S. backed in the 1980s. 
Mazzetti et al. (2010) also suggest that the Pakistani government, which 
continues to receive over $1 billion per year from Washington for its part in the 
GWOT, also funds certain madaris toward similar ends. But here again, the focus is 
on local and regional rather than international terrorism.  
The perception of madaris as training centers for radical jihadists, while 
meriting consideration, is at best misguided and incomplete, and at worst blatant 
propaganda. The alarm generated over madaris largely stems from the funding they 
receive by Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia. However, as noted above, U.S. funding 
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has been linked to militant madaris as well. While some madaris may incite hatred, 
very few students who attend such madaris will ever obtain the technical ability and 
financial means necessary to orchestrate a terrorist attack against the West.  
One can see that, as with structural and cultural factors, institutional 
explanations alone prove incomplete. While institutions may shape both the 
preferences of terrorists and the opportunities available for them to exploit, they do 
not explain why only a tiny percentage of the population within a given institutional 
design choose to engage in or support acts of terrorism. Nor do they further our 
understanding of whether such actors are likely to achieve their strategic objectives 
through violence.    
Finally, combinations of systemic causes have also been cited as the culprits 
behind terrorism. However, the sheer randomness of terrorism suggests that 
something much more specific also needs to be considered. Hence, I will now explore 
the role of rational explanations as a potential key to understanding this phenomenon. 
 
3.4.4: Rational Explanations of Terrorism 
 
Rational choice scholars analyze individual strategic interactions as the 
primary causal factors of political outcomes (Fiorina 1995; Kiser 1996; Levi 1997). 
Thus, it is possible to distinguish rational choice scholars from structuralists, 
culturalists and institutionalists by the level of analysis that they employ. Rationalists 
tend to approach problems deductively rather than inductively. They are more 
interested in broad generalization than deep understanding. The deductive method is 
evident by the three fundamental assumptions of the rational-choice approach: (1) all 
individuals have fixed and perfectly ranked preferences, (2) all individuals are self-
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interested and strive to maximize their preferences, and (3) all individuals are 
interdependent and therefore act strategically based upon their expectations of what 
others will do. Rational choice scholars apply these three assumptions to all cases 
regardless of individual circumstances.  
The rationalist camp in the body of terrorism literature attempts to understand 
terrorism via the preferences, incentives, and choices of individual utility maximizers 
who act deliberately toward the most efficient means to an end based upon their 
perception of what other actors will do (Enders and Sandler 2000; Berman 2003: Frey 
2004).  
For example, kidnapping is a rational act provided there is reasonable cause to 
believe that someone will comply with the perpetrator’s demands. While kidnapping 
is sometimes used to raise awareness or to negotiate the release of political prisoners, 
it would not be employed for these purposes if there were zero expectation that the 
media outlets or governments involved would comply.  
Kidnapping also raises a substantial amount of money. It is estimated that the 
409 international kidnapping incidents occurring between 1968 and 1982 yielded 
some $350 million (roughly $850,000 per incident), generating significant revenue for 
the perpetrators and therefore constituting a rational act (Rapoport 2004).  
Still, no one kidnaps homeless children in Manila. Nor does anyone make 
demands in exchange for the safe return of a hostage possessing insufficient political 
or emotional value to those negotiating. Kidnapping is only employed in cases where 
the perpetrator perceives that there is someone involved who both can and will pay 
the ransom. Thus, kidnapping is an example of a purely rational act- engaged in only 
when the perpetrator(s) perceive it to be the most expedient means to a desired end. 
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Likewise, acts of terrorism can be understood more clearly when one adds the 
rationalist lens to the looking glass.  
One could argue that terrorism is not entirely rational in that the fruits of 
terrorism are most certainly also a public good because any political concessions 
achieved are shared by all regardless of whether they participate in the act or not. 
While this is certainly true, it in no way precludes terrorism from being rational.  
Berman (2003) argues that terrorist organizations gain tremendous popularity 
despite the destruction they cause if the public goods they provide exceed those 
provided by the government. In this respect, even the provision of public goods is 
rational as it benefits the organization.  
Even in the extreme case of suicide terrorism, any potential benefits are almost 
entirely in the public realm, making the rationality of suicide terrorism for the 
individual a particularly difficult case to sell. Still, suicide terrorism is rational if the 
bomber believes that there are rewards to be had in the next life. What is more, the 
bomber's family also often benefits through support from the group sponsoring the act 
(Zakaria 2007).  
Petter (2004) elaborates on the rationality argument by identifying four 
distinct terrorist profiles in a typical jihadist cell; each with their own rationale for 
membership: (1) the entrepreneur, (2) the protégé, (3) misfits, and (4) drifters. The 
entrepreneur is carving out a niche and making a name for him or herself. For the 
entrepreneur, terrorism is a business opportunity. The protégé sees an opportunity to 
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utilize his or her special ability. Finally, misfits see a place to belong while drifters 
see a convenient, albeit temporary, economic opportunity.37   
Unsurprisingly, Rosendorff and Sandler (2010) find that supporters will join 
terrorist organizations if they stand to gain more from their participation in the cell 
than from other economic opportunities available to them. Therefore, as real earnings 
from wages rise, so do the opportunity costs for engaging in terrorist activities. This 
point is so intuitive that it hardly merits mention.  
However, Rosendorff and Sandler also suggest that in addition to fewer acts of 
terrorism, policy makers can also expect more egregious types of terrorism in times of 
economic prosperity. The reason there are often more suicide bombings and other 
particularly lethal attacks during times of economic prosperity is because terrorist 
leaders hope to provoke the government into overreacting. Harsh retaliation by the 
government generates popular support for the terrorists’ cause and therefore lowers 
the group’s cost of engaging in terrorism through increased financial support, 
approval, and volunteers.  
This tactic works particularly well against liberal democracies since elected 
officials respond to political pressure to do something. Harsh retaliation on the part of 
the state in turn generates popular support which then allows the terrorist organization 
to continue to operate even in times of economic prosperity (Bloom 2004, Rosendorff 
and Sandler 2010).  
                                                 
37 Horgan (2005) makes a somewhat related point in his discussion of the complexity of human 
behavior, stating the need to understand that the reason(s) an individual initially engages in terrorist 
activity is not necessarily the same as the reason(s) that person continues to engage. Nor is it always 
relevant to the reason an individual eventually ceases to engage in terrorist activity.  
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Enders and Sandler (2005) propose that individuals can choose how they 
respond to systemic factors such as the economy and the political structure, thus 
specifying their models with the individual's choice as the independent variable. This 
distinction is particularly salient in the post 9/11 era.  
The United States and its allies targeted al-Qaeda and its affiliates, captured or 
killed roughly two-thirds of the leadership (along with some 3,400 operatives), and 
froze more than $135 million in assets. Al Qaeda responded by decentralizing its 
network and thereby adapting to the new economic and political realities.  
Decentralization renders the larger organization more resilient against 
infiltration and attacks as each local cell is much more independent than before the 
GWOT. If one cell is infiltrated and the leadership is captured or killed, the entire 
organization is no longer compromised. Likewise, the nature of the new design makes 
it exponentially harder to track and freeze the organization’s financial assets as 
(ideally) each cell is financially independent of the other.  
This resilience on the part of al Qaeda demonstrates that it is a rational actor. It 
does more than simply react to systemic forces. It strategically adapts and responds 
according to its own preferences. Rosendorff and Sandler (2010) further contend that 
terrorists can choose to manipulate the government’s response−all in accordance with 
their own preferences.38 This is quite different from the many approaches that specify 
the terrorists themselves as the dependent variable.  
For example, in addition to the theories mentioned earlier, Gurr (1970) 
advances the relative deprivation theory, and Tilly (1978) promotes his theory of 
                                                 
38
See also Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) who conclude that nonviolent opposition to authoritarian 
governments substantially improve the chances for democratic transition while violent resistance 
increases the likelihood that transition will usher in another dictatorship.  
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political opportunity. While Gurr investigates the link between economic distribution 
and political violence, Tilly considers the level of state oppression as the greater 
factor in determining how much violence will be tolerated. Both theories offer 
compelling arguments and have spawned large bodies of literature, yet neither views 
the terrorists themselves as the independent variable.  
Likewise, Lichbach (1987) introduced a rational actor model with three 
propositions: (1) Government repression of nonviolent opposition will result in less 
nonviolent and more violent opposition. (2) The factor that determines whether an 
opposition group will increase or decrease all resistance activities (both violent and 
nonviolent) is the government’s accommodation policy toward that particular group. 
(3) It is not repression per se that increases violent resistance, but inconsistency in 
government policy toward opposition (whether repressive or accommodating) that 
increases violent opposition. While offering a rational explanation of sorts, Lichbach 
essentially sidesteps the human agency of the terrorists altogether by specifying the 
state as the independent variable.  
 
3.5: Suggested Solutions to Terrorism 
 
With the potential causes of terrorism being so widespread, suggested 
solutions to terrorism run the gamut as well. Everything from economic aid (Cragin 
and Chalk 2003) and more open trade (Bremmer 2003), to more military intervention 
(Howard 2003) and better intelligence (Foxell 2004), to increased diplomacy (Slater 
2006), increased political rights and civil liberties (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006; 
Wade and Reiter 2007), religious reform (Venkatraman 2007) more stable party 
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systems (Piazza 2006), and American hegemony (Mallaby 2002) have all been 
offered as potential solutions to terrorism.  
From the few examples just listed, it is evident that the same four-part 
typology used to categorize potential causes of terrorism (structural, cultural, 
institutional and rational) can also be used to differentiate proposed solutions to 
terrorism. But there are other approaches as well.  
For example, Miller (2007) employs a two-part typology to frame the ongoing 
debate over the solution to terrorism as essentially one that pits those who promote a 
more aggressive response to terrorism (O’Brien 1985; Johnson 1986; Carr 1996; Betts 
2002; Bremmer 2003)  against those that champion a more diplomatic approach 
(Koopmans 1993; Charters 1994; Tarrow and Tollefson 1994; Sederberg 1995; 
Ginges 1997; Heymann 2000). Similarly, Sinai (2005) explores a 
coercive/conciliatory approach as well and concludes that in the case of a military 
stalemate, states are often better off employing the latter.   
Post (2005b) suggests a four-fold typology that consists of (1) preventing 
individuals from joining groups that employ terrorism, (2) creating dissention within 
such groups, (3) blocking popular and financial support to such groups and (4) 
providing exit opportunities and support for individuals entangled in them.  
Another approach is to simply view all responses to terrorism as either 
counterterrorist or antiterrorist. 
 
3.5.1: Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism 
 
Counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures represent the gamut of possible 
responses to terrorist violence. Hence, virtually all responses fall under one label or 
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the other. The point of this discussion is threefold. First, from an academic 
perspective, it is fruitful and necessary to fully understand the concepts one employs 
(Smith 2005).  
Second, it is important to emphasize the fact that, like terrorism, 
counterterrorism and antiterrorism are also merely tactics. They are simply means to a 
desired end. While tactical means are necessary as part of an overall strategy, unless 
they are employed toward a strategic goal, they are irrational and incomprehensible. 
Even worse, when used in the absence of strategy, tactical measures can actually help 
to erode the legitimacy of the target government.  
Finally, this section discusses the similarities between policies that rely solely 
on tactical approaches and those that attempt to solve the problem of terrorism by 
fighting its causes.  
 
3.5.1.1: Counterterrorism 
Defined as an offensive military operation in the United States Army/Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Nagl et al. 2008), counterterrorism largely 
entails reactive measures such as freezing the financial assets of known terrorist 
organizations, the creation of international treaties and uniform legislation 
condemning terrorism, and various efforts to apprehend known terrorists.  
The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism officially declared the 
9/11 attacks an act of war against the United States and made both counterterrorism 
and antiterrorism national security priorities (Bush 2003). Defense of the homeland 
(antiterrorism) was only a partial solution, however. The Bush administration also 
insisted that the war on terror be brought to the perpetrators of terror wherever they 
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may be. The war was to be global. Therefore, America’s counterterrorism efforts must 
be global as well. The official U.S. stance on the war made the very narrow 
assumption that anyone not allied with the United States was allied with the terrorists. 
A more effective approach might have been to state that anyone not with the terrorists 
was with the United States. (Bergen 2011).  
The 9/11 attacks also resulted in the passage of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR), 1368, 1373, and 1377, which called upon all member 
states to join the U.S. in the fight against the perpetrators and sponsors of terrorism 
and to pass legislation that criminalized terrorism. Even though the GWOT received 
considerable UN support, several UN member states viewed U.S. reliance on a 
military solution as ineffective at best, and at times even disastrous (Sampson and 
Onuoha 2011).  
The main problem with counterterrorism efforts is that there is little 
uniformity across states when it comes to defining, documenting, and punishing acts 
of terrorism (Shelton 1998). Another major drawback to counterterrorism is that it is 
often counter-productive, especially if the government involved is viewed as overly 
harsh or repressive (Solomon 2015).  
 
3.5.1.1.1: Military versus Legal Approaches to Counterterrorism 
 
Targeted killings are a popular practice employed by Israel. When Israel 
decided to assassinate Salah Shehada, one of the senior leaders of Hamas in 2002, the 
bomb that took Shehada’s life also claimed the lives of at least 14 civilians including 
nine children. Hamas vowed revenge with the support of hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians who came out to protest and mourn the dead (Byman 2006).  
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Targeted killings are also a popular practice employed by the United States. 
Unfortunately, while notorious for the collateral damage they inflict, targeted killings 
are also limited in efficiency and effectiveness, and operations are often based on 
erroneous intelligence (Cordesman 2006).  
One of the supposed weaknesses of al Qaeda was the vulnerability of its 
leadership. However, Van Raemdonck (2012) points out that of the 581 militants 
assassinated in 2010, only thirteen were high-value targets. Yet the accompanying 
civilian casualties and collateral damage provided the terrorists with a powerful 
political weapon. Still, the United States continues to strongly favor military solutions 
over diplomacy. But at what cost? 
As Howie (2012) maintains, witnesses are the true targets of terror. The same 
can be said of counterterrorism. The fear of a retaliatory strike was very real to the 
people of Tokmok. It is not only the victims (or potential victims) of counterterrorist 
attacks that protest such methods. Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) argues that 
orthodox approaches to counterterrorism are nothing more than hegemonic attempts 
to maintain the status quo (Jackson et al. 2011). Even among proponents of orthodox 
approaches, opposing views prevail. For instance, the Clinton administration framed 
terrorism as a criminal issue39 while the George W. Bush administration framed it as a 
military phenomenon (Bush 2001). 
Moreover, the Bush administration’s approach caused division even among 
proponents of a military solution because the concept of a war on terror fought largely 
                                                 
39 For instance, the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 reintroduced guilt by association as a precedent in the 
criminal prosecution of those suspected of engaging in terrorist violence (Cole and Dempsey 2002). 
However, already in 1996, the case was being presented to replace civilian criminal trials with military 
tribunals in the prosecution of persons accused of committing acts of terrorism (Crona and Richardson 
1996). Following the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the Bush administration adopted this very 
approach (Kellner 2003).  
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against illegal combatants was also a political construct−one that sparked 
considerable controversy concerning its lack of legal legitimacy (Nanda 2009).   
As both non-citizens and non-state actors, illegal combatants are neither 
entitled to protection under the Geneva Convention nor the United States 
Constitution. This approach afforded the Bush administration the opportunity to 
circumvent due process of the law; an opportunity that it took full advantage of 
through questionable detention practices, cruel and inhumane interrogation practices, 
targeted killings and extraordinary rendition (ICRC 2007; Kreimer 2007). 
 While it never adopted the Clinton administration’s view of terrorism as a 
criminal issue, the Obama administration has shied away from the military construct 
as well (Pleming 2009; Engle 2010). And although Obama has made some effort to 
ensure the humane treatment of terrorist suspects and detainees,40 They were largely 
ineffective (U.S. Department of Justice 2009; Corcoran 2010; Huskey 2010).  
 Yet for all his efforts to avoid the politically-charged term “war on terror,” 
and despite his attempts to bring his administration’s policies on terrorism back within 
the rule of law, one could argue that Obama has also intensified the GWOT. For 
instance, the Obama administration has increased the use of unarmed aerial drone 
strikes in spite of significant collateral damage (Mayer 2009; Williams 2010; 
O'Connell 2011).41 
While the Obama administration has perpetuated the GWOT, it has yet to fully 
address the legal controversies associated with it (Thompson 2013). Hence, the 
                                                 
40 Executive Order No. 13,491, issued on January 27, 2009, addresses unlawful interrogation practices. 
Executive Order No. 13,492, also issued on January 27, 2009, addresses inhumane treatment of 
detainees at Guantanamo. 
41 See also the speech that Harold Honglu Koh, legal advisor of U.S. Department of State, made at the 
annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (Koh 2010). 
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division among proponents of a military solution to terrorism continues. Meanwhile, 
America’s foreign policy on terrorism has changed very little since the Bush 
administration despite Obama’s more tolerant tone.  
Although Article 51 of the UN Charter provides member states with the right 
to self-defense, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the 
political independence or territorial integrity of another sovereign member state 
without the existence of a real and imminent threat. Thus, the 2003 US invasion of 
Iraq was questionable at best from a legal standpoint. From a moral standpoint there 
was no question, and in 2005, widespread concerns over human rights abuses voiced 
by UN member states led to the appointment of an independent expert on the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 
(Sampson and Onuoha 2011).  
The GWOT greatly damaged America’s international reputation. Even though 
the Middle East has been the recipient of roughly one half of all US foreign aid, a July 
2011 Zogby poll reveals that popular opinion toward America in the Middle East is 
considerably more negative than in other developing areas receiving far less US 
assistance (Stockman 2011). Given America’s unpopularity, Beg (2010) argues that 
the key to defeating terrorism lays neither with superior military strategy nor usable 
intelligence data. Rather, success will be obtained by preventing the recruitment of 
future jihadists. Pointing to suicide training centers for children in South Waziristan 
and factories for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide jackets in Southern 
Punjab, Beg insists that the only way to diminish recruitment is to directly challenge 
radical religious ideology.  
Silke (2005) points to U.S. military retaliation against Libya in 1986, extra-
legal assassinations in South Africa and Israel, and countless cases of internment 
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without a trial such as in Northern Ireland to bolster his case that military tactics often 
do more to radicalize local populations than they achieve in countering terrorism. 
One need only consider how the attacks on 9/11; 11 March, 2004 and 7 July, 
2005 affected the West. As an example, Murphy et. al. (2004) point out that 9/11 
constituted a cultural upheaval for most Americans. This cultural upheaval led to a 
change in values, which in turn led to a change in attitudes and finally a change in 
behavior. Among other noticeable changes in behavior (reduced travel, increased 
attendance at religious services, and increased patriotism), Americans as a whole also 
demanded retaliation. If the 9/11 attacks radicalized a population as large and 
heterogeneous as the United States, it is reasonable to expect repeated military attacks 
against a much more conservative and homogenous population to produce a similar 
radicalizing effect. 
The point to be made here is that military solutions alone are not working 
(Solomon 2015). Lessons from both Vietnam and Iraq suggest that the only way to 
militarily defeat non-state enemies is to clear an area and hold it, perhaps indefinitely 
(Cordesman 2006). But this approach cannot work against terrorism. It is not enough 
to simply vanquish terrorist groups from a particular region. Even if the United States 
were willing and able to dedicate troops to the numerous locations where terrorists 
cells were uprooted with the sole mission of preventing their return, any useful 
solution to terrorism has to also address the perception that terrorism provides a viable 
option or new terrorist groups will simply spring up in their place (Gunaratna and 
Iqbal 2012).  
According to the 2004 Zogby International-Sadat Chair poll, popular support 
for clerics in politics is on the rise, but largely only as an alternative to corrupt, 
puppet-regimes propped up by the West (Gause 2005).  
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Daniel Byman (2010) suggests that the United States consider an alternative to 
military tactics. He points to America’s failed attempts at isolating and weakening 
Hamas. The solution, according to Byman, is direct engagement.  
Braniff and Moghadam (2011) agree with Byman (2010). They point to the 
fact that the popular uprisings in Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria were 
largely non-violent. These protests not only demonstrate the power of the Arab Street, 
but also that non-violent approaches are a popular and viable alternative to the 
violence advocated by al Qaeda and other groups. Braniff and Moghadam also argue 
that Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution has taught us that popular uprisings can succeed 
where top-down regime change has failed.42  
However, Braniff and Moghadam also caution us regarding al Qaeda’s post 
9/11 success in continuing to inspire global jihadist resistance against American 
hegemony despite the GWOT and the subsequent loss of Osama bin Laden and other 
key leaders. They remind us that al Qaeda has adapted and evolved and will continue 
to pose a threat to the West. Braniff and Moghadam’s advice is justified by the fact 
that Islamism appears to be growing more popular in many Arab Spring states.  
Public opinion among US Muslims also seems to align with this assessment. A 
2007 Pew poll of US Muslims reveals that less than half of all respondents supported 
the GWOT, but even fewer (less than ten percent) supported violence such as suicide 
bombings in the name of Islam (McCauley and Scheckter 2011).  
                                                 
42 The Jasmine Revolution began when a young, unemployed Tunisian man protested the dire 
economic conditions in the country by setting himself on fire in front of a government building on 
December 17, 2010. Others quickly joined in protest, and within a month, President Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali was forced to step down after 23 years of dictatorship. El-Khawas (2012) states that the 
Jasmine Revolution, which sparked the Arab Spring, was truly a popular revolution, with no leader and 
no political, ideological or religious aims.  
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Likewise, Pargeter (2008) examines the rise of radical Islamism in Europe and 
notes that groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Algerian 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and many others only moved to Europe after they were 
forced out of their own countries. Therefore, Pargeter concludes that while there may 
be increasing support for jihadist strategies among Muslims in Europe, this support in 
no way constitutes a coherent, unified movement against the West. It is rather the 
result of a number of individual nationalist militant groups, with their own unique set 
of grievances against their home state, continuing to press their demands from exile.  
Pargeter’s findings, together with the data collected by the 2004 Zogby poll 
and the 2007 Pew poll, suggest that a moderate solution would be favored by the 
popular majority in both the Muslim world and the West.  
Concerning the effectiveness of military approaches, Jones and Libicki (2008) 
examined 648 terrorist organizations to determine the most common ways that such 
groups end. They found that 43 percent of the 648 terrorist groups examined ended by 
joining the political process, 10 percent ended because they achieved their strategic 
goal(s), and only 7 percent ended because of military force exerted against them.  
Furthermore, Jones and Libicki found that religious terrorist groups share a 
different experience. While 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended since 1968, 
only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended. As Neumann and Smith 
speculate (2005), religious groups rarely achieve their strategic goal(s), and no 
religious terrorist group that has ended since 1968 achieved its stated goals. 
If the recent Arab Spring has taught us anything, it is the lesson that public 
perception is relevant to policy considerations and that it can be a powerful force for 
change. As Byman (2010) argues, by adopting a policy of direct engagement, the 
United States can help to shape both the trajectory and outcome of that change.  
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The solution is not to pursue a policy of reactive counterterrorism efforts 
detached from an overall strategy. Rather, a successful solution must take the enemy’s 
strategic goals into consideration and apply the resources at our disposal in such a 
way as to prevent the enemy from achieving those goals. In short, there is no one 
universally accepted counterterrorism policy or approach. Each situation must be 
analyzed and responded to individually (Wilkinson 2014). 
 
3.5.1.1.2: Other Approaches to Counterterrorism 
 
The previous section largely discussed American approaches to 
counterterrorism which tend to be employed mostly against foreign targets (although 
there is a domestic aspect to it as well). The opposite is true in Europe, where most 
counterterrorism policies were originally targeted at domestic terrorism. The 
Europeans treated terrorism as a criminal offence (Anderson et al, 1995) while also 
attempting to uncover its root causes (Bjørgo 2004).43  
However, rising security concerns over migration began pushing issues of 
transnational terrorism to the front burner (Joffé 2008). The pot boiled over in 2005, 
when the London attacks demonstrated that Islamic extremism was no longer just an 
external threat. It was now also a domestic issue. This realization caused a shift in 
counterterrorism policy from a focus on root causes to an emphasis on 
deradicalization (Coolsaet 2010). Of course, others such as Veldhuis and Staun (2009) 
argue that radicalization is a root cause of terrorism. 
                                                 
43 For clarification (in light of the recent referendum), for the purposes of this thesis, the United 
Kingdom is included in discussions of Europe.  
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A natural outcome of this approach includes managing extremism. Prince 
(2016) defines extremism as not just possessing hostile beliefs towards members of 
specific groups (and intolerance for all who do not share those beliefs), but also a 
willingness to act upon those beliefs. Here too, perception of the other plays a vital 
role in understanding the motivation behind acts of violence.  
Blakemore (2016) suggests that while lone-wolf attacks are a reality to 
contend with, organized extremist groups constitute the lion’s share of threat to 
society. Indeed, Prince’s definition of extremism paints an accurate likeness of groups 
such as al Shabaab and Boko Haram. The takfiri doctrine encourages hostility toward 
certain groups (Shia, Yazidis, Sufis, etc.) and intolerance of anyone who does not 
agree.  
Awan (2016) rightfully cautions, however, that there are many types of 
extremists from all different cultures, classes and religions (Islamic, far left, far right 
and digital populist). Fixating on Islamic extremism alone does everyone an injustice, 
not just Muslims (Heck 2007).  
 Following the London and Madrid attacks, a number of European scholars 
also began to argue that counterterrorism efforts must incorporate a wide range of 
strategies that first take the individual aims and ambitions of each group into 
consideration (Neumann 2006; Pargeter 2006; Vidino 2006; Rosenthal 2007, Wuchte 
and Knani 2013).   
Such an approach necessarily involves community-level involvement. For 
instance, Tucker (2016) suggests a community-led “neighborhood policing” approach 
whenever possible as it is more sensitive to the local population than the more 
common “community policing” approach (p. 35). The basic difference between the 
two is geographic. Neighborhood policing recognizes that there can be a number of 
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diverse neighborhoods within any community, and it seeks to train and appoint 
officers that are familiar with and sensitive to the specific needs of each neighborhood 
who will also be more aware of suspicious activity. The intended result is more 
effective policing with sensitivity to sub-groups within a community and fewer 
incidents of police brutality.  
One of the downsides to such an approach is that actual geographic borders 
rarely coincide with virtual borders, making neighborhood policing less efficient and 
more reliant on more formal international agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Den 
Boer et al. (2008) caution, however, that the more horizontal arrangements such as 
local neighborhood policing may in fact undermine the efficacy of established vertical 
international agencies. 
Whether through local arrangements or through international organizations, 
there seems to be broad agreement that managing extremism is an integral component 
of effective counterterrorism (Awan 2016, Blakemore 2016, Prince 2016).  
The European approach to counterterrorism has been much more 
comprehensive in scope than the American approach. Other considerations include 
the strength and limitations of national legislation on issues such as hate crimes 
(Bleich 2011), how to deal with digital communities (Ball and Webster 2003), and the 
age-old challenge of balancing civil liberty with national security (De Hert 2005). 
 
3.5.1.2: Antiterrorism 
Antiterrorism can be thought of as defensive or preventative attempts to 
decrease a society’s vulnerability to terrorism, such as hardening likely targets and 
increasing airport security. The problem with antiterrorism measures is that they are 
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often costly, disruptive to daily routine, and largely inconsequential as terrorists can 
simply choose alternative targets. The current anti-terrorism policy has cost the 
United States billions with very little measurable results (McGovern 2011).  
 Antiterrorism often violates human rights as well. For example, one standard 
US anti-terrorism measure entails checking all passengers traveling within the United 
States and US territories against terrorist watch lists. As of 2001, the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requires all airlines to transmit Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data on all passengers aboard their aircraft before entering the 
United States. DHS has also issued no-fly orders and detained thousands of innocent 
people. Even the late Senator Ted Kennedy and singer/songwriter Cat Stevens were 
both detained. The EU has claimed that the policy violates data privacy rights. 
In addition to the conflict DHS has encountered with the EU, the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has filed a class action law suit on behalf of US 
citizens believed to have been wrongfully detained by DHS based on PNR data 
(Brouwer 2009; Byrne 2012). 
US anti-terrorism measures also include the blacklisting of state sponsors of 
terrorism such as Sudan, Syria, Cuba, and Iran. Nigeria was also added to the blacklist 
after the failed Christmas Day bombing on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, when a 
Nigerian citizen, Umar Farouk Abdalmutallah, attempted to detonate a small 
explosive device he had hidden in his underwear. Abdalmutallah was a member of al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen (Harnicsh and Zimmerman 
2010).  
Nigeria was later removed from the blacklist upon its agreement to publicly 
condemn all forms of terrorism, pass legislation aimed at countering terrorism, 
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improve its security at Nigerian airports, and place air marshals on board aircraft 
destined for the United States (Sampson and Onuoha 2011). 
Of course, blacklisting state sponsors of terrorism can only do so much, 
especially considering the dramatic decline in state-sponsored terrorism following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. What is needed is an effective deterrent for non-state 
actors, who have more than compensated for the decline in state-sponsored terrorism 
with fewer, but more lethal, attacks.  
While “terrorist” attacks took 4,798 lives in the ten years between 1970 and 
1979, that number rose to 51,797 lives between 1990 and 1996 demonstrating a stark 
increase in the number of fatalities despite a decreasing number of attacks (Stern 
2000a).44  
In accordance with this general trend, transnational terrorism has also become 
less frequent but more lethal. There were 5,431 transnational terrorist attacks between 
1980 and 1989 resulting in 4,684 deaths. And while the number of transnational 
terrorist attacks between 1990 and 1999 dropped to 3,824, the number of resulting 
deaths was 2,468 (an average of 1.5 deaths per incident, up from 1.2 in the 1980s), 
making the attacks fewer in number yet more lethal (Pillar 2001).   
While terrorist attacks decreased overall in the 1990s as compared to previous 
decades, closer examination of the distribution of attacks reveals that this trend was 
reversing. There were 19% fewer terrorist incidents between 1990 and 1994 than 
there were between 1995 and 1999. Yet the attacks in the second period produced 
more than double the amount of casualties than the first (Enders and Sandler 2000). 
                                                 
44 Of course, how one defines terrorism is a critical issue when considering these figures. 
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So while the increase in incidents was under 20%, the casualties more than doubled 
making the attacks in the second period far more lethal. 
The next decade saw a substantial increase in terrorist incidents. Suicide 
terrorism also increased substantially with eighty percent of all suicide attacks since 
1968 occurring after September 11, 2001. The year 2004 saw more suicide attacks 
than any year previous, and the number continued to grow in 2005 with more than one 
suicide attack per day on average in Iraq alone (Desouza and Hensgen 2007).   
The trend continued into 2006. The U.S. State Department issued a report in 
May 2007 revealing that terrorist attacks in 2006 increased by more than 25% over 
2005, with fatalities increasing some 40 percent (U.S. Department of State 2006, 
Whitelaw 2007). Islamist web sites also increased from less than 20 in 2001 to over 
3,000 in 2006 (Atran 2006).  
 Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) examine the situation in Israel. They suggest 
that rather than attempting to deter terrorists by raising the cost of engaging in 
terrorism through traditional counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures, 
policymakers should increase the benefits of not engaging in terrorism. They point out 
that in both the First and Second Intifada, conciliatory measures led to an overall 
decrease in terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the authors contend that repressive 
measures have never led to decreased attacks in Israel. Quite the contrary, they often 
lead to an increase in terrorist activity. Hamas and Hezbollah secured the loyalty of 
many in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon respectively by providing 
humanitarian services (Malka 2007; Flanigan and Abdel‐Samad 2009). In the same 
respect, Dugan and Chenowith reason that Israel can diminish support for Hamas and 
Hezbollah by offering services that improve the status quo for Palestinians and 
Lebanese citizens. 
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Robert and Araj (2006) make a similar argument, asserting that acts of suicide 
terrorism against Israel are largely acts of retaliation against real or perceived 
injustice. This finding is supported globally as well by Piazza and Walsh (2009) who 
conclude that repressive regimes committing human rights violations experience 
higher incidents of terrorism than regimes that do not.  
Clearly, current antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies have failed to 
prevent the death toll due to terrorism from increasing more than tenfold every two 
decades. Even within the EU, criticism abounds regarding the ineffectiveness of 
existing measures (e.g. Bamford 2004; AI 2010). 
The attacks of 11 September, 2011 (9/11) posed a three-fold challenge to the 
EU for which it was ill-prepared. The EU suddenly had to prove itself a credible 
partner in the military and political war on terror, increase internal security and defend 
its external borders as well (Den Boer and Monar 2002).  
Den Boer (2003, p.1) argues that the 9/11 attacks served as a pretext for an 
“unprecedented wave of policy interventions within the European Union,” passed in 
haste with little or no consideration of human rights.  
Bossong (2008) adds that the EU’s action plan for combatting terrorism, 
hastily pushed through by integration-minded policy entrepreneurs, ignores the more 
important strategic dimension and is therefore flawed. One such dimension is 
financing.  
Napoleoni (2006) insists that a principal reason the West is losing the war on 
terror is due to a lack of a global policy to prevent terrorist financing. Napoleoni 
reminds us that, following 9/11, some $200 billion in Saudi funds were transferred out 
of the Unites States, much of it being reinvested in the EU where she contends that 
border and financial controls are still too lenient to prevent the financing of terrorism. 
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The bottom line is that without attention to broader strategic considerations, 
even the more comprehensive European approach to combatting terrorism is flawed. 
Having considered the limitations of the more customary approaches to 
counterterrorism and antiterrorism, I will now explore the danger of relying solely on 
tactical counterterrorism and antiterrorism as a response to strategic terrorism. 
 
3.5:2 Limitations of Tactical Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism 
 
What does it mean to act strategically in our efforts to prevent terrorist 
violence? To begin with, one has to distinguish between means and ends. What is the 
opponent’s goal, and what means are they employing to achieve that goal? For 
example, Hoffman (2009) insists that a crucial step in reducing terrorist violence is to 
break the cycle of terrorist recruitment. The long-term goal in this case is to reduce 
terrorist violence. The strategy is to break the cycle of recruitment. Therefore, the 
tactical use of the means at one’s disposal should be employed to logically produce 
this effect. In order to break the cycle of recruitment, the status quo has to be more 
appealing to potential recruits than a violent alternative (Clarke 2009). However, in 
too many instances, the tactical use of violence has not been used in service to a 
desired strategic goal at all.  
In all fairness, the balance between maintaining order and security on the one 
hand, and acting strategically on the other, is difficult to achieve. Terror attacks are 
intended to provoke an overreaction on the part of the target state. Who is not both 
shocked and angry when they see reports of attacks against a children’s park on a 
major religious holiday? The impetus to react is very strong. However, to simply react 
without the guidance of strategy is a mistake.    
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This is not to suggest that society simply accepts acts of terrorism or that 
governments never employ military force against those who engage in terrorist 
violence. Only that an understanding of each actor’s strategic horizon is critical 
(Wuchte and Knani 2013). Which means that any effective counterterrorism or 
antiterrorism policy requires more than a short-sighted fixation on the tactic of 
violence itself (Bryden 2006).  
In northeastern Nigeria, for example, more than 650,000 people remain 
internally displaced and thousands more have been brutally murdered (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center 2015). Boko Haram is only partially to blame for 
these victims, however. Nigerian security forces and the state-led Joint Military Task 
Force (JTF) are equally culpable due to their policy of indiscriminately targeting 
civilians and entire villages suspected of harboring Boko Haram members and 
supporters (Jarvis 2009). In fact, Solomon (2015, p. 225) states that “state violence in 
the form of counter-terrorism has been indistinguishable from Boko Haram 
terrorism.” 
One of Boko Haram’s key strategic goals is to rid Nigeria of its corrupt 
government officials. However, rather than attempting to counter Boko Haram’s anti-
government message, Nigerian security forces and the JTF are instead confirming it 
by overreacting to the group’s tactical use of violence and responding with brute 
military force. Atrocities such as these only serve to exacerbate the violence. They 
also increase popular support for Boko Haram by demonstrating to the average 
Nigerian (and to the world) just how corrupt and inhumane the Nigerian government 
can be (Baiyewu 2014). 
The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 is another classic example. Both 
Somali and Ethiopian military forces systematically attacked the homes of al Shabaab 
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members and supporters, killing their families and destroying their property. Rather 
than addressing one of the key strategic goals of the group (the elimination of foreign 
military intervention in Somalia), this particular counterterrorism measure was 
focused solely on al Shabaab’s tactical use of violence and ultimately served to 
increase the level of terrorist violence in Somalia by reinforcing the public perception 
that Somalia needed to be defended against the military incursion of Ethiopia. The 
sympathy this tactic generated on behalf of al Shabaab members and their families 
translated into massive support for the movement in the form of sympathy, funds, 
food, clothing and recruits. It also reinforced the perception among many Somalis that 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was illegitimate and needed to be 
overthrown (Marchal 2009).  
When the United States (U.S.), Kenya, Uganda and others joined the fight 
against al Shabaab, they only served to escalate the violence. It was not long before 
the group began to retaliate against some of the very governments that supported 
counter-terrorism efforts against it. In 2010, al Shabaab carried out twin suicide 
attacks in Uganda, killing 78 people in Kampala and injuring 89 others while they 
watched the World Cup. This was the deadliest military assault in sub-Saharan Africa 
since 1998, when al-Qaida bombed the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 
(Holzer 2010). Al Shabaab later retaliated against Kenya in the famed Westgate 
Shopping Mall attack in September 2013 and again with the slaughter of 147 
university students in Garissa on April 2, 2015.  
Boko Haram also engaged in a series of cross-border attacks against Chad in 
early 2015 in retaliation for its participation in a multinational counterterrorism effort 
against the group (International Crisis Group 2014; Blanchard 2015). Clearly, an 
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understanding of these two groups’ strategic goals would have gone a long way in 
creating a more effective counterstrategy.   
There are far too many other examples of ineffective counterterrorism 
measures gone awry to mention here. As for antiterrorism measures, simply hardening 
an asset in no way deters an act of terrorism because it does not address the 
underlying motivation behind the decision to resort to violence in the first place. Not 
to mention, another target can always be chosen as a suitable replacement.  
The point that these examples are intended to make is simply that strategic 
theory offers policy makers and terrorism scholars a more comprehensive 
understanding of an actor’s decision to employ tactical violence in the first place. And 
though this is not the primary task of the strategic theorist (Smith 1991), it is the 
primary task of most policy makers and terrorism scholars. Unfortunately, most 
policy makers and terrorism scholars continue to rely solely on either widespread 
systemic explanations of terrorism or lower-level explanations- neither of which 
produce effective policy when consulted in isolation. 
 
3.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter addresses the myriad of challenges faced by academics and 
policymakers when attempting to define terrorism, categorize it, and identify it 
causes. It concludes that given the vast number of variables involved, and the 
systemic nature of structural, cultural and institutional causes of terrorism, an 
additional explanation is desirable.  
However, rational explanations are also problematic. Most suggest a type of 
oppression, grievance or political trigger that creates the impetus for terrorism, but 
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they do not explain why only a small fraction of the populous affected resort to acts of 
terrorism. Even several roots and triggers typologies, such as Crenshaw’s and others, 
while specifying elite disaffection as a primary factor, do not always explain why 
violence is chosen as the means to a desired end rather than some other course of 
action. Finally, nearly all rational explanations specify the terrorist as the dependent 
variable, and therefore essentially isolate the cause within the actions of the regime or 
some other explanation.  
Having thus far discussed both the limitations of systemic and lower levels of 
analysis as well as the strengths of the strategic approach as justification for 
employing the strategic terrorism framework, I will proceed with the case studies. 
Join me as I turn your attention to a brief history of Somalia. 
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Chapter Four: Somalia                                                                                                                                                       
The Teeth of a Lion 
 
“A cat in her house has the teeth of a lion…” 
                                                 -Somali Proverb 
4.1: Introduction 
 
If one were to examine the history of Muslim extremist ideology from the 
Prophet Mohammad and the Arab conquests to Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-
Zawahiri and beyond, three categories (or varying degrees) of extremist ideology 
would emerge again and again. These three ideologies are Islamist, jihadist and 
takfiri. Unfortunately, space does not allow for such an examination. For our purposes 
here, please allow the brief summary below to suffice. 
As the Arab conquests spread Islam further west, these ideologies continued to 
influence the generations that followed. By the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the 
rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the evolution of these ideas came full circle as 
proponents faced persecution and sought asylum in Saudi Arabia. Largely because of 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, these same ideologies were dispersed from the Arab 
peninsula a second time by groups such as al Qaeda, adopted by yet another 
generation and passed on to the next.  
To the vast majority of Muslims, the word jihadist signifies the struggle to be 
a good Muslim (Heck 2004; Bonner 2008).45 However, in the mainstream media, 
                                                 
45 For a discussion of the concept of Islamism, see (Mozaffari 2007). 
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jihadist is synonymous with terrorist. While sensitive to this conundrum, I employ the 
term more specifically (see below).  
Pre-Islamic Arabs observed a basic code of conduct in war: don’t kill women, 
children, the aged or the wounded. Muslim Arabs inherited this practice, and it was 
established as part of Muslim law (Khadduri 1955). It is believed that in the days of 
the prophet Mohammad, jihad was a very comprehensive term, requiring the 
submission of all one’s resources- both physical and spiritual- to Allah. Therefore, 
jihad encompassed all aspects of life, including military.  
The multiple applications of jihad were very practical in the time of 
Mohammad. For instance, the early Muslims were instructed to reject the idolatry and 
polytheism of the pre-Islamic Arabs, and thus struggle for inner spiritual growth and 
revelation. When Mohammad and his followers fled to Madinah, they were called 
upon to sacrifice their homes and possessions and to start over in the name of Islam. 
Military jihad was defensive, as the battles of Badr (624 CE) and Uhud (625) 
demonstrate. But military jihad was also offensive, as when Mohammad attacked 
Mecca in 630 CE.   
As the Muslim empire began to coalesce and power was consolidated, the 
concept of jihad became a matter of state policy, justifying both defensive war and 
conquest. During times of division when power was contended, jihad was used to 
claim political legitimacy over one’s opponents (Bassiouni 2007). 
Various scholars interpreted jihad differently to deal with different practical 
realities. For instance, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, better 
known as Averroes, stressed the peaceful and spiritual applications of jihad, while Ibn 
Taymiyyah emphasized its role in war (Bassiouni 2007; MacEvitt and Sizgorich 
2011). In contemporary times, its true nature has been widely debated as definitions 
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vary from the sensational to the more benign (Firestone 1999; Heck 2004; Bonner 
2008).  
The term itself is derived from the Arabic jahada, a verb which literally means 
to struggle or to exert (Bassiouni 2007). The more moderate interpretation of jihad, of 
course, refers to either (1) the individual spiritual struggle against sin, or (2) the 
collective battle against an enemy aggressor. However, according to this 
interpretation, jihad must be sanctioned by authority and conducted with restraint 
(Zawati 2001). The moderate interpretation is based on a hadith (account) of the 
Prophet Muhammad where he is quoted as saying, “self-exertion in peaceful and 
personal compliance with the dictates of Islam (constitutes) the major or superior 
jihad” and the ‘best form of jihad is to speak the truth in the face of an oppressive 
ruler’ (quoted in Ali and Rehman 2005, p. 10). 
It is not uncommon today to hear reporters and politicians use the terms 
‘Islamist’ and ‘jihadist’ synonymously. Although it may seem pedantic, it is 
important to differentiate between the two. The aim of the first group is to reform both 
government and society in accordance with sharia (Islamic law) by operating within 
the political process (Gerges 2005). This goal sets them apart from moderate everyday 
Muslims who do not necessarily wish to live under sharia.  
We can correctly date the beginning of Islamist ideology to the 1920s, when 
the Ottoman Empire was dismembered after World War One. This event was of 
supreme significance to Sunni Muslims everywhere because the Ottoman Empire was 
the last caliphate (Islamic empire), and the Sultan was the caliph (deputy of God). 
And even though the caliphate had lost much of its actual power and influence over 
the centuries, for Sunni Muslims, the caliphate retained symbolic importance because 
most believed that there could not be a valid ummah (Muslim community) without a 
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caliph to lead it. However, when Ataturk founded the secular state of Turkey, he 
abolished the office of the caliph. 
Conservative Sunnis met together at a number of conferences to try and revive 
the caliph, but of course, there was widespread disagreement on who would assume 
the office. This attempt to bring Islam back into the state marks what many scholars 
refer to as the beginning of political Islam or Islamism. Islamists such as Hassan al-
Banna (1906-1949) and those who followed want to see the re-establishment of the 
caliph and the re-institution of sharia. Most are non-violent. Those that are violent are 
typically referred to as jihadists. Therefore, many scholars refer to jihadists as a 
subset of the Islamist population. Technically, this classification is true as both groups 
desire the reinstitution of sharia. However, as we will soon see, jihadists have been 
around much, much longer. 
Jihadists, reject man-made laws and democracy as deceptions. In fact, they 
reject the entire Westphalian nation-state system and all international political 
institutions (except the caliphate), arguing that these are merely extensions of 
Western imperialism. Therefore, jihadists legitimize violence as the only means to re-
establishing the caliphate and defending the ummah (Muslim community). This is 
what sets jihadists apart from Islamists, and most are staunchly opposed to their 
Islamist counterparts (Lahoud 2010b). While it is not entirely incorrect to classify 
jihadists as a violent subgroup within the Islamist fold as both desire the reinstitution 
of sharia, it is incorrect to assume that both date their beginnings back to the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire. The origins of jihadist ideology go back much further.  
Beyond the classification of Islamist and jihadist, it is possible to make 
another important distinction between jihadist and takfiri groups. While jihadist 
groups maintain that violence against the apostate regime is necessary for instituting 
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sharia, takfiri groups do not distinguish between the government and the governed 
(Podeh 1996). In their estimation, shirk (idolatry) is shirk, and it does not matter who 
you are. These groups justify their actions upon the takfiri doctrine which basically 
argues that anyone who does not agree with a particular interpretation of the faith 
should be excommunicated and killed. The doctrine dates back to the Kharajites 
(outsiders) in the seventh century who opposed the Ummayad dynasty, claiming that 
they were not true Muslims (Lahoud, 2010a; MacEvitt and Sizgorich 2011).  
The doctrine has since been invoked by Ibn Taymiyyah, Mohammad al-
Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb and more recently it resurfaced in Egypt in the 1960’s with an 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Takfir wal-Hijira (Excommunication and 
Exodus).46 The group’s followers spread the doctrine to Peshawar in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s where it influenced a number of jihadists including Zarqawi. Today, 
the most notorious adherent of the takfiri doctrine is Baghdadi’s Islamic State, which 
has inspired literally dozens of other groups to follow its example. 
Therefore, I suggest a threefold typology consisting of Islamist, jihadist and 
takfiri groups. All wish to establish sharia. While Islamists are willing to contest in 
democratic elections, jihadist reject democracy as an usurpation of the sovereignty of 
Allah and therefore are willing to employ violence to impose sharia. Jihadist 
organizations such as al Qaeda, however, following al-Banna’s more conciliatory 
bottom-up approach, believe that the ummah (Muslim community) should be taught 
the true way of Islam from the ulama (Muslim scholars). Takfiri groups such as 
                                                 
46 Gilles Kepel (2006) argues that Qutb’s ideas should be understood as a reaction to the repression of 
the Nasser regime, and therefore, only relevant to a specific time and place (Egypt in the 1950s). 
Michael Chertoff (2008) credits modern-day jihadist theory to Western proponents of communism and 
fascism. Chertoff discusses four indicators linking modern jihad with twentieth century totalitarian 
regimes: (1) their common rhetoric, (2) the shared policy of indiscriminate killing, (3) their mutual 
celebration of death and (4) the comparable elevation of ideology above the rule of law. 
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Islamic State, following Qutb’s authoritarian top-down approach, believe that apostate 
Muslims should be killed, not as a means to an end but as an end in itself (Husain 
1995; Zollner 2007). 
Islamists are Muslims that want to re-establish the caliphate and institute 
sharia. While Islamists are committed to replacing the current international order with 
a world-wide caliphate, they are willing to do so non-violently via political parties 
and contesting in democratic elections (Ashour 2009; McCants 2011). 
While there is not space for a detailed discussion of the concept here, for the 
purposes of this thesis, jihadists are Islamists that reject the democratic process as a 
violation of sharia (Phares 2007; Ali and Stuart 2014). Reasoning that man-made law 
has usurped Allah’s rightful position as al Malik (the Absolute Ruler), jihadists 
bypass the democratic process and seek to re-establish the caliphate via violence 
(Turner 2012; McCants 2015).  
Finally, takfiri groups adhere to the takfiri doctrine- a radical Sunni 
interpretation allowing for the accusation of a fellow Muslim of major unbelief which 
is punishable by death (Stanley 2005; Crooke 2015). The takfiri doctrine explains 
much of the current violence against Muslims that otherwise appears to be senseless 
and random. 
While not every group fits into this typology perfectly, it serves as a 
methodological starting point from which we can discern an actor’s strategy. We will 
see this very important distinction again and again, for example, from the Islamist 
approach advocated by the more moderate faction of the Muslim Brotherhood to the 
jihadist agenda outlined by al Qaeda, and finally the takfiri doctrine embraced by the 
Islamic State.    
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Without the space to go into a detailed examination of al Qaeda and Islamic 
State, it is possible to conclude that since al Qaeda has both denounced the democratic 
process and has largely relied upon violence to coerce target governments to change 
their policies, it is a jihadist organization that has employed strategic terrorism.47 It is 
also possible to conclude that since Islamic State has adopted the takfiri doctrine but 
has not attempted to coerce target governments to change their policies (rather it has 
largely acted as a belligerent state itself), it is a takfiri group that has not employed 
strategic terrorism.  
Given that al Shabaab has pledged bay’ah to al Qaeda under the leadership of 
Godane, and then again under Godane’s successor, Abu Ubaidah, it is important to 
assess the nature of this alliance and whether it has any impact on the group’s 
strategic objectives. In Chapter Five, I will identify al Shabaab’s theoretical 
underpinnings, trace any influences the group may have adopted from its predecessors 
and explore the practical implications of these influences on the group’s strategic 
goals and tactical use of violence. I will also employ this information to assess the 
relationship between al Shabaab and al Qaeda- whether it is based on ideology or 
something else. However, in this chapter I will focus on the more immediate context. 
Because the strategic goals of al Shabaab cannot be fully understood without a 
minimal knowledge of the region’s colonial and modern history, this chapter begins 
                                                 
47 Some may take issue with my designation of al Qaeda as a jihadist group rather than a takfiri group. 
For example, Quiggin (2010) points out that al Qaeda regularly makes use of the takfiri doctrine to 
discredit its opponents. However, al Qaeda, while employing violence to manipulate concessions from 
target governments, does not endorse the killing of apostate Muslims as an end in itself as we see with 
takfiri groups such as Islamic State, al Shabaab and Boko Haram. Abdullah Azzam was a staunch 
opponent of the takfiri doctrine. He was so opposed that he issued a fatwa against the doctrine claiming 
that the killing of fellow Muslims and civilians is against Islam. Yet, Azzam clearly supported the use 
of violence to coerce political concessions from target governments to the ultimate end of regaining 
lost Muslim territory and establishing sharia (Kepel 2004; Wright 2007). 
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by discussing the history of Somalia and exploring how the Somali population 
became so fragmented. Second, I examine the various groups that have appeared in 
Somalia since independence and analyze their strategic objectives in an effort to 
identify any continuity between them.  
 
4.2: History 
 
Today, there are six political entities in the region of the Horn of Africa with 
substantial Somali populations. The first is the Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS). The second is Puntland, an autonomous state which officially recognizes the 
authority of the FGS but establishes its own policy. The third is Somaliland, an 
autonomous region of Somalia which has enjoyed relative peace and stable 
governance and seeks independence. The fourth is the Republic of Djibouti. The fifth 
is the Somali National Regional State, one of the eight regions of Ethiopia, and the 
sixth is the Northeastern Province of Kenya (Møller 2009).  
While all Somalis are derived from one ancestral tribe, Somalia is further 
divided into clans and sub-clans. There are four main clan families. Lewis (1980) lists 
them as the Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Isaaq while Menkhaus (2000a) lists them as the 
Daarood, Hawiye, DigleMilifle and Dir.  
Gundel (2009, p.11) elaborates on the discrepancy by clarifying that the 
“perceived” majority clans are “the Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and – depending on one’s 
perspective – the Isaaq.”  These three (otherwise known as the “noble clans”) 
comprise the nomadic-pastoralist clans that speak Af-Maxaa-tiri which became the 
official language of Somalia following independence. The fourth large group is the 
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Digil-Mirifle (also called the Rahanweyn) which are mainly farmers who live in 
Southern Somalia and speak AfMaay-tiri.   
Beyond these four main clans, there are a multitude of various sub-clans and 
diya-paying groups48 that, heretofore, have remained stubbornly independent of one 
another (Grossman 2007). Uniting the Somali peoples of the region has been the 
primary goal of several groups, some of which bear the label, “terrorist.”  
The area that now comprises Somalia and Ethiopia has been plagued with 
expansionist conflict for centuries. The two powers vied for control of the borderlands 
between them while outside powers also wrestled for influence and resources. 
Religious differences played a role in the fighting as well. While the Somali territories 
were largely controlled by emirs and Islamic elites, the predecessor of modern-day 
Ethiopia was the Abyssinian Christian Empire.  
 
4.2.1: Pre-colonial History 
 
 For centuries leading up to the fifteenth century, peace prevailed in the region 
between Muslims and Christian Abyssinia. Tradition attributes this peace to the 
gratitude of the Prophet Muhammad who blessed the Abyssinians for their hospitality 
and protection of his early followers who fled persecution in Mecca at the hands of 
his own tribesmen, the Quraysh. Mohammad forbade his followers from waging jihad 
                                                 
48Diya-paying groups are most popularly known as blood compensation pacts in which groups ranging 
from a few hundred to a thousand or more enter into contract to avenge the death of a member or his 
loved ones. However, Diya groups are also local insurance arrangements that usually exist at the 
village level or lower. Members of diya groups provide support for each other in times of drought, 
famine or other such crises. Members also protect one another’s property from other diya groups via 
the threat of retaliation from the entire group. (see for example, Besteman 1996; Menkhaus 2000b; 
Coyne 2006; Hagmann 2007). 
 177 
 
against the Ethiopian emperor and his people. Therefore, while Muslim conquest 
ensued against the empires of Persia and Byzantium, the Muslim forces lived in peace 
with Christian Ethiopia for nearly a millennium (Budge 2014). 
 Friendly relations began to deteriorate when Emperor Yeshaq (1414-29) 
declared Muslims as "enemies of the Lord" and launched sporadic attacks against 
vulnerable Muslim settlements. However, a state of war erupted when Yeshaq’s 
armies invaded the sultanate of Ifat in 1415, killed King Sa'ad al-Din and demanded 
tribute. Yeshaq also commissioned a hymn to commemorate his victory in which the 
word “Somali” first appears in written history (Trimingham 1952). 
 By the sixteenth century, the Muslim/Christian divide was already well-
pronounced. The Abyssinian- Adal War (1529-1543) cemented the animosity that 
would persist unto the present day. With the aid of the Ottomans, the Somali imam, 
Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (also known as Ahmed Guray in Somali which means 
“Ahmed the left-handed”), captured nearly three quarters of the Abyssinian Kingdom 
in what came to be known as the “Conquest of Abyssinia.” Al-Ghazi might well have 
taken the entire kingdom had the Portuguese not intervened (Desplat 2005; Solomon 
2015). 
 
4.2.2: Colonial History 
 
 Once Britain established colonial ties with India, it sought the most economic 
ocean route available to transport raw materials and goods. The Suez Canal, which 
opened in 1869, allowed Britain to significantly reduce the distance between India 
and Britain by traveling via the Red Sea rather than around Africa. In 1884, the Berlin 
Conference triggered the infamous "scramble for Africa" in which Britain and other 
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European states laid claim to the continent. Somalia was colonized by four imperial 
powers: Ethiopia, Great Britain, France and Italy. Ethiopia claimed the Ogaden 
region, Great Britain carved out the area that became the protectorate of British 
Somaliland, Italy occupied the South (Italian Somaliland) and France colonized the 
region that is now Djibouti. The result was disunity, division and endless war (Martin 
2006). 
By the late nineteenth century, the British and Italians had gained commercial 
rights through a series of trade agreements and established the respective protectorates 
of British and Italian Somaliland (Cassanelli 1982). Both powers viewed the 
expanding Ethiopian Empire as a direct threat to their own territorial claims. The 
Ethiopian victory over the Italians at Adwa in 1896 further confirmed their fears. For 
the next thirty years or so, localized border conflicts sprung up here and there between 
both Ethiopia and the colonial powers and among the colonial powers themselves. 
One such clash led to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the annexation of the 
Ethiopian Empire in 1935-36 (Barnes, 2007). 
Somali resistance against foreign incursions was also fierce. One of the more 
successful resistance movements of the early twentieth century was led by Sayid 
Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, who established the Dervish state and successfully 
resisted British and Italian expansion by enlisting the aid of Somali soldiers from 
across the Horn of Africa to wage jihad against the Christian invaders. The Dervish 
state maintained its independence until 1920 when it was finally defeated by the 
British (Laitin 1979; Harper 2012).   
The British also forced the Italians out of Ethiopia during World War II and 
afterward retained control of both British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland as 
protectorates. Ethiopia itself was designated as Occupied Enemy Territory, which was 
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problematic given that the British had allowed the exiled Ethiopian Emperor, Haile 
Sellasie, to return with limited powers. The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement allowed 
Ethiopia to become a sovereign state but left certain areas under British control. 
Among these areas were the Haud, an important Somali grazing land in the Northeast 
along the border between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the Ogaden, a Southeastern 
border region which is mostly comprised of ethnic Somalis (Ullendorff and 
Beckingham 1964).  
In 1945, the UN granted Italy trusteeship over Italian Somaliland on the 
condition that it agreed to Somali independence within ten years. In 1948 Britain 
returned the Haud and the Ogaden to Ethiopia, a move which would exacerbate tense 
border relations between Ethiopia and the soon to be independent Somali state for 
decades to come (Barnes, 2007).  
 
4.2.3: From Independence to the Islamic Union 
 
British Somaliland gained its independence on 26 June, 1960, taking upon 
itself the new name, the State of Somaliland. The former Italian Somaliland (known 
as the Trust Territory of Somalia) gained independence five days later. The two 
newly-independent states united and formed the Somalia Republic on July 1, 1960 
(Poore 2009).  
The new state’s border problems increased when the British granted the 
largely Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of 
Kenya in 1963. The year 1963 also marked continued border conflict in the Ogaden 
with the Nasrullah Uprising, a struggle between Somali nationalists and the Ethiopian 
National Defense Force (ENDF). In Arabic, Nasrullah means, “sacrifice for the sake 
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of Allah” (Abdullahi 2007b). While Somalia’s border conflicts with Ethiopia and 
Kenya are often framed in religious terms, they are fundamentally nationalist at the 
core, and the Somali government would soon prove itself to be anything but Islamic 
(Markakis 1987).  
 On 15 October, 1969, President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated 
by one of his own bodyguards. Six days later, on 21 October, Major General 
Mohammad Siad Barre led a coup and seized power (Walls 2008). He renamed the 
country the Somalia Democratic Republic. Barre, who headed the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council, envisioned Somalia as a secular, socialist state. 
Unsurprisingly, the Barre government leaned heavily toward the Soviet Union 
(Ahmed 2006).  
 The military expanded from 5,000 troops in 1960 to 65,000 troops in 1990. 
Between 1961 and 1979, Somalia imported $660 million worth of weapons. During 
the 1980s alone, the government spent $44.5 million annually on the military. This 
incredible military growth came at the expense of social spending such as education, 
healthcare, clean water and food. The Barre regime had one of the worst human rights 
records in Africa. During Barre’s reign, Somalis ranked among the lowest in the 
world for per capita caloric intake (Leeson 2007). Meanwhile, the military accounted 
for 90 percent of Somalia's total expenditures (Mubarak 1997). The United States and 
the Soviet Union also paid Somalia a great injustice by equipping it with arms and 
weapons rather than helping it develop its infrastructure, agriculture, industry and 
educational system. 
In 1975, to further its revolutionary socialist agenda to liberate women and 
equalize society, Barre passed the Family Law, allowing women to inherit wealth 
equally with men, restricting the practice of polygamy and allowing women to 
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divorce their husbands. When Somali religious leaders insisted that the law violated 
Islam, the government put ten to death and imprisoned or exiled hundreds more 
(Abdullahi 2007a). 
In 1977, the Barre regime openly supported rebels in the Ogaden Desert along 
the border between Ethiopia and Somalia leading to the Ogaden War. Although the 
Soviet Union had previously supported Barre and the United States had supported 
Ethiopia, the Soviet Union switched alliances following a Marxist coup in Ethiopia 
led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the head of Ethiopia’s Derg regime (Zounmenou 
2009). Other communist states such as Cuba, East Germany, North Korea and The 
People’s Republic of Yemen also sent troops and/or military aid to Ethiopia (Prunier 
and Gisselquist 2003).  
In an act of Cold War balancing, the United States began to support Somalia 
(Schraeder 1992). Despite American support, Somalia lost badly. The eight-month 
war cost Somalia roughly 32,000 troops and nearly all of its heavy military 
machinery. Still, the Ogaden conflict was never fully resolved. Conflict over control 
of the region continues to this day. The primary agents in the fight are the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF) and ENDF. ONLF claims that rightful control of 
the Ogaden belongs to Somalis, and it perceives Ethiopia as an occupying force in 
Somali territory while ENDF is simply defending the status quo (Abdullahi 2007b).  
 Somalia’s conflict with Kenya over their poorly-secured, 424-mile common 
border is also an ongoing problem. Somalia never accepted the borders drawn by the 
British at independence as the Shifta War exemplified (1963-1967). The Somali 
government backed Somali rebels in the Northern Frontier District against the Kenyan 
army in their fight to secede from Kenya and become a part of Greater Somalia 
(Møller 2009). 
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 As with the Ogaden War, the Shifta War was never fully resolved either. The 
Somali government signed a ceasefire in 1967, but local clans continue to clash along 
the border over control of land and resources (Whittaker 2008). In 1981, the so-called 
"bandits" (the word "shifta" is used in the Horn sub region to refer to bandits or 
outlaws) formally became the Northern Frontier District Liberation Army (NFDLA) 
and obtained funding from conservative Gulf countries (Ringquist 2011). 
 With the exception of a few major incidents such as the 1984 Wagalla 
Massacre when Kenyan security forces rounded up approximately 2,000 Somali men 
and opened fire on them at the Wagalla Airstrip (Kerrow 2010), it is usually left to 
local clan elders to resolve smaller disputes in the absence of more formal 
mechanisms (Menkhaus 2005).   
 The Kenyan government has all but ignored the region regarding social 
services and infrastructure. While there is no official survey data available from the 
Northern Frontier District, an online article from the region maintains that the Somali 
inhabitants feel that they are being forced to be Kenyans against their will. The issue 
is a matter of perception. The NFDLA and native Somalis in the region perceive 
Kenya as an occupying force on Somali land, and they want to have a say in who 
controls their territory (Mburu 2005). 
Ongoing border disputes are only part of the equation, however. A greater 
source of instability is derived from internal conflict. While clan politics constitutes 
the lion’s share of the fighting, religious differences between moderates and 
extremists also plays a role.  
Sufism has traditionally been the predominant form of Islam practiced in 
Africa (Lewis 2002). The main differences between Sufism and Salafist Islam is that 
the former tends to be more adaptable to social norms as it is less concerned with a 
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strict interpretation of the Koran and more concerned with individual spirituality and 
growth. In other words, it cares less about outward observance and more about inner 
purity (Meijer 2009). Salafist Islam, on the other hand, stresses a strict interpretation 
of the Koran and demands much more rigid outward conformity to Islamic precepts 
(Gelvin 2010). Salafist teaching often rejects Western culture and advocates both the 
purification of Islam and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate (Hill 2010).  
Even before Somalia gained its independence, Somalis began travelling to 
Egypt and to Saudi Arabia to study Salafi/Wahhabi Islam. However, those who broke 
with the dominant Sufi beliefs and traditions in Somalia were clearly in the minority, 
and they enjoyed only limited success in spreading their beliefs among Somalia’s Sufi 
majority (Gatsiounis 2013).  
In the 1970s, a large number of Somali men travelled to Saudi Arabia to work 
in the oil fields. Many of these men returned to Somalia with a strict Salafist 
interpretation of Islam that influenced the emergence of two groups in Somalia: The 
Unity of Islamic Youth (Wahdat al Shabaab al Islamiyya) and The Islamic Group (al 
Jama’a al Islamiyya) (Møller 2009).  In 1982, the two organizations merged to 
become the Islamic Union (al Ittihad al Islamiyya), commonly known as AIAI 
(Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010, Shinn 2011).  
 
4.2.4: From the Islamic Union to the Union of Islamic Courts 
 
AIAI received substantial financial support from Saudi-based charitable 
organizations, and thus it was heavily influenced by Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine. The 
members of AIAI largely consisted of educated Muslims who had studied in the Middle 
East and believed that political Islam was the only answer to the problem of the corrupt 
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government in Somalia (Menkhaus 2004b; Pirio and Gregorian 2006). Under the 
leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys, AIAI’s primary goals were to oust the corrupt 
Barre regime, establish an Islamic government in Somalia and free the Ogaden region, 
currently controlled by Ethiopia (ICG 2002).  
Funded by wealthy Saudis and Somali expatriates in Kenya, AIAI gained 
control of the Gedo region of Somalia and appointed Mohamed Haji Yusuf, a former 
Somali High Court judge, as leader of the region. Yusuf set up Islamic courts, medical 
centers, schools, orphanages and other charitable services in the region. Yusuf also 
outlawed Qat, a stimulant that is commonly chewed in the Horn region (Miller 2004).  
 Meanwhile, Barre privileged members of his own sub-clan (the Marehan) by 
granting them access to the best land, water and government jobs. For example, Barre 
supported Marehan herders by backing their claim on available water in Southern 
Somalia. Barre also showed favoritism to certain other groups, particularly to the 
Ogadeni (his mother’s sub-clan) and to the Dhulbahante (his son-in-law’s sub-clan), 
while intentionally causing divisions among the other various clans and sub-clans to 
keep them weak.  
External funding during the Cold War years allowed the Barre regime to 
pursue a ruthless strategy pitting one clan against the other. Those clans that were not 
favored by Barre united in the 1980s to form various opposition groups such as the 
Somali Patriotic Movement, the Somali National Movement and the United Somali 
Congress (Shay 2010). When Cold War support dried up, the Barre regime had too 
many enemies and too little resources (Rawson 1993). Barre eventually became 
known as the “mayor of Mogadishu” because he had lost control of so much of the 
rest of the country (Gettleman 2009).  
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The Somali Civil War broke out in January, 1991. An alliance of clan militias 
armed with American and Soviet military-grade weapons drove Barre from power. 
With Barre out of the way, fighting then broke out between the militias as they 
spewed their venom on each other (Mwangi 2012). A free for all followed as war 
profiteers battled over everything of value from shipping ports to parking spots. 
Overpriced (and often tainted) goods flooded the market as warlords and clan militias 
taxed shipments by land and sea (Besteman and Cassanelli 1996).  
A conference was held in Djibouti in June and July of the same year, in which 
an interim government was set up with Ali Mahdi Mohamed named as interim 
president. General Mohammed Farah Aideed (a warlord from the Habir Gadir sub-
clan of the Hawiye clan) rejected the agreement, however, and took control of the 
Southern part of Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Ali Mahdi (from the Abigal sub-clan of the 
Hawiye clan) retained control of the Northern districts. A green line initially divided 
the two camps, however, the civil war disintegrated even further into all out clan 
warfare as clans and sub-clans fought for control over scarce resources (Møller 2009).   
Conditions grew steadily worse. Somaliland seceded in May 1991, and by 
1992, there were more than ten militarized factions controlling various areas of 
Somalia.49 These forces, led by competing warlords, fought among themselves for 
hegemony, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians and displacing nearly one 
million others (Sommer 1994).  
                                                 
49 United Somali Front (USF), Somali Party (USP), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali 
Democratic Alliance (SDA), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front (SSDF), Somali National Front (SNF), Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali Africans Muke 
Organization (SAMO), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and 
Somali National Union (SNU). 
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The humanitarian crisis that resulted prompted the UN to respond in 
November 1992 with humanitarian aid and multinational peacekeeping forces to 
ensure its delivery. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I) not 
only failed to improve conditions in Somalia, it most likely made them worse. By 
attempting to distribute food and aid through the warlords, the UN only empowered 
them more and further fanned the flames of the insurgents. UNOSOM-I was followed 
in December 1992 by the U.S.-led United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and 
UNOSOM-II in March 1993 (Boutros-Gali 1996).  
In March 1993, fifteen different warring parties signed two separate 
agreements calling for national reconciliation and disarmament. The first agreement 
was basically an agreement to reconvene at a future time to discuss national 
reconciliation. When they re-assembled at the Conference on National Reconciliation 
on March 27, they signed the Addis Ababa Agreement which outlined the terms of 
national reconciliation and disarmament. Fighting continued, however, and the 
agreement was of little effect other than to unite several of the factions together under 
the leadership of Aideed (AMISOM 2016).  
Although UNITAF (also called Operation Restore Hope) received a UN 
mandate to establish a safe zone for humanitarian intervention, it was more-or-less a 
unilateral effort that also went badly awry. The intervention of 28,000 (mostly 
American) forces largely turned the civil conflict in Mogadishu into a bilateral war 
between the United States and Aideed’s coalition (Samatar 2010).  
U.S. troops also attracted al Qaeda’s attention, and the group dispatched 
operatives to train Somali militants and fight beside them (Shinn 2009, Mingst and 
Kams 2011). Al Qaeda operatives fought in the Battle of Mogadishu (and the 
infamous Black Hawk Down incident) of October 3, 1993 where Somali militants 
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killed 18 U.S. soldiers and paraded their corpses in triumph through the streets of the 
city (Sangvic 1998). Al Qaeda later bragged how the defeat led to the withdrawal of 
American troops (Kohlmann 2009), however, many believe that al Qaeda exaggerated 
the extent of its role in the victory (e.g. Gartenstein-Ross 2009, Harnisch and 
Zimmerman 2010).  
UNOSOM-II was dispatched in March 1993 to take over where UNITAF left 
off. Meanwhile, the U.S. began to pull out of the fight. The U.S. withdrawal from 
Somalia was completed by March 1994. Following suit, UN forces began to withdraw 
as well. The last peacekeepers left in March 1995. After more than two years of 
fighting and substantial casualties, some would argue that the international 
humanitarian intervention left Somalia in worse condition than it had been in before 
the peacekeepers arrived (Clarke and Herbst 1997). 
As disastrous as the failed UNOSOM missions turned out to be, one huge 
benefit resulted. The vast quantities of aid funneled into Somalia in turn required a 
myriad of local contractors to build infrastructure and telecommunications systems to 
aid in its disbursement. Somali businessmen began to offer what the government no 
longer could: schools, healthcare facilities, courier services and even power plants.  
The result was a Somali shilling that was more stable without the central bank 
than it had been during the last decade of the Barre regime. Despite the involvement 
of the warlords, this enormous infusion of cash and the creation of legitimate business 
opportunities had a ripple effect on the Somali economy which stimulated trade and 
bolstered the political will for stability and the rule of law (Menkhaus et al. 1995).  
AIAI had managed to maintain control of the city of Luuq near the borders 
with Ethiopia and Kenya. The group imposed a strict interpretation of sharia and 
punished violations without mercy. Amputations and stoning were commonplace, but 
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in the absence of another alternative, the people accepted AIAI because life was safer 
under the Islamists than anywhere else in Somalia (Jan 2000). In 1996, the Ethiopians 
provided an alternative (Dagne 2010).  
Because of AIAI’s strategic goal of creating a greater Somalia, the group 
focused on liberating the ethnically Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia. AIAI agitated 
separatist sentiment in the area and plagued Addis Ababa with a series of 
assassination attempts and bombings in the mid-1990s. Luuq's close proximity to the 
Ethiopian border made it both a threat and a convenient target (Jan 2000).  
Ethiopian troops attacked AIAI’s stronghold in Luuq and slaughtered 
hundreds of AIAI militants. Various clan militias and many Somalis welcomed the 
Ethiopian victory because they resented the imposition of Salafist ideology and the 
presence of AIAI militants from other clans. The group decided to alter course and 
change its operational approach. Rather than relying primarily on military tactics 
(terror attacks, gaining control of territory and attempting to hold it), AIAI began to 
focus on providing social services and building a constituency that way (Phillips 
2002, Dagne 2010, Menkhaus 2005). 
Further efforts at peace and reconciliation were also made. Between 
November 1996 and January 1997, a conference in Sodere, Ethiopia established a 41-
member National Salvation Council (NSC) which was assigned the task of creating a 
transitional government. Hussein Farrah Aideed, son of the late General Aideed, and 
the government of Somaliland both refused to attend the conference, however.  
A similar conference was convened later that year in Sana’a, Yemen, but this 
one was also boycotted and rejected by parties to the conflict. It was not until 
December 1997 that another attempt, this time in Cairo, concluded with an agreement 
signed by 28 parties (including both Ali Mahdi and Hussein Farrah Aideed). The 
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Cairo Declaration established a Council of Presidents, a prime minister and a national 
assembly. But the attendees could not agree on a leader (AMISOM 2016). 
Meanwhile, back in Somalia, sub-national governance began to emerge. Local 
Islamic courts sprung up in place of the collapsed Somali government. They 
maintained a rule of law, collected taxes and offered basic services such as running 
water. Local courts were just that, however, local. The courts exercised jurisdiction 
only within specific sub-clans with no authority outside that sub-clan’s town or 
neighborhood. So while the local courts did much to improve law and order within 
clans, they did little to establish law and order between clans. In fact, they often 
competed among themselves for control of strategic resources (Ibrahim 2010).  
Even within the more stable autonomous region of Somaliland, fragmentation 
continued to be a major challenge to maintaining law and order. The local courts also 
proved initially powerless to confront the warlords, who were a major threat to peace 
and security following the collapse of the Barre government (Marchal 2007). But the 
local authorities did at least enjoy some level of legitimacy in the eyes of their 
constituents which is more than can be said of the warlords (Le Sage 2005). 
The fact that the local tribal leaders and the local courts enjoyed legitimacy in 
the eyes of their constituents went a long way in preserving order at the local level. A 
correlation can be drawn between the local peace achieved in Somalia and the 
perception of the local courts as legitimate in the eyes of the people.  
Despite claims that AIAI posed a serious international threat, many experts 
remain unconvinced concerning its strength and alleged links with international 
terrorist organizations, claiming that there is no reliable information or pattern of 
behavior to indicate that the group had an international agenda (Dagne 2002).  
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Still, U.S. intelligence reported that AIAI cooperated with al-Qaeda in the 
1998 United States embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that claimed the 
lives of 224 people. After 9/11 and the subsequent defeat of the Taliban, AIAI was 
labeled a terrorist organization by the United States. Washington feared that the 
collapse of the Taliban would drive al Qaeda operatives to Somalia to seek safe haven 
with AIAI. Under Executive Order 13224, the organization’s finances were frozen 
and its leaders were sanctioned (ICG 2005, Shinn 2007). The U.S. also put pressure 
on Saudi Arabia to close down al-Haramain, an Islamic charity that funded AIAI. The 
Bush administration also froze the assets of al-Barakat, a wire service in Somalia, 
claiming that it transferred funds for al Qaeda (Kelley 2001).  
In 1998, Aweys started an Islamic court in Merka, a port city in Southern 
Somalia. Aweys, who hails from a sub-clan of the Hawiye/Habr Gedir clan, rose to 
prominence as the spiritual leader of the Consultative Council of Islamic Courts, a 
loose network of Islamic courts that controlled Northern Mogadishu (Holzer 2008). 
The more moderate members of the group disagreed with Aweys’ strict Wahhabist 
views, but they were unable to prevent the hard-liners from taking control. Aweys’ 
court soon became a foundation of the future ICU (ICG 2005; Barnes 2007).  
A major political divide emerged in Somalia. On the one side, the Mogadishu 
Group was dominated by the Hawiye/Habr Gedir clan and favored a strong central 
government. This group included Islamists such as Aweys, received support from the 
Arab world and was staunchly anti-Ethiopian. On the other side, the Somali 
Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), led by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad (a 
former warlord turned president of Puntland), favored a decentralized state. The 
SRRC was anti-Islamist, pro-Ethiopian and dominated by the Darood clan-family. 
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These two camps were so bitterly opposed to one another that more than a dozen 
efforts at reconciliation failed to bring unity to Somalia (Menkhaus, 2007). 
One such effort, the 2000 peace talks in Arta, Djibouti, culminated in the 
establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG was 
dominated by the Mogadishu Group and therefore opposed by the SRRC. It faced 
substantial political opposition by various other clan factions as well. The TNG was 
also seriously weakened by financial problems and internal conflicts. Three years and 
four prime ministers later, the TNG declared bankruptcy (ICG 2002).   
In October 2004, after two years of negotiations, the delegates to the Nairobi 
peace accords agreed that a transitional federal government would replace the defunct 
TNG. The negotiations were anything but neutral, however, and heavy outside 
pressure influenced the outcome. The TFG was clearly allied with Ethiopia, and it 
therefore alienated many Somali clans, especially in and around Mogadishu (Koko 
2007). 
 Not surprisingly, on October 10, 2004, the TFG elected Abdullahi Yusuf as its 
president. Yusuf, as the leader of the SRRC and with the support of Ethiopia, had 
heavily influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for the 
past two years concerning the formation of a new government.50 Ethiopia had an 
interest in replacing the TNG because it had been strongly influenced by Islamist 
groups, and so Addis Ababa supported the SRRC toward that end. Even though IGAD 
attempted to reconcile the SRRC with the TNG, Ethiopia was able to influence the 
                                                 
50 The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development is a trade bloc consisting of Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. 
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final outcome and thousands of Ethiopian troops would later support the TFG from 
late 2006 until the beginning of 2009 (Shinn 2011).  
The resulting TFG, though supposedly based upon the principle of 
proportional clan representation, was not a unity government at all. Instead, it was a 
narrow, pro-Ethiopian coalition which excluded Islamist groups and TNG supporters 
alike. Among those which were marginalized by the new government was the Habar 
Gedir Ayr sub-clan, one of the most influential sub-clans in Southern Somalia. The 
previous TNG president, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, as well as several prominent 
Islamist figures, descended from this sub-clan (Menkhaus 2004c).  
Both the TNG and the TFG employed the 4.5 formula, an electoral policy that 
allocates equal seats in parliament to the four largest clan-families. Half that number 
of seats were allocated to the remaining minority groups. However, because Somali 
clan-families are further divided into sub-clans, the TFG was able to abide by the 4.5 
formula in principle while effectively excluding sub-clans that were politically 
opposed to it (Bryden and Brickhill 2010). 
The TFG was largely viewed as a puppet regime by many ordinary Somalis. A 
Somali blog representative of this perspective refers to the "U.S. inspired brutal 
occupation of Somalia by Ethiopian troops,” as just another sign of U.S. imperialism 
and hegemony (Lalkar 2009). The blog states that the TFG was created by Ethiopia 
and was controlled by the US. It further states that the ICU, which the U.S. overthrew, 
exercised considerably more authority and created more stability than the TFG could 
have ever hoped to.  
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4.2.5: From the ICU to al Shabaab 
 
The ICU emerged as several of these clan-based courts began to cooperate 
with one another (Menkhaus 2005; Stevenson 2007). By 2005, eleven clan-based 
courts merged to form the ICU. Some, like the court in Merka, were radical and some 
were more moderate. At the top of the ICU organizational structure, the Supreme 
Islamic Court was chaired by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Some would argue that the real 
power, however, was in the hands of Aweys who headed the Shura Council which 
could approve or veto all decisions made by the Supreme Islamic Court (Stevenson 
2007; Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010). Still, most districts were ruled according to 
the individual court that held jurisdiction over it. Therefore, the application of sharia 
and secular law was patchwork depending upon the local judge (Mwangi 2010).  
Not long after the ICU established itself, hundreds of foreign fighters from 
Chechnya, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula began arriving to 
train in Somalia’s training camps. Eventually the ICU became the central judicial 
body in Somalia and also took on the role of the de-facto police as local businesses 
hired its services for protection against gangs and organized crime (Prendergast and 
Thomas-Fensen 2007; Bakier 2008).  
The ICU also supported two armed insurgencies against Ethiopia: the Oromo 
Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (Connell 2009). The 
leadership of the ICU was comprised of mostly moderate Islamic scholars. As before, 
however, Awey’s influence was strong and the hardliners dominated the courts 
(Ibrahim 2010). The ICU won the support of the people as it waged war on crime, 
drugs and pornography. Most ordinary Somalis, while not necessarily favoring the 
imposition of strict sharia, preferred the ICU over the corruption and chaos that 
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ensued under the TFG and the warlords (Terdman 2008; Bruton 2010; Harnisch and 
Zimmerman 2010).  
The rise and success of the ICU in 2006 triggered alarm among Somalia’s 
neighbors and also raised considerable concern within the international community. 
Ethiopia feared a continuation of AIAI-style attacks while the U.S. suspected that the 
ICU continued to maintain AIAI’s alleged connection with al Qaeda. Many moderate 
Somalis worried that, given Eritrea’s support for the ICU, Somalia would be used as a 
battlefield in the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The greater concern within the 
international community was that Somalia might turn into another Afghanistan 
(Bruton 2009).  
As the ICU gained influence, the warlords and other clan-based authorities 
began to challenge its authority and demand that ICU militias withdraw from their 
districts. However, the ICU claimed a mandate based on the support of the people and 
the fact that many local businesses had hired its militias to protect them from the 
warlords. In February 2006, the warlords formed the Alliance for Restoration of Peace 
and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) and were backed by TFG forces and funded by the 
U.S (Bruton 2010; Shay 2010; Stevenson 2007).  
After the failure of UNITAF in 1992-93, one would think that the United 
States had learned a lesson or two about dealing with Somali warlords. Nevertheless, 
the Bush administration decided that the way to fight the Islamists was to deputize the 
warlords and arm them to the teeth. According to one account, American CIA agents 
armed with briefcases full of cash arrived in Mogadishu. The fact that the warlords 
had been exploiting and abusing the Somali people for decades was bad enough. Now 
they were supported by the United States. The Bush administration’s move backfired 
badly and the ICU grew more popular than ever (Gettleman 2009). 
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Fighting between the ICU and ARPCT escalated into open street battles in the 
capital and continued for four months (Kagwanja 2006). In April 2006, a UN 
monitoring group referred to the ICU as a “third force” in Somalia and reported a 
dramatic increase in its military capability (Schiemsky et al. 2006). On June 5, 2006, 
the ICU took control of Mogadishu and it soon controlled most of Southern and 
central Somalia. The ICU victory over the ARPCT and TFG forces marked the first 
unified rule in Mogadishu in 15 years (Stevenson 2007; Abbink 2009; Gartenstein-
Ross 2009). Other groups subsequently joined the ICU (which renamed itself the 
Supreme Council of Islamic Courts), and the ICU model of governance quickly 
spread throughout Southern Somalia as a result (Menkhaus 2008, Bruton 2010). 
Puntland and Somaliland still remained outside of the ICU’s control, and 
Baidoa served as the TFG stronghold, but the ICU controlled large portions of 
Somalia and its authority was increasing. By October 2006, the ICU had claimed 
nearly all of the country’s key strategic points and was able to transport supplies 
without hindrance. Somali businessmen greatly benefitted from the removal of the 
many roadblocks and checkpoints previously used to tax the movement of goods 
under the warlords. Furthermore, Baidoa was more-or-less surrounded and many TFG 
forces defected to the ICU. If it were not for the Ethiopian military surrounding the 
city, Baidoa would have fallen to the Islamists (Roggio 2006).  
For the first time in years, civil society began to return to ICU-controlled 
areas. Children played outside, trash was collected and Islam truly equated to a 
measure of peace. Still, the price was high. Thousands of Somali civilians had been 
displaced in the conflict (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2007; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010).  
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Many credit the ICU’s victory to outside assistance from Eritrea, Saudi Arabia 
and members of the Somali Diaspora (Terdman 2008). However, others attribute the 
ICU’s success to the strong nationalist sentiment that developed among the Somali 
people. This nationalism was fueled by the fact that both the ARPCT and the TFG 
were backed by the hated Ethiopians, and worse yet, the Americans. The people’s 
perception of the ICU as legitimate and the ARPCT and TFG as illegitimate proved to 
be a decisive factor (Bruton 2010). This perception was echoed by a leading member 
of the ARPCT as his reason for defecting to the ICU. "I have left the alliance because 
of requests from elders and other civil society members from my Sa'ad sub-clan" 
(Aljazeera 2006). 
Had the ICU not been so internally fragmented itself, it might have been more 
successful in using this spirit of nationalism to unite the Somali people. But two 
opposing ideologies within the ICU itself prevented this. The first was the division 
between the moderates who wanted to cooperate with the TFG and the hardliners who 
wanted to overthrow it. The second division concerned the issues of morality and 
foreign influences. The hardliners wanted to effectively ban any and all foreign 
media- particularly movies and music. They also wanted to rid Somalia of all social 
influences (foreign or domestic) that tainted the purity of Islam. The hardliners 
imposed a strict interpretation of sharia upon Somali society which made them less 
popular than the moderates. However, the hardliners controlled the ICU’s armed 
militias (Le Sage 2009).  
A message, presumably from Osama bin Laden, was posted on the internet in 
July 2006 encouraging Somalis to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and promising 
to join the fight against the TFG and its external supporters (Hansen 2013). In 
September 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri further urged all Somalis to oppose the TFG and 
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its allies. On 18 September, a Somali man named Abdisalan Hirsi Mahmud Lugey 
became the first known Somali to carry out a suicide attack by detonating his vehicle 
outside parliament in the provincial capital of Baidoa. The attack, which targeted 
former President, Abdullahi Yusuf, killed five people and injured several others. 
Yusuf was not harmed (Gartenstein-Ross 2009). 
Meanwhile, the ICU made several efforts to convince the international 
community that it was a moderate force intent on returning peace and order to 
Somalia. These efforts included improving traveler safety, re-opening both the 
Mogadishu airport and seaport, and fighting pirates (Terdman 2008).  
The ICU’s efforts to combat piracy were largely underappreciated. Roughly 
ninety percent of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal. 
Approximately 20,000 ships sail Somali territorial waters every year. Nearly one third 
of the world’s oil is shipped through the Gulf of Aden. Given Somalia’s 3,025 
kilometers of coastline, protecting coastal waters is no small feat (Menkhaus 2009a).51  
                                                 
51 Piracy increased dramatically after the ICU disintegrated. The year 2008 witnessed a surge in 
reported pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden. The International Maritime Bureau lists 111 recorded 
attacks off the Horn of Africa in 2008 alone- more than double the number of reported attacks in 2007.  
Estimates vary, however, depending on how one defines a pirate attack. Also, ships rarely report minor 
incidents or attempted attacks (to keep insurance premiums as low as possible), so the actual number of 
attempted attacks and thefts may be considerably higher. It is difficult to be certain. What is known, 
however, is that by the end of the year, at least 815 crewmembers had been taken hostage and twenty-
three countries had sent a total of 30 warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden. Estimates of total ransoms 
collected in 2008 range from $50 million to $130 million (Gettleman 2009; Rothwell 2009). A record 
$3.2 million was paid for the release of the MV Faina alone (Frump 2009). By April 2009, Somali 
pirates were operating within an area extending over one million square miles from the Gulf of Aden to 
the Indian Ocean. Between January and September 2009, an estimated 306 attacks took place. Pirates 
boarded approximately 114 ships, took 661 crew members hostage and murdered six others (Ploch et 
al. 2011). This enormous increase in reported attacks generated renewed interest in piracy. In addition 
to questions regarding the sovereignty of Somalia and whether it is legal for foreign states to conduct 
counter-piracy measures in Somali coastal waters, there has also been speculation in the popular media 
that the recent increase in piracy is somehow linked to terrorism (Burgess 2008). But this concern is 
largely unfounded. While there have been allegations that al Shabaab taxes the profits gained from 
piracy (ICG 2014), it is known that the ICU took a very strong stand against piracy, making it a capital 
offense and beheading convicted pirates (Panjabi 2009). Unfortunately, the ongoing struggle for power 
between the TFG and al Shabaab provided a vacuum within which lawlessness and chaos thrived. 
Piracy and other forms of violent crime grew rampant as desperate Somali youths were lured into illicit 
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 Despite these efforts, the ICU was unable to win the favor of the international 
community (Wise 2011). Any further effort became futile once the idea spread that 
the ICU was controlled by al-Qaeda. This misinformation was first advanced by 
Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, in November 2006 and then echoed by U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, in December 2006. 
As a result, international favor rested largely with the TFG, which was receiving 
military support from Ethiopia, the African Union (AU) and the United States (Shinn 
2007).  
Addis Ababa, of course, benefited substantially from the rumor. With a 
population that is nearly 50% Muslim, and the ethnically Somali ONLF active within 
its borders, the last thing Ethiopia wanted to see was an Islamist awakening gain 
ground next store. Selling itself as an agent of light against the forces of evil, it did 
not take much for the Zenawi administration to convince the U.S. to back the 
Ethiopian invasion (Gettleman 2006).   
On 6 December, the UN passed Resolution 1725 (in 15 minutes!). The 
resolution authorized IGAD and the surrounding AU Member States to train and 
protect TFG forces, and further stipulated that according to the arms embargo 
originally imposed in 1992 (under UN Resolution 733) and readdressed in 2002 
(under UN Resolution 1425), the surrounding AU Member States would not deploy 
troops to Somalia. However, the resolution did allow weapons to be introduced for the 
sake of training and protection (United Nations 2006).   
                                                 
activities by the promise of easy money and a way out of their dismal and hopeless existence (Hanson 
2013).  
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On December 20, 2006, the ICU attacked TFG forces in Baidoa which were 
heavily backed by Ethiopian troops. The attack failed. Many of the ICU’s fighters fell 
in the offensive, and many more were driven back by the superior Ethiopian military 
(Hackett 2006; McGregor 2008). On December 25, Ethiopian forces “officially” 
crossed into Somalia with 14,000 troops where they were accused of indiscriminately 
shelling civilian areas, including entire neighborhoods- prompting the EU to open a 
war crimes investigation (Harper 2012).  
The UN asserts that it has evidence that Ethiopia exploded white phosphorous 
bombs against al Shabaab militants hiding among civilians.52 White phosphorous 
burns human flesh to the bone, and it keeps burning until it is deprived of oxygen. 
Victims who survive the burns often die of vital organ failure as the phosphorous is 
absorbed into the body. These and other atrocities forced hundreds of thousands of 
Somalis out of Mogadishu (Smith 2007).  
By December 29, a combination of TFG forces, Ethiopian troops, and AU 
peacekeepers backed by U.S. air power reclaimed Mogadishu, and the TFG moved its 
headquarters to Mogadishu. In the face of utter defeat, Aweys resigned as the leader 
of the ICU (Stevenson 2007; Gartenstein-Ross 2009; Harper 2012).   
By January 12, 2007, the combined forces took Ros Kamboni, the ICU’s only 
remaining stronghold. On January 13, 2007, the TFG declared a state of martial law 
throughout Somalia in an effort to consolidate its authority. The ICU disintegrated 
with the moderate members fleeing to Eritrea and the hardliners reconstituting into al 
Shabaab and later Hizbul Islam. Many of the group’s fighters simply went back to 
                                                 
52  The UN presented photographs and soil samples demonstrating that affected areas had 117 times as 
much phosphorus as normal (Smith 2007). 
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their clans and took their weapons with them (McGregor 2008; Menkhaus 2008). For 
the first time since 1991, the federal government controlled most of Somalia (Browne 
and Fisher 2013).  
 
4.2.6: From al Shabaab to the Present Day 
 
The group that would officially become known as al Shabaab began as the 
Youth Movement wing of the ICU. The official name of the group is Harakat al-
Shabaab al Mujahidin or Movement of the Striving Youth (Woodward 2012).53 It is 
not entirely certain when the group began. Accounts of its early leadership also 
vary.54 By one account, the group was founded in 1998. The original leader of the 
faction, Aden Hashi Ayro, was appointed by Aweys, his long-time mentor, who was 
then the leader of the Shura Council of the ICU (Dempsey 2006). It is believed that 
Aweys arranged for Ayro to train in Afghanistan in the 1990s (Gartenstein-Ross, 
2009; Shinn 2011). 
In July 2004, the CIA attempted to assassinate an al- Qaeda operative, Abu 
Taha al-Sudani, believed to have been sheltered by Aweys and Ayro in a compound 
in Mogadishu. The CIA authorized a raid which resulted in the death of Ayros’ 
                                                 
53 In local parlance where I live in the United Arab Emirates, al Shabaab simply translates as “the 
guys.” 
54 Reports of the group’s origins vary. One version suggests that al Shabaab emerged in 2005 when the 
group retaliated with a number of reprisal killings after a string of ICU members were assassinated in 
Mogadishu (Barnes and Hassan 2007). Another suggests that Aweys created the group in 1998 as the 
military arm of the ICU (ICG 2008). A variation of this report claims that Aweys created the group in 
2006 to fight against the Ethiopians (ICG 2008). A third version claims that the group formed in 1996 
in a training camp in southcentral Somalia (Bakier 2008). A fourth version suggests that al Shabaab 
emerged in 2003 after a group of radicals stormed out of an AIAI meeting in Laascanood and later 
formed the group (Dagne 2010; Shinn 2011).  In an interview in 2011, Ahmed Madobe (who later 
became president of Jubaland State, claimed, “I wasn’t just in the Shabab; I helped found it” 
(Gettleman 2011). 
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brother-in-law (neither Ayro, Aweys, nor al-Sudani were present). According to the 
story, Ayro spent the next 18 months recruiting and training poor and marginalized 
young Somali men. These young fighters were not religious radicals by any means. 
Unemployed and desperate, their loyalty lay first with their clans and second to the 
ICU due to the wealth of social services it offered (Vidino et. al. 2010).  
Regardless of how the group actually began, it is generally agreed that the 
original members included Ayro, Godane, Robow, Faud Mohamed Khalaf Shangole 
and Ibrahim Haji Jama al-Afghani (Dagne 2010, Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010a).55 
By December 2006, when the ICU was driven out, more than 5,000 al Shabaab 
fighters remained behind in Mogadishu alone (Bruton and Williams, 2014).56   
The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 played an important role 
in both the rise and operational strategy of al Shabaab. First, al Shabaab owes much of 
its original success to the intense anti-Ethiopian and anti-American sentiment felt by 
many Somalis. Not only did the majority of Somalis resent Ethiopian occupation, they 
had not forgotten Mogadishu 1993. And they hated the occupation even more because 
of the fact that it was supported by the American military (Strachan 2008). While the 
ICU gained legitimacy for its ability to offer stable governance amid the chaos in the 
wake of the Barre regime, al Shabaab’s legitimacy derived from the fact that it was 
fighting a foreign invasion. This perception of the group among average Somalis 
boosted its recruitment efforts substantially and largely allowed it to transcend clan 
identification (Solomon 2014).  
                                                 
55 It is believed that all five of these men trained in Afghanistan. 
56 The Ethiopian invasion dramatically increased al Shabaab’s membership from about 400 initially to 
several thousand (Wise 2011). 
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Second, the invasion pitted the young and tiny ‘David’ against the much larger 
and seasoned ‘Goliath.’ Thus, al Shabaab learned to employed guerrilla tactics early 
on in order to survive. Finally, the presence of a foreign army encouraged radicalism. 
While the Ethiopian incursion had been successful in wiping out the ICU, it was not 
successful in eradicating the threat of Islamic radicalism. In fact, the opposite was 
true. Al Shabaab had been the military arm of the ICU. With its more moderate 
master driven out, the group had to rely on its own political leadership as well as 
advice from outsiders. Much as was the case with the ICU, the more radical elements 
in the organization quickly floated to the top. Al Shabaab soon presented a much 
greater threat to Ethiopia than the ICU ever did (Menkhaus 2013b).  
Al Shabaab was able to capitalize on the chaos that ensued in the South 
Central regions of Somalia in 2007. The group earned tremendous popularity for its 
efforts to expel the Ethiopians (Shinn 2009; Curran 2011). This popularity afforded al 
Shabaab financial support and plenty of new recruits. While AIAI was not able to 
control territory outside the town of Luuq, both the ICU and al Shabaab gained 
control of large portions of Somalia―though neither group was able to maintain 
control for very long.  
A commercial property-owner in Mogadishu (that has requested to remain 
anonymous for reasons of personal safety) states that the group is highly organized 
and very strict on its members. The source also disclosed that most al Shabaab 
fighters are poor, illiterate young men who are fiercely loyal to the organization 
(although the group has also been able to attract increasing numbers of young women 
as well- mostly through family connections with existing members). Since the 
majority of the rank and file cannot read, it is much easier for the group to radicalize 
them (Anonymous 2016).    
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The group established training camps and, in the absence of any real 
government opposition in the South, was able to arm and train its recruits quickly and 
effectively without hindrance. Thus the Ethiopian invasion was largely responsible for 
both radicalizing al Shabaab and transforming it into the most lethal militia in 
Somalia (Menkhaus and Boucek 2010; Wise 2011). However, it is important to point 
out that the Ethiopian invasion merely picked up where the Barre regime and the 
warlords that followed left off. A resident of Somaliland described the terrible 
persecution her Isaaq tribe endured at the hands of the Barre Regime (Hussain 2016).  
As al Shabaab increased in power, it began to expand the area under its 
control. Whenever the group took control of a new region, it would use a combination 
of charity, public rallies and propaganda to win over the majority- often coopting 
local clan elders for support. Where public relations failed, intimidation and sheer 
terror succeeded (Bruton 2009; Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010; Curran 2011).   
The group operated much as the ICU did before it, as a network of more-or-
less independent administrations accountable to a central Shura Council consisting of 
85 members and led by the group’s emir (Shinn 2011). Each administration was 
responsible for implementing al Shabaab’s radical interpretation of sharia. However, 
as with the ICU, the actual implementation varied from one administration to the next 
(Gartenstein-Ross 2009). The Shura Council possessed the authority to overrule 
decisions made by individual administrations, such as when the Office for 
Supervising Foreign Agencies reversed the decision by some administrations to 
increase the number of aid agencies permitted to operate due to the drought in 2011 
(Chothia 2011).  
In most cases, al Shabaab enforced a strict Salafist interpretation of sharia in 
an effort to radically reform all aspects of Somali life and society. The group also 
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used Salafi-Wahhabism as a way to transcend clan loyalties and forge alliances 
between clans (Roque 2009).  
The group’s religious police, the Army of Hisbul, carried out public whippings 
and amputations for crimes such as stealing, drug use or improper dress and public 
executions for murder, adultery and other more serious crimes (Harnisch and 
Zimmerman 2010). All forms of entertainment such as movies, music, sports and 
dancing were prohibited as well as any public coed activities. Women were required 
to completely cover their body and were denied participation in most aspects of public 
life. Indeed, women were forbidden to go out in public at all unless accompanied by a 
male relative. Single women were often compelled to get married, sometimes on 
penalty of death if they refused (Albin-Lackey et al. 2010; Macleod and Flamand 
2010).  
While the emphasis was clearly placed upon policing the population, these 
administrations also collected taxes, built and repaired roads and bridges, and 
provided other public goods. However, these services also varied by administration 
(Gartenstein-Ross 2009).  
Al Shabaab forced two major transitions on Somali society where the group 
was active. The first involved the imposition of strict sharia as discussed above. This 
observance of Salafist doctrine as law was alien to the vast majority of Somalis whose 
clan-based approach to conflict typically depended upon customary law and, in the 
case of an inter-clan dispute, negotiation between clan elders (Menkhaus 2007). 
However, the imposition of sharia bypassed both customary law and, in large part, the 
elders as well. Since most Somalis did not willingly accept this new order, al Shabaab 
often forced it upon them (Gartenstein-Ross 2009). 
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In early 2007, Ayman al-Zawahri released a statement encouraging al Shabaab 
and other Islamists in Somalia to employ suicide attacks to drive out the invading 
forces. Capitalizing on a power struggle between TFG president, Abdullahi Yusuf, 
and Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, al Shabaab established itself as a formidable 
opposition force and began to recapture territory lost to the TFG.  
Fighting in the capital grew fierce as al Shabaab and various other warlords 
and factions continued to oppose the TFG. By the end of 2007, the group would gain 
control of most of the capital- all but a tiny federal holdout protected by AU 
peacekeepers- but the civilian toll was alarming. The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (2007) reported that over 600,000 civilians fled 
Mogadishu in 2007 and over a million were left homeless. 
While al Shabaab primarily targeted TFG, Ethiopian and African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, it was not yet strong enough to confront them 
in conventional battles. Rather, the group employed a variety of suicide blasts, car 
bombs and sniper attacks.  
In April 2007, for example, the group exploded a car bomb outside the 
Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu where TFG officials were known to stay. The blast 
killed mostly civilians. In June 2007, al Shabaab launched a suicide attack against the 
home of Prime Minister Gedi. Although Gedi himself was not injured, seven guards 
and the attacker were killed.  
The TFG, itself largely considered a faction rather than a unity government, 
used the threat of terrorism as an excuse to request foreign assistance to defeat its 
political adversaries. However, internal division was also a problem. The president 
and prime minister were from different clans. Ahmed was from the Majeerteen Harti 
Darod clan, and Ghedi was from the Abgaal subclan of Mogadishu's Hawiye clan. 
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The two were bitter rivals and fought over clan politics. The dispute further dashed 
any hope of stabilizing the regime. 
International support for the TFG also split. With only a fraction of the 
projected AU peacekeeping forces mobilized, Ethiopia began to complain that it bore 
the brunt of the support. Meanwhile, the UN accused Ethiopian forces of human 
rights abuses (Weinstein 2008). 
In September 2007, the more moderate members of the former ICU met with 
the former TNG Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Mohamed Farrah and the former 
TNG Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden57 and formed the Alliance for 
the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). The group approved a constitution, created a 
central committee and vowed to oppose the TFG and its allies (Menkhaus 2009b; 
Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010).  
By the beginning of 2008, al Shabaab had begun to engage Ethiopian troops in 
more conventional battles and actually win. Having largely shifted away from its 
early guerrilla tactics, the group launched an offensive against Ethiopian and TFG 
forces and gained control over territory throughout southern Somalia (Harnisch and 
Zimmerman 2010; Curran 2011). In fact, already in January 2008, AU Commission 
Chairman, Alpha Konare, issued a warning that al Shabaab had captured areas outside 
of Mogadishu. Konare also expressed concerned that al Shabaab was enlisting 
additional fighters and planning to increase its territory (IRIN 2008). The AU was 
                                                 
57 President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed nominated Nur Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister after Ghedi 
resigned in October 2007. Yusuf himself was forced to resign at the end of 2008 (Lister 2012). 
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also alarmed at the group’s success, and in February 2008, the U.S. State Department 
designated al Shabaab a terrorist organization (Shinn 2011).58 
The second transition that al Shabaab forced upon the Somali public began in 
May 2008 after Ayro, the group’s emir, was killed in his own home by an American 
missile strike (Shinn 2010). Ayro was succeeded by Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed 
Godane, also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair. Godane had trained with al-Qaeda and 
fought in Afghanistan until 2001. He had also been an integral member of AIAI 
(Shinn 2009).  
Born in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, Godane was in many respects an 
outsider from the beginning. Although he was no stranger to the cause, he hailed from 
the Isaaq tribe in the North, and therefore did not have the support of his clan to count 
on in the Deep South where al Shabaab mainly operated (Le Sage 2010; Abukar 
2013). After becoming emir of the group in 2008, he began to refute clan loyalty and 
impose the takfiri doctrine upon Somalis and fellow al Shabaab members alike. This 
latter development took place as the Ethiopian occupation was beginning to wind 
down, making al Shabaab’s brutality that much more intolerable. Once Ethiopian 
troops completely withdrew in January 2009, the group enjoyed minimal support from 
the Sufi majority who clung to clan loyalty and resented the imposition of Salafi 
doctrine on their daily lives (Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010). 
Dwindling local support and strong clan loyalty among the group’s rank and 
file increased the need for foreign fighters. Therefore, al Shabaab also began to 
develop its online media program through which it warned against the evils of 
                                                 
58 On 5 April, al Shabaab released a statement declaring that the designation was an honor (NEFA 
2008). Al Qaeda responded by issuing its first public recognition of the group and encouraging Somalis 
to fight for an independent Islamic state (Shinn 2011). 
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democracy and denounced Western influence. Godane was shrewd enough to realize 
that in order to increase foreign recruits, he needed to elevate the conflict in Somalia 
beyond the local level (Thomas 2013). The group was particularly successful in 
attracting young Somalis from the diaspora, but it was also able to recruit a fair 
amount of non-Somalis as well (Bryden 2014). 
The inclusion of a foreign contingent allowed al Shabaab to introduce 
unconventional tactics into its repertoire such as the use of suicide bombings and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Suicide is taboo in Somali culture and brings 
shame and disgrace upon the family (Byman 2012). Al Shabaab first employed 
martyrdom operations in 2006 against a government convoy, and it has depended 
upon the tactic more and more as the number of foreign recruits supplied willing 
operatives (Gartenstein-Ross 2009; Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010; Shinn 2011). 
Arabic and English are spoken in the group’s martyrdom videos, demonstrating both 
their intended audience as well as the continued stigma of suicide in Somali culture 
(Vidino et al. 2010).  
Likewise, al Shabaab also increased its use of IEDs dramatically. Often 
referred to as roadside bombs, IEDs were fairly uncommon in Somalia prior to 2006. 
The group largely depended upon drive-by assassinations using technicals- machine 
guns mounted on the back of a pick-up truck (McGregor 2008).  
However, by 2011, IEDs had become the weapon of choice as unexploded 
artillery shells became more available. While the IEDs al Shabaab used were initially 
very crude, extracting the explosive material from the shells, packing the IED with 
shrapnel, and successfully activating the device with a mobile phone required much 
greater sophistication and technical expertise than is commonly available among the 
average Somali population. Therefore, the group’s increasing reliance upon 
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explosives for IEDs and suicide vests is often attributed to foreign expertise and 
training (Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010; Shinn 2011).  
In June 2008, the ARS and the TFG concluded a peace agreement calling for a 
90-day ceasefire and the eventual withdrawal of Ethiopian troops (Kasaija 2010). 
However, Aweys rejected the agreement, and a split emerged between the moderate 
members of the ARS and the hardliners who, led by Aweys, formed the Asmara wing 
of the Alliance (ARS-A). Al Shabaab also sharply criticized the ARS for cooperating 
with the TFG (Menkhaus 2008; Gartenstein-Ross 2009).  
In September 2008, al Shabaab announced that it had established a 
government administration in Kismayo and that it was planning to declare the Islamic 
Emirate of Somalia. The group stated that administrative posts would be allocated 
between al Shabaab, surviving ICU members and clan elders, however, various clan 
elders and ICU commanders that were left out of the negotiations criticized the 
arrangement (Grace 2008a). 
In January 2009, three important factors would unfold. First, the ARS joined 
the TFG, and Sheik Sharif Ahmed, the former Commander in Chief of the ICU, 
emerged as the new President of the TFG (Le Sage 2010). Senior leaders within al 
Shabaab refused to acknowledge the agreement and the group launched attacks on the 
ARS, calling it a puppet of the TFG (Menkhaus 2009; Dagne 2010; Shinn 2011). 
Within a few months, the new coalition government had lost control of nearly all the 
territory the TFG recovered in 2007 (Shinn 2010). By July 2010, the government only 
controlled a small portion of Mogadishu and even that was only possible because of 
the assistance of 4,000 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers (Samatar 2010).  
Second, Ethiopia withdrew its forces. Al Shabaab lost much of its popular 
support once Ethiopia pulled out. Somalis were willing to put up with the imposition 
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of strict religious mandates in exchange for liberation from Ethiopian occupation. 
However once the Ethiopians left, support for the group decreased significantly as 
people grew tired of its adherence to strict sharia and harsh punishments (Menkhaus 
2009).59 The group began to rely more and more on foreigners and forced conscripts 
(Bruton 2009, Le Sage 2010).  
Somali moderate groups that opposed al Shabaab took advantage of the 
group’s declining popularity. One such group is Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ). Also 
known as “the Majority,” ASWJ was formed in 1991 and is comprised of Somali Sufi 
moderates. The group, which allied itself with the TFG, clashed with al Shabaab after 
it began destroying the tombs of Sufi saints (Hassan 2009). While ASWJ receives 
support from Ethiopia and can muster larger numbers than al Shabaab, its forces are 
not as well trained, leaving ASWJ at a distinct disadvantage. Also, the group’s 
reliance on Ethiopia has led many Somalis to view it as a proxy of Addis Ababa 
(Bruton 2009; Said 2015). Still, ASWJ continues to fight against al Shabaab with 
support from federal forces (Gettleman 2009).  
Third, under the leadership of Aweys, the ARS-A merged with three other 
Islamist militias to form Hizbul Islam: Mu’askar Ras Kamboni (Ras Kamboni 
Brigade), Jabhatul Islamiya (Islamic Front) and Mu’askar Anole (Anole Brigade) 
(Lossi 2009, Dagne 2010, Le Sage 2010).60 Seeing itself as now the largest and 
strongest militia in Somalia, al Shabaab refused to join (Wise 2011).  
                                                 
59Popular resistance against al Shabaab continued to escalate throughout 2009, culminating in mass 
protests against the group throughout Mogadishu after al Shabaab launched a suicide attack against a 
large graduation ceremony for doctors in December, killing 19 (Bruton 2010; Harnisch and 
Zimmerman 2010; Lister 2012).  
60 ARS-A was led by Aweys and dominated by the Ayr clan. The Ras Kamboni Brigade was founded 
by former commander of both AIAI and the ICU, Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, and dominated by 
the Ogaden clan. The Anole Brigade was dominated by the Marehan clan but also had some fighters 
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The merger was doomed to fail from the beginning, and there was contention 
as clan rivals competed for control. In April 2009, the Anole Brigade clashed with the 
Ras Kamboni Brigade in a territorial dispute near the port city of Kismayo in the 
Southern Lower Juba province of Somalia (Roque 2009).  
At times Hizbul Islam cooperated with al Shabaab, but there were also times 
when the two groups battled over territory (Le Sage 2010; Roggio 2010). For 
instance, in October 2009, a dispute erupted over control of Kismayo. This time the 
Ras Kamboni Brigade contended with al Shabaab. Kismayo had traditionally been an 
Ogaden city, and the contention created a rift in the Ras Kamboni Brigade itself. One 
group led by former AIAI commander, Hassan al-Turki, sided with al Shabaab against 
the other group, led by al-Turki’s son-in-law, Ahmed Madobe. Al-Turki had more 
fully embraced al Shabaab’s Salafist ideology and was, therefore, more willing to rise 
above clan politics and accept outside leadership in Kismayo. Madobe, on the other 
hand, was much more clannish and attempted to defend Ogaden clan interests in the 
port city (Hansen 2013). 
The conflict also caused further division in Hizbul Islam with ARS-A and the 
Islamic Front aligning with al Shabaab, and the Anole Brigade remaining neutral. Al 
Shabaab claimed a clear victory and took control of the city (Hesse 2010). Over the 
next three months, al Shabaab successfully drove the Madobe faction out of Southern 
Somalia. Meanwhile, in February 2010, al-Turki’s faction merged with al Shabaab 
(Dagne 2010; Höhne 2010).  
                                                 
from the Harti clan, and the Somali Islamic Front was led by Mohamed Ibrahim Hayle and dominated 
by Hawiye sub-clans. 
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Hizbul Islam had been negotiating a merger with al Shabaab since 2009 when 
it became clear to Aweys that his group could not emerge as the dominant force. 
However, local disputes prevented any successful agreement for over a year (Roggio 
2010). At the same time, disagreements among senior members of al Shabaab were 
brewing, primarily over Godane’s authoritarian style of leadership.61 A division 
eventually erupted between Godane (whose group consisted of a large number of 
foreign fighters)62 and Robow, Aweys and Afghani (who formed a coalition of 
nationalists headed by Afghani). The nationalist group increasingly refused to take 
orders from Godane, and the two factions began to oppose one another (Bryden 
2014).  
In return, Godane made several public statements signaling that al Shabaab 
shared al Qaeda’s vision of global jihad (a fight for global jihad has more appeal to 
foreign fighters than a local power struggle ever could). He made several attempts to 
alter the group’s international image such as (1) adopting the use of suicide bombers, 
which were previously unheard of in Somalia, (2) changing the group’s name to 
Harakat al Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Mujahidin Youth Movement) in an effort to stress 
its global agenda, and (3) Godane stopped using the Somali flag and nationalist 
slogans and began forcing Somali women to marry foreign fighters (Bruton and 
Williams 2014).  
Despite Godane’s efforts to change the face of the group, both factions 
continued to be predominantly concerned with the local power struggle rather than 
                                                 
61 Al Shabaab had previously been ruled collectively by the senior leadership rather than according to 
the dictatorial approach assumed by Godane (Abukar 2013). 
62 The majority of the group’s non-Somali foreign fighters come from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and 
Sudan and are believed to have been recruited by third party organizations such as Kenya’s Muslim 
Youth Center (MYC) (Anzalone 2012). 
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global jihad, suggesting that Godane’s sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda and other 
cosmetic changes were simply attempts to gain outside support, convince foreign 
fighters to stay and to regain control over a quickly disintegrating group (Ploch 2010, 
Omar 2012). While some al Shabaab’s leaders were believed to have trained with al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan, most foot soldiers knew very little about al Qaeda (Lister 
2012). 
Despite the local flavor of both groups, there were key differences in ideology 
between them. The nationalist faction rejected an alliance with al-Qaeda (however 
superficial it may be), the involvement of foreign fighters and especially the practice 
of the purging of Islam by killing apostate Muslims (Bryden 2014). As a result of 
these differences, intense fighting broke out between the two al Shabaab factions.  
In July 2010, IGAD approved an additional 2,000 AMISOM troops to fight al 
Shabaab. Particularly interesting is the fact that IGAD did not preclude bordering 
states- including Ethiopia- from contributing troops. This increase in troops 
(particularly Ethiopian troops) offered the two opposing al Shabaab factions a 
common enemy to converge around. A week later, the group launched the retaliatory 
twin suicide attacks in Kampala. These attacks can be viewed as an effort to coerce 
Uganda to withdraw its troops from Somalia and as a warning to other countries as 
well. However, the attacks can also be seen as an effort to instigate a harsh reaction 
from the international community and provoke a surge of foreign troops (particularly 
Ethiopian troops), which had previously been their greatest source of legitimacy and 
support.  
To some extent, the provocation was fruitful. Literally within hours of the 
attacks, Ugandan forces retaliated by bombing a residential area of Mogadishu, 
generating support for al Shabaab and hatred for the TFG. Ethiopia’s official reaction 
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was more tempered, however. In accordance with U.S. policy, Addis Ababa ruled out 
sending more troops to Somalia at that time (Holzer 2010).   
Disagreements between the two factions continued over a variety of divisive 
issues such as whether to merge with Hizbul Islam (Godane was against the merger) 
and the Shura Council’s decision to ban aid agencies from assisting during the famine 
(Bruton 2010). In September 2010, Robow (a deputy leader of the group) moved his 
militia out of Mogadishu and went back to the Bay region in protest of Godane’s 
leadership (Dagne 2010; Abukar 2013). The ongoing contention eventually led to al 
Afghani’s elevation to the position of emir of the nationalist faction in December 
2010 (Shinn 2011). Al Afghani allowed the merger with Hizbul Islam to go through, 
and it officially joined ranks with al Shabaab on 24 December 2010 (Roggio 2010).  
Fighting between al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam quickly emerged (Shinn 2011). 
Infighting within al Shabaab itself also began to take its toll, and by August 2011, al 
Shabaab once again lost control of Mogadishu to federal forces with the help of 
AMISOM troops (Omar 2012; Hansen 2013).63  
On October 16, 2011 Operation Linda Nchi was launched as Kenyan forces 
crossed over into southern Somalia with a two-fold mission: capture Kismayo and 
wipe out al Shabaab (Anderson and McKnight 2015). Kenya’s decision to invade 
Somalia came after two years of planning and preparation. Al Shabaab had long 
created both regional security concerns and posed a direct threat to the Kenyan 
economy.  
                                                 
63 Uganda was the first African country to contribute troops to AMISOM in March 2007. Kenyan 
forces joined the struggle against al Shabaab in October 2011 and were officially integrated into 
AMISOM in June 2012. 
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A number of factors came to a head in 2011 that prompted Kenya to act when 
it did. First, the ongoing refugee crisis along the Kenyan-Somali border was 
exacerbated by the drought that devastated East Africa in mid-2011 (Chothia 2011; 
Gettleman 2011). Kenya accused al Shabaab of attacking aid workers on the Kenyan 
side of the border (Hirsch 2015). Second, the recent success of AMISOM forces in 
Mogadishu, no doubt, encouraged Kenya to kick al Shabaab while it was down. And 
third, Kenya has a vested interest in stabilizing southern Somalia as it is actively 
developing its own northern regions (Williams 2016). 
The same day that a Kenyan battalion crossed into Somalia to create a 100 
kilometer buffer zone, air support targeted al Shabaab positions near Qoqani in Lower 
Jubba. Kenya’s hopes of wiping out al Shabaab were premature, however. The next 
day, al Shabaab hit a Kenyan patrol boat with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) off 
the coast of Lamu, injuring three.  
On 18 October, the group dispatched a suicide operative who exploded a car 
bomb near the Foreign Ministry in Mogadishu. The attack occurred while Kenyan 
Defense Minister, Mohammed Yusuf Haji, and Foreign Minister, Moses Wetangula, 
were visiting. No one was injured, however, as the planned route to the airport had 
been changed last minute.  
The next day, al Shabaab exploded a remote-control bomb near the seaport in 
Mogadishu. The group attacked Kenyan soldiers on 21 October and again on 27 
October. The same day, al Shabaab militants killed two Ministry of Education 
officials. On 28 October, a paramilitary vehicle from the Kenyan General Services 
Unit (GSU) hit a roadside bomb planted 7 km from Garissa, Kenya.  
The attacks continued through November and December with al Shabaab 
militants ambushing Kenyan convoys with RPGs, killing tourists in Kenya, throwing 
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hand grenades into a church and assaulting Kenyan police officers and government 
officials (Zimmermann and Khatib 2012). 
Pushback from AMISOM forces was fierce. While al Shabaab did not break, it 
did retreat. And in its absence, clans began to clash as they competed for local power 
and control over resources. Similar to the period following the fall of the Barre 
regime, chaos ensued. The TFG was too divided and corrupt to maintain control in the 
capital much less over the rest of the country. Nearly two dozen mini-states were 
established-many with well-armed militias- that not only fought al Shabaab, but also 
battled each other (Gettleman 2011).   
In December 2011, senior al Shabaab members met and agreed to change the 
name of the group to Imaarah Islamiyah (Islamic Authority), stating that they were no 
longer young. The senior members also agreed to alter the tactics of the organization 
and to establish a Shura Council for the Islamic Emirate of Somalia. Godane, who did 
not attend the meeting, posted a message on the group’s twitter page denying any 
such name change (Odowa 2011).  
For two years, internal struggles over practical matters such as the value of 
allying with al Qaeda, the takfiri doctrine and the inclusion of foreign fighters 
prevented al Shabaab from making any real headway toward its strategic goals (Lister 
2012). However, in June 2013, the group’s infighting came to a head (Bryden 2014). 
The two contingents clashed in Barawe. Afghani was killed by Godane’s men while 
Aweys and Robow fled. Aweys cut a deal with the TFG, and there have been 
unsubstantiated rumors that Robow, who escaped to his Rahanweyn clan in the Bay 
and Bakol region, also defected to the Somali government.  
Godane launched an attack against any remaining supporters of Aweys and 
Robow within the ranks of the group, including foreign fighters such as al Amriki 
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(Harper 2012; Abukar 2013). Godane’s purge of the nationalist faction had a three-
fold effect.  
First, it consolidated Godane’s power and allowed him to more convincingly 
promote the image of a group committed to international jihad and second, it greatly 
reduced al Shabaab’s military capacity as the majority of the group’s foot soldiers 
came from Robow’s Rahanweyn clan (Abbink 2009). Third, Godane’s purge of 
foreigners loyal to Robow and Aweys greatly jeopardized the group’s appeal for 
foreign fighters, and revealed that the jihad in Somalia was first and foremost a local 
struggle for power (Abukar 2013). Yet the group remained a force to be reckoned 
with. 
On November 12, 2013, the United Nations Security Council authorized an 
additional 4,000 peacekeepers in Somalia to battle al Shabaab militants (Reuters 
2013). By July 2014, Kenya alone had 4,400 soldiers fighting in southern Somalia and 
the Kenyan navy patrolled Somali waters.  A ‘temporary’ increase in troop strength 
brought the total number to 22,126 AMISOM forces in Somalia. Although, many of 
these were simply a reallocation of Ethiopian forces that were already deployed to 
Somalia (Anderson 2014).  
Still, simply sending more troops is not the answer. The main problem is that 
the federal government has little (if any) legitimacy in the eyes of the people. More 
troops can never solve that problem. The UN has effectively chosen sides in a long 
and bloody civil war, further delegitimizing the federal government in the eyes of 
many Somalis and actually exacerbating the violence (Lynch 2013). 
AMISOM initially attempted to defeat the group by liberating al Shabaab 
controlled territories and then holding them. This approach was effective to a degree 
as it cost the group in two ways. First, a few senior leaders were killed in the process. 
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Second, the loss of towns often meant the loss of profits from taxing local businesses 
and from operating illicit smuggling operations. It is estimated that al Shabaab raised 
approximately $70 to $100 million annually from taxing local businesses (Harnisch 
and Zimmerman 2010). The group also earned an estimated $15 million by illegally 
exporting charcoal (Chothia 2011). 
However, this approach also cost AMISOM as well. First of all, al Shabaab 
would often retreat at the sight of AMISOM forces and surrender towns without a 
fight, destroying wells, clinics and most other vital infrastructure as they left. Then, 
the group would set up camp a few kilometers away. As AMISOM forces gained 
control of more and more towns, its critical supply lines grew longer and more 
vulnerable and its troop strength began to grow thin. Al Shabaab would then attack 
AMISOM forces where they were most vulnerable with sporadic hit and run tactics 
and by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along major supply routes 
(Williams 2016). However, al Shabaab was not AMISOM’s greatest problem. 
Not only did AMISOM troops lack properly-trained personnel to govern in 
these newly-acquired areas, but the presence of foreign troops (and especially 
Ethiopian troops) caused resentment among the residents. AMISOM forces have been 
implicated in sexually abusing and exploiting Somali women and young girls (Ahmed 
et al. 2015). At the other extreme, AMISOM national contingents often engaged in 
illicit side deals with the locals. For example, Kenyan troops allowed charcoal and 
sugar to be smuggled through Kismayo, indirectly aiding al Shabaab and costing 
AMISOM considerable legitimacy (Anderson and McKnight 2015).64 
                                                 
64 Al Shabaab, the Ras Kamboni Brigade and local merchants all benefit from the export of charcoal 
and sugar. Al Shabaab was believed to be earning approximately one million per month by taxing 
imports and exports transported through the port of Kismayo (Roble 2010). It is estimated that al 
 219 
 
Furthermore, the presence of Somali National Army (SNA) troops was an 
affront to local leaders and powerbrokers. This was especially true since many SNA 
recruits come from the Hawiye clan. Given the nature of clan politics in Somalia, the 
high representation of Hawiye in the SNA created suspicion that its interests in 
southern Somalia were not neutral (McConnell 2014). In other words, it was obvious 
to everyone involved that capturing state resources was the name of the game, not 
rebuilding the Somali state. Therefore, the SNA was perceived as an agent of the 
Hawiye clan rather than an agent of the federal government. 
As the localized struggle for resources raged on, al Shabaab was largely 
adapting to the situation. Robinson (2007) argues that successful military action 
against militant groups can often disperse rather than defeat such organizations, 
effectively exporting terrorism across state borders (such as occurred with Russian 
military intervention in the second Chechen War).  
This is largely what happened with al Shabaab. Rather than attempting to 
create a state within a state and govern such as IS has done, al Shabaab has instead 
taken a more transnational course of action by adopting a guerrilla-style hit and run 
approach aimed at destabilizing the entire region. This new approach is facilitated by 
Somalia’s long and poorly-protected border with Kenya. While the Shura Council 
dictates strategic goals, individual al Shabaab militias continue to be commanded 
locally. AMISOM needs to change its approach as well if it ever hopes to be effective 
in ridding Somalia of al Shabaab.  
                                                 
Shabaab is actually drawing more revenue now from taxing trucking routes than it did when it 
controlled the port of Kismayo (Anderson and McKnight 2015). 
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Al Shabaab retaliated against AMISOM involvement with twin suicide attacks 
in Uganda, the much-publicized Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi and again 
when the group attacked a university in Garissa. The group has also continued to 
orchestrate attacks against Ugandan, Kenyan and Burundian AMISOM bases. These 
operations have evolved into complex hybrid attacks, utilizing both suicide bombers 
and suicide infantry. After armed operatives launch an assault and secure access for 
the suicide bombers, they detonate themselves as well to maximize casualties (Bryden 
2014). 
Godane continued to lead al Shabaab until he was killed in a U.S. drone strike 
in Southern Somalia on September 1, 2014. Eight days later, Ahmad Umar (also 
known as Abu Ubaidah), one of Godane's generals, succeeded him as the group's emir 
(Chothia 2014). 
Umar was a member of AIAI since 1996 and later became an officer in the 
ICU. He was educated and headed a Qur’anic school in Kismayo. Umar became a 
member of al Shabaab in 2007 and worked as Ayro’s assistant. In 2008, he became 
Godane’s assistant after Ayro was assassinated. Umar was promoted to deputy 
governor for the group over the Lower Jubba region in late 2008 and on 29 June, 
2009, Umar was again promoted to governor of Bay and Bakool regions.65 As al 
Shabaab’s governor, he imposed a Salafist interpretation of sharia, enforced a strict 
code of conduct on humanitarian workers operating in the regions and absolutely 
forbade any and all aspects of Western culture. In January 2012, Godane appointed 
Umar as transitional military commander of Bay, Bakool, and Gedo regions. Godane 
                                                 
65 During this period, Umar was known as Mahad Omar Abdikarim. 
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promoted Umar again in November 2013. This time the appointment was to the 
position of advisor. It is speculated that Umar influenced Godane’s decision to purge 
the group’s foreign fighters in 2012-2013. He is also credited as leading the 
contingent that murdered al Amriki. From Godane’s advisor, Umar moved up to 
oversee al Shabaab’s office of the interior where he largely dictated the group’s 
domestic policy. From that position, Umar became emir (Cleaves 2015).  
On 5 October 2014, Somali and AU troops forced al Shabaab out of the 
coastal city of Barawe, the group’s only remaining stronghold and the location of its 
headquarters for the past six years. Control of Barawe afforded al-Shabaab strategic 
access to a major route for importing weapons, fighters and finances (AMISOM 
2014).  
Umar firmly adheres to the takfiri doctrine and is infamous for his brutality. 
He is reported to be equally ruthless in his leadership. When the news broke that the 
group’s spiritual leader, Abdul Qadir Mumin, pledged bay’ah to IS in October 2015 
with roughly 100 (mostly younger) followers, Umar responded by directing the 
Amniyat, al Shabaab’s secret police, to start sniffing out and arresting other members 
who might also pledge their allegiance to IS (Kriel and Duggan 2015). Hussein 
Hassan, a popular preacher based in Kenya who once supported al Shabaab, has also 
been influencing members to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi (IISS 2015). 
The faction of fighters drawn to IS represents just one of Umar’s problems. 
There are also an unknown number of members that oppose the takfiri doctrine. 
Representative of this group is former intelligence chief, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed 
Hersi, who surrendered to authorities in December 2014. "There were a number of us 
who opposed the leadership's approach and its flawed doctrine," Hersi revealed to 
journalists in January 2015. Hersi referred to the takfiri doctrine as a "distorted form 
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of the holy jihad, which has resulted in countless innocent Somali citizens being 
killed" (AFP 2015). 
Even though most people in the West have only become aware of al Shabaab 
since the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in September 2013, the group is 
fighting a battle that has raged on for decades. At the heart of the matter are clan 
politics, border conflicts, and the age-old issue of who possesses the legal and 
legitimate right to rule Somalia (Bruton and Williams 2014).   
In February 2015, an al Shabaab operative carried out a suicide attack at the 
Central Hotel in Mogadishu, killing the deputy mayor, two legislators and 23 others. 
Nearly 50 more were seriously injured. The following month, 24 people were killed 
when the group laid siege to the Maka Al-Mukarramah Hotel in Mogadishu. The 
group continues to launch increasingly deadly guerrilla attacks such as the assault on 
a Kenyan army camp in El-Adde in January 2016 in which 200 soldiers died.66 
Although the Kenyan government denies the death toll, al Shabaab’s tactics are 
successfully hindering AMISOM forces. 
In February 2016, Ambassador Maman Sidikou claimed that AMISOM forces 
had liberated 80% of Somali territory. Despite the fact that there are still more than 
22,000 AMISOM forces in southern Somalia today, poor co-ordination and a lack of 
cooperation prevents them from being effective. Al Shabaab continues to enjoy 
freedom of movement and maintains a troop strength of approximately 7,000 fighters 
(Williams 2016).   
                                                 
66 Al Shabaab posted a video of the assault, claiming to have killed over 100 Kenyan soldiers (News 
Desk 2016). 
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In March 2016, a US airstrike hit the group’s Raso training camp in the central 
Hiran region, killing almost 70 militants and wounding dozens more. Among the 
victims were several al Shabaab commanders who were there for the graduation of 
hundreds of recent recruits. 
Al Shabaab initially focused on nationalism and controlling Somali territory, 
therefore the target of the group’s violence was TFG forces and the Ethiopian 
military. After Godane took over leadership, he adopted the takfiri doctrine and began 
to specifically target apostates. Once the Ethiopians pulled out, the group’s audience 
largely shifted to internal enemies. This targeting of everyday Somalis cost al 
Shabaab many of its followers and created a huge rift within the organization. The 
group fractured and split and Godane lost several top commanders and a large number 
of foot soldiers as a result. Al Shabaab has since also lost most of the territory under 
its control and has altered its operational tactics as well. It transitioned from an 
insurgent group dedicated to overthrowing the corrupt Somali government and 
replacing it with sharia to an organization reliant upon violence to manipulate foreign 
governments. The group now attacks mainly foreign targets. Whether this change is 
out of necessity, due to military defeats and the loss of Mogadishu, Kismayo and 
Barawe, or whether al-Shabaab has legitimately changed its ideological focus from 
national interests to global jihad remains a matter of speculation. The conflict remains 
largely unresolved to this day. 
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Chapter Five: The Strategic Terrorism of al Shabaab 
“Everything in strategy is very simple,  
but that does not mean that everything is very easy” 
-Clausewitz  
                               
5.1: Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I concluded that al Shabaab has transitioned from an 
insurgent group that targeted the corrupt TFG and Ethiopian invaders to an 
organization that dedicated to the use of violence to manipulate foreign governments. 
In this chapter, I consider how al Shabaab devised its strategic objectives as well as 
the extent that ideological, tribal and religious factors helped to shape, advance or 
hinder those goals. In what ways are these objectives different from the group’s 
immediate predecessors and why? Have these goals been consistent? If not, how have 
they changed and evolved since the group’s inception? I then explore whether al 
Shabaab is engaged in strategic terrorism, and I consider whether this strategy is 
likely to be successful. 
I begin by identifying al Shabaab’s theoretical underpinnings, tracing any 
influences the group may have adopted from its predecessors and exploring the 
practical implications of these influences on the group’s strategic goals and tactical 
use of violence. Next, the chapter details the various stages that al Shabaab has moved 
through and identifies which stage the group is in now. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a brief analysis as to whether al Shabaab employs strategic terrorism or whether 
it should be considered a guerrilla insurgency.  
 
 225 
 
5.2: Militant Groups in Somalia 
 
As previously mentioned, disunity is endemic in Somalia. The ongoing 
conflict in the country is much more complex than any one cleavage (i.e., religious 
versus secular or Islam versus Christianity) can explain. Ambitious warlords, corrupt 
politicians, greedy businessmen and constantly shifting alliances prevail in the place 
of stable political institutions (ICG 2006). Even in the relatively stable autonomous 
region of Somaliland, governance stems from the political will of the clans to 
cooperate and not from official political institutions. This absence of effective top-
down governance in the face of strong clan-based loyalties is a reality that deserves 
recognition (Menkhaus 2007). 
Gaining the trust of the people is critical to uniting them behind any single 
cause. Organizations in Somalia might gain the local support of the people in any 
number of ways. First, they must be careful not to abuse the people as the TFG forces, 
warlords and gangster politicians have typically done. A young man in his mid-
twenties who grew up in Mogadishu told me that he remembers seeing armed-men in 
pick-up trucks going into stores and businesses to collect “taxes.” Often, those who 
did not pay were beaten or worse. The men also sometimes took women and children 
as payment. While the people definitely feared these men, they also hated them and it 
is not difficult to understand why they would welcome Islamist groups such as the 
ICU or al Shabaab as an alternative (Sharmáke 2016).  
Second, insurgent groups in Somalia might earn a measure of respect in the 
eyes of the local population by fighting foreign forces such as Ethiopian, American, 
and AU peacekeeping troops largely considered invaders by ordinary Somalis. Armed 
groups in Somalia may also gain the public trust by offering protection, enforcing 
laws and punishing infractions as the ICU militias did. In return, once an organization 
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has earned the trust of the people, they often enjoy support from religious leaders, 
local mosques, Somali businesses and individuals in the form of food, water, shelter 
and clothing. Most importantly, such groups gain the perception of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the people (Seery 2009).  
Armed groups in Somalia also frequently receive arms and munitions through 
soldiers who defect from the TFG. These soldiers are equipped with weapons and 
supplies provided mainly by Ethiopia, but also by the United States and other foreign 
governments. Thus, Somali armed factions tend to be well-armed. Finances are 
commonly obtained by Somalis living abroad who send remittances (Lindley 2010; 
Rahim 2016). Financing also flows directly from Saudi Arabia and through Muslim 
charities such as the World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)  (Saggiomo 2011). 
The main point to be made is that al Shabaab did not emerge in a vacuum. 
Both its ideological underpinnings and its strategic objectives are in many ways 
connected to the broader context and adopted from groups that came before it. The 
following is a summary of the major arteries of terrorism in Somalia prior to the 
emergence of al Shabaab. In this section, I will examine AIAI, the ICU and the 
limited role of al Qaeda in Somalia. I will compare and contrast these group’s 
ideological underpinnings and strategic objectives, and I will consider any continuity 
between them. I will demonstrate that, for the most part, the main division within 
these groups has been between the moderate and radical elements. As these elements 
battled each other, factions within have formed, splintered, disintegrated and then re-
emerged again under the same leadership with different names. The same would later 
be true of al Shabaab.   
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5.2.1: Al Ittihad al Islamiyya (AIAI) 
 
AIAI is a Salafist group that draws its influences from the Wahhabi tradition 
in Saudi Arabia. While there is some speculation regarding the level of involvement 
AIAI may have had with al Qaeda,67 it is doubtful that the group adopted its 
Wahhabism from al Qaeda as Somalia has enjoyed a direct link with the Arabian 
Peninsula for centuries (Budge 2014). Not to mention, when al Qaeda did attempt to 
establish itself in Somalia, its operatives were attacked by bandits and extorted by the 
various clans. In the end, these obstacles and the overall lack of appeal of Salafi Islam 
among the Sufi majority precluded al Qaeda from establishing a franchise in Somalia 
(Stevenson 2007; Shinn 2011).68     
Neither did AIAI employ strategic terrorism. While the group technically falls 
within the jihadist camp given its emphasis on violence, AIAI was largely attempting 
to replace some semblance of law and order in the chaos that followed the collapse of 
the Barre regime in 1991. As such, it acted more like a pseudo-government than a 
terrorist organization. By providing public services and collecting taxes, it attempted 
to win broad popular support and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In fact, it 
is not entirely unlikely that AIAI might have taken a more peaceful route through 
mainstream politics had the opportunity been available. However, given the structure 
of society in Somalia, clan politics and the sheer power of the warlords at the time, 
such an option was not viable (Menkhaus 2013b).  
                                                 
67 U.S. intelligence reports suggest that AIAI provided safe haven for three al Qaeda operatives 
following the embassy bombings in 1998 (Marquardt and Shinn 2009). However, Menkhaus (2004b) 
points to the facts that (1) no Somalis hold positions in al Qaeda’s top leadership and (2) no Somalis 
have been involved in attacks against Western targets outside of Somalia until 2003. 
68 However, al Qaeda was able to recruit a few young men such as Ayro and Godane to train in 
Afghanistan (Shinn 2011).  
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As stated earlier, AIAI’s ideology was a combination of Salafism and 
nationalism, and its primary goals were to oust the corrupt Barre regime, establish an 
Islamic government in Somalia and free the Ogaden region (Stevenson 2007; 
Gartenstein-Ross 2009). While Aideed’s United Somali Congress deserves most of 
the credit for defeating Barre, it was a collaborative effort.  
Although the extent of AIAI’s actual involvement in overthrowing Siad Barre 
in 1991 is largely unknown, what is known is that the group never rose to the level of 
prominence in Somalia as the ICU briefly did. Rather, AIAI’s heyday came after the 
state collapsed when the group governed the town of Luuq for five years from 1991 to 
1996 and launched a string of terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in the 1990s (Menkhaus 
2005; Shinn 2011).With the successful overthrow of the Barre regime, AIAI focused 
on its remaining two goals of establishing an Islamic government and freeing the 
Ogaden region from Ethiopian control.   
Regarding AIAI’s second goal of establishing an Islamic government in 
Somalia, the absence of a central government obviously created a vacuum in which 
various groups competed for power. However, the specific absence of the 
secular/socialist Barre regime, which had ruthlessly stifled any expression of religious 
or tribal identification, meant that competition could now be framed in both tribal and 
religious contexts.  
The main contenders in this competition emerged as (1) the Salafist 
Mogadishu Group (dominated by the Hawiye/Habr Gedir sub-clan) which favored a 
strong central government and was staunchly anti-Ethiopian, and (2) the anti-Islamist 
SRRC (dominated by the Darood clan-family) which favored a decentralized state and 
was pro-Ethiopian. Aweys, who led AIAI, was also a prominent member among the 
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Mogadishu Group. Although the Islamists achieved temporary success between 2000-
2003 with the TNG, AIAI was already disbanded by December 1998. 
AIAI also failed to achieve its third strategic objective, freeing the Ogaden 
region from Ethiopian control. Its tactics were initially limited to terrorist attacks 
against Ethiopian forces. In 1996, AIAI attempted to assassinate the Ethiopian 
minister of transportation in Addis Ababa. Although the attempt failed, the minister of 
transportation was seriously injured. The group is also suspected of perpetrating a 
string of explosions in Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997 and kidnapping a number of 
relief workers in 1998 (Menkhaus 2013b).  
AIAI’s terrorist activity elicited harsh responses from Ethiopian security 
forces. On 18 September 1996, the Ethiopian army attacked AIAI forces in the district 
of Luuq. Over the next two years, AIAI fought both Ethiopian forces and later mainly 
Somali National Front (SNF) militias receiving substantial support from Ethiopia. The 
fighting ended when a truce was negotiated at a peace conference held in December 
1998 (Omar 2012). Many of AIAI’s members fled to Yemen. Aweys later became a 
prominent member of the ICU (Bryden 2006).  
 
5.2.2: The Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) 
 
The ICU can largely be seen as an extension of AIAI. After AIAI was defeated 
in 1998, Aweys and other key players in AIAI simply laid low and regrouped to 
continue the fight another day. When they re-emerged as the ICU, no one had any 
illusions as to where this “new” group had come from. Ethiopia feared a continuation 
of AIAI-style attacks while the U.S. suspected that the ICU continued to maintain 
AIAI’s alleged connection with al Qaeda (Bruton 2009; Shay 2010). Despite bin 
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Laden’s vow to fight foreign troops on Somali soil, the ICU’s practical relationship 
with al Qaeda is also highly questionable. In fact, the ICU even went so far as to 
publicly denounce Al Qaeda (Dagne, 2010).  
In this respect, one can draw very similar conclusions regarding the 
ideological makeup of the ICU as with AIAI. Neither group employed strategic 
terrorism. And while the ICU is technically a jihadist organization, like AIAI it was 
also so heavily involved in governance that one has to wonder whether, given 
different circumstances, the group might not have opted for a more peaceful 
alternative.  
The answer to this question is definitely maybe. The ICU was internally 
divided between two main groups and each had its own unique objective. The first 
group was led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and consisted of the moderates who 
wanted to work with the TFG, and consequently, with Ethiopia. The second group 
was led by Aweys and consisted of the Salafi faction who wanted to overthrow the 
TFG, impose sharia and reclaim the contested lands in Ethiopia and Kenya that 
constituted Greater Somalia (Terdman 2008).   
Whether the ICU might have taken a more peaceful path and renounce its 
jihadi ways depends on which element might have ultimately dominated the group. 
Given that the ICU was defeated and dissolved in 2007, it is impossible to know the 
answer to this question with total certainty. However, a short exercise in 
counterfactuals can be useful here.  
Even though the application of sharia and secular law was patchwork in the 
lower-level courts, the Salafi faction clearly dominated the ICU in 2006. Aweys 
headed the Shura Council and the hardliners controlled the ICU’s armed militias (Le 
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Sage 2009). As long as Aweys and the hardliner faction maintained the upper hand, it 
is safe to assume that the ICU would have remained a jihadist organization.  
However, the Salafi hardliners were not at all popular with the Sufi majority in 
Somalia (Menkhaus 2002; Dalmar 2015). Therefore, had the moderates been able to 
influence the future course of the group, given their level of popular support and their 
willingness to work with the TFG, the ICU would most likely have made the 
transition to an Islamist group and possibly even denounced violence.  
 The ICU shared AIAI’s vision of freeing the Ogaden region from Ethiopian 
control, however, its other strategic objectives were somewhat different. First, while 
AIAI initially faced Barre as a major obstacle, the ICU had to contend with the 
ARPCT. Second, as already noted, the Salafi faction of the ICU wanted to establish 
an Islamic government in Somalia while the moderate faction wanted to cooperate 
with the TFG.  
The ICU was clearly successful in achieving it first goal of defeating the 
ARPCT. As for its second strategic objective, The ICU was never able to establish an 
Islamic government over the whole of Somalia. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed did, 
however, serve as president of Somalia under the TFG from 2009-2012. Regarding its 
third goal, the ICU engaged Ethiopian troops directly and supported two armed 
insurgencies against Ethiopia: the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (Connell 2009). Despite these efforts, the ICU failed to free the 
Ogaden region from Ethiopian control.   
 
5.2.3: Al Qaeda   
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Al Qaeda has been more successful in East Africa and the Horn than anywhere 
else in sub-Saharan Africa. Osama bin Laden operated out of Sudan between 1991 
and 1996, and al Qaeda later claimed credit for the 1998 attacks on the two U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2002 hotel bombing in Kenya. The 9/11 
attacks, combined with a number of other factors, culminated in a change of U.S. 
foreign policy toward Somalia from mostly humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to 
focusing primarily on counterterrorism. While 9/11 served as the main impetus for 
this switch, other reasons included the 1998 attacks on the two U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, Somalia’s proximity to the Middle East, and the suspicion that 
al Qaeda may try to relocate its base of operation to Somalia (Riedel 2007).  
Declassified al Qaeda documents reveal that Osama bin Laden considered 
Somalia to be a potential safe haven and possibly even the next Afghanistan. Abu 
Hafs al Masri, a top al Qaeda lieutenant, travelled to Somalia frequently to determine 
the potential ability of Somali Islamists and to equip and train jihadists (Watts et al. 
2007).  
In December 1992, UNITAF began to arrive in Mogadishu to deliver food to 
starving Somalis. On December 29, al Qaeda exploded a bomb at the Gold Mohur 
Hotel in Aden, Yemen where U.S. troops lodged on their way to Somalia. The attack 
failed, however, as the troops were already en route to Somalia (Shinn 2007). 
Later in February 1993, an elite group of seasoned al Qaeda operatives arrived 
in Somalia. They set up three training camps and solicited the aid of AIAI fighters to 
target U.S. operations in the Arabian Peninsula. Al Qaeda also assisted Mohamed 
Farah Aideed, a prominent Mogadishu warlord who fought in the resistance against 
UNITAF forces (Kohlmann 2009). The U.S. pulled out of the operation in October 
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1993 after Aideed’s militia shot down a special forces Black Hawk helicopter (Shinn 
2009). 
Short-lived victories aside, bin Laden believed that conditions in Somalia 
would create a steady supply of willing recruits, eager to fight against the foreign 
invaders. However, Somalia turned out to be far different than anticipated. Al Qaeda 
operatives met with massive corruption in bordering states only to be extorted by rival 
Somali clans and attacked by Somali gangs once they entered Somalia (Riedel 2007).  
Somali clan leaders were largely in agreement concerning their desire to expel 
U.S. forces from Somalia. However, they were even more concerned with defending 
their own clan’s interests against the claims of other clans. Abu Hafs attempted to 
create a sense of unity among the various leaders, but to no avail. The cost of 
operating in Somalia proved too high for al Qaeda (Watts et al. 2007). 
Al Qaeda continued to hold an interest in Somalia, and it encouraged Somalis 
to wage jihad against foreign forces in Somalia. U.S. intelligence, however, was not 
aware of the threat that al Qaeda posed in the region until 1996 (Kean 2011). 
Following the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7 1998, 
the U.S. actively pursued three al Qaeda operatives linked to the attacks (Fazul 
Abdullah Muhammad, Abu Taha al-Sudani and Salah Ali Salah Nabhan). Intelligence 
reports suggested that AIAI had provided safe haven for the three operatives in 
Somalia (Marquardt and Shinn 2009; Vidino 2010).  
In 2007, al-Sudani was killed in an Ethiopian airstrike near the Kenya-Somali 
border (Grace 2008b; Shinn 2009). Nabhan appeared in an al Shabaab promotional 
video in 2008. He was allegedly involved in training for the organization in Southern 
Somalia. Nabhan died on September 14, 2009 near Baraawe, along with three Somali 
al Shabaab members, when four American military helicopters fired upon their trucks 
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(Gettleman 2009; Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010). Lastly, Muhammad was killed at 
a military checkpoint outside Mogadishu on 7 June, 2011 (Omar 2011).  
While al Qaeda was clearly involved in Somalia during the early 1990s, the 
extent of its involvement is still undetermined- as is the nature of its relationship with 
the groups under examination (Dagne 2002). What is clear is that the presence of al 
Qaeda in Somalia has failed to materialize into the threat originally predicted by 
Washington. In addition to the difficulty of operating in a failed state, Somalia’s Sufi 
majority and clan-based system makes it an unfavorable location for al Qaeda to 
thrive in (Watts et al. 2007).  
Even though al Shabaab officially joined al Qaeda in 2012, Gartenstein-Ross 
(2009) points to earlier evidence of the group’s ties to al Qaeda such as Godane’s 
press releases proclaiming global jihad and the various messages released by 
American member, Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, as proof of the group’s ideological 
alignment with Al Qaeda. 
In one message released in January 2008, Amriki quoted Qutb and Maududi 
and insisted that al Shabaab would never accept anything short of sharia in Somalia. 
Amriki insisted that this refusal to compromise with the kaafir (infidel) governments 
distinguished al Shabaab from the ARS who had sold out and left the path of jihad. 
Amriki also criticized the ICU for their willingness to cooperate with clan politics and 
for abiding by the borders delimited by the taghoot (a ruler that does not follow 
sharia).69 Finally, Amriki claimed that al Shabaab’s methodology is the same as bin 
Laden’s, Zawahiri’s and Zarqawi’s. 
                                                 
69 I can only assume that Amriki was referring to the moderate faction within the ICU that accepted 
political concessions from the TFG and ultimately accepted man-made borders, because the hardliners 
within the ICU rejected the existing borders and wanted to establish Greater Somalia. 
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Gartenstein-Ross (2009) also points to the fact that Godane increased the 
number of foreign fighters, adopted the tactic of suicide attacks (which were 
previously unacceptable in Somalia), and upgraded the quality and sheer quantity of 
the group’s media releases as indications of al Shabaab’s ideological connection to al 
Qaeda.  
Still, there are reasons to doubt the practicality of the relationship between al 
Qaeda and al Shabaab. It is true that Godane increased the number of foreign recruits 
and adopted the tactic of suicide attacks. By 2009 more than twenty young men joined 
al Shabaab from America alone. One American recruit, Shirwa Ahmed, was among 
the group’s first suicide bombers in October 2008 (Ephron et al. 2009). Al Shabaab 
has successfully recruited young men from Canada as well (Abdulkadir 2012). So 
how does one explain Godane’s reliance on foreign recruits if it is not due to a strong 
working relationship with al Qaeda?   
First of all, one has to consider Godane’s situation at the time that he assumed 
leadership of al Shabaab. From a strategic standpoint, it made perfect sense for 
Godane to shift from a predominantly nationalist position to an Islamist focus as his 
organization was facing increasing opposition from the clans over the imposition of 
Salafist doctrine. This became particularly relevant as the Ethiopian invasion drew to 
a close and the group lost its main rallying cause. Godane needed to justify the harsh 
interpretation of sharia as Somalis were no longer willing to accept it as the lesser 
evil. The increasing quality and quantity of al Shabaab’s media releases served this 
purpose.  
The shift to a primarily Islamist agenda, in turn, created a rift between the 
nationalist faction led by al Afghani and those that were loyal to Godane. At the heart 
of this rift is the same issue that rose up again and again: whether to topple the corrupt 
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apostate regime and establish a state based on sharia first or attack the far enemy 
first.70 The ensuing power struggle created the need for Godane to recruit outsiders. 
While agreeing that Somalia belonged to Allah and therefore should be ruled 
according to sharia, the earlier leadership (2006-2008) played the patronage game and 
were careful to work within clan politics as much as possible.  
Godane declared war on the old leadership and eventually purged the 
nationalist faction from the group. Foreigners were useful to Godane as they were 
willing to do things that most Somalis would not (suicide missions, defy clan politics, 
murder clan elders, etc.). Godane needed them to effectively counter the growing 
resistance from the Somali public as well as to consolidate his power in relation to the 
nationalist opposition within the organization itself.  
Once Godane achieved the upper hand, he still needed foreign fighters to 
insulate and protect him from his enemies among the more clan-minded members of 
the group (Gartenstein-Ross 2009). Therefore, foreign fighters were strategically 
valuable to Godane. Furthermore, the group largely attracted foreign recruits through 
jihadist propaganda. In this respect, any alleged ties to al Qaeda were very valuable. 
In light of these facts, it is not entirely surprising that Godane released a video in 2009 
offering his services to al Qaeda. But this still does not automatically suggest that 
there was a viable working relationship between the two groups.  
By far the most compelling reason to question the true nature of the 
relationship between the two groups is that al Shabaab transformed from a jihadist 
group under Ayro to a takfiri group under Godane. In this respect, al Shabaab was 
ideologically closer to al Qaeda under Ayro than it was under Godane- even though 
                                                 
70 Ironically, even with all of its global rhetoric, al Shabaab remains focused on African targets.  
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the earlier al Shabaab leadership was openly opposed to a relationship with al Qaeda 
(Harper 2008).  
If the relationship between the two groups was legitimately an operational one, 
why did al Qaeda largely ignore al Shabaab’s pleas for help from the international 
community? For example, in August 2008 (after Godane took over leadership of the 
group), al Shabaab released a video practically begging for reinforcements. In the 
video, Commander Abu Yusuf Saalih Anabhaani pleads, “Oh muhajirins, Oh 
muhajirins Will anyone respond? Will you not rush to the help of your brothers in the 
army of difficulty?” (Anabhaani 2008). Assuming the relationship between the two 
groups was as strong as some suggest, why did al Qaeda not respond to al Shabaab’s 
cry for help by sending operatives? 
Even more puzzling, why did al Qaeda remain silent during Godane’s reign of 
takfiri terror when bin Laden and Zawahiri were so outspoken against Zarqawi?  Al 
Qaeda did not attempt to exercise control over al Shabaab at all (Harnisch 2010a). In 
fact, there is little evidence of any direct correspondence between the two groups (as 
occurred between al Qaeda and AQI). Contact between al Shabaab and the al Qaeda 
leadership generally consisted of unofficial statements made indirectly through media 
releases or some other intermediary (Bennett 2011).71  
                                                 
71 There were several such random releases such as the messages of encouragement from bin Laden 
and Zawahiri in 2006-2007, the video released in September 2008 in which Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan 
pledged allegiance to al Qaeda on behalf of Al Shabaab, and Zawahiri’s quid pro quo in November of 
the same year (Joscelyn and Roggio 2012). Bin Laden released a video in March 2009, denouncing the 
ARS and accusing Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed of abandoning Islam to partner with apostates (bin 
Laden 2009). Al Shabaab released a message in February 2010 stating that it would ally itself with al 
Qaeda (Childress 2010). Zawahiri released a video in September 2015 claiming that, according to a 
correspondence from Godane, al Shabaab is not interested in becoming an affiliate of IS (Meleagrou-
Hitchens 2015). However, there is little evidence of actual correspondence between the two groups. 
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In all fairness, there could be legitimate reasons for this. For instance, in 2010, 
bin Laden (apparently replying to a request from Godane to join al Qaeda) suggested 
that correspondence between the two groups remain informal for security reasons 
(Meleagrou-Hitchens 2015). Another possibility is that bin Laden had such dire 
concerns about making another mistake such as the one he had made with Zarqawi, 
that this is the reason why al Shabaab’s membership into al Qaeda was not approved 
until after bin Laden’s death- despite Godane’s many efforts to court the group (ISS 
2015).  
Finally, there is Godane’s internal purge of foreign fighters in 2012-13, among 
which Amriki’s death was the most conspicuous (Hammami 2012; Blake 2013; 
Pantucci and Sayyid 2013). Recall that Amriki was under the mistaken impression 
that al Shabaab’s ideology lined up with al Qaeda’s. This is not so mysterious if one 
considers the possibility that Godane used the group’s alleged ties to al Qaeda to 
attract foreign fighters in the first place, and then used the foreign fighters to conduct 
suicide operations and purge his enemies from the ranks. In an open letter to Zawahiri  
released in April 2013, Ibrahim al-Afghani requested that Zawahiri intervene in a 
controversy between Godane and the international operatives. The conflict seems to 
center around Godane’s dictatorial approach to leadership and the foreign fighter’s 
apparent disillusionment with the overall direction of the group (Pantucci and Sayyid 
2013).    
Observations such as these should raise serious questions regarding the true 
nature of the relationship between al Shabaab and al Qaeda. Other than simply 
assuming a practical working relationship between the two groups based upon the 
changes instituted by Godane, one must also consider that, given Godane’s need for 
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outside support against the nationalist faction, he likely attempted to maximize the 
international appeal of the group in any way possible.  
As for al Qaeda, the situation in Somalia made the country an ideal poster 
child for the global jihad. When Christian Ethiopia invaded Muslim Somalia with the 
backing of the evil United States, it created a propaganda opportunity that was too 
good for either group to pass up (Thomas 2013). It is important to consider, however, 
that while Somalia offered an ideal situation for al Qaeda, al Shabaab under Godane 
did not. 
Given Somalia’s religious composition, its strategic location via the Arab 
Peninsula and its proximity to key Islamic cities such as Mecca and Medina, one 
would have expected that the invasion of the country by infidel crusaders would have 
turned it into a hotbed for international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. However, 
this is not the case. While the ongoing conflict in Somalia has clearly involved 
citizens and territory of more than one country, it can hardly be labeled a global jihad 
of the al Qaeda variety (Gatsiounis 2013). 
 Even al Qaeda’s global jihad is aimed at driving the far enemy out of the 
Islamic world so that it can focus on destroying the near enemies: Israel and apostate 
regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan (Gerges 2005; 
Riedel 2007). Furthermore, several U.S. State Department officials argue that “most 
terrorist cells in Africa are pursuing local aims, not global ones, and do not present a 
direct threat to the United States” (Whitlock 2012, p. 2).   
  Even though al Qaeda was not able to set up permanent operations in Somalia, 
it has enjoyed some limited access. The perpetrators of the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” 
incident allegedly received arms and training from al Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 
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East Africa embassy bombings took refuge in Somalia, and the arms used in the 2002 
Mombassa attacks were smuggled through Somalia (ICG 2005).  
In spite of attempts by al Qaeda to capitalize on Somalia’s unique 
opportunities, terrorism in Somalia has been, and continues to be, primarily a tactic 
used by local groups in a localized struggle for power. What is more, conflict in 
Somalia is mainly a clan-based/nationalist struggle framed at times as a religious 
cause and at other times as anti-imperialist, anti-Ethiopian, anti-Kenyan and anti-
American (Abdulkadir 2012).  
Framing the conflict in such a multi-dimensional way has attracted substantial 
foreign interest. And while a very small number of foreign jihadists have entered the 
fray due to their religious convictions, the vast majority of individual participants see 
the cause as one of nationalism, clan loyalty, a matter of economic opportunity or all 
of the above (ICG 2005).  
 
5.2.4: Al Shabaab 
 
By comparing the ideological underpinnings of AIAI and the ICU, it is 
possible to trace the line of continuity from one group to the next. This line of 
continuity also extends to al Shabaab under the original leadership of Ayro. Aweys 
dominated the ICU via control of its armed militias. When Ethiopian troops forced the 
ICU out of Somalia, the group split with the moderates fleeing and later joining the 
TFG and the hardliners staying behind to fight. In the struggle for dominance among 
the militias that followed, al Shabaab emerged victorious. However, the group 
maintained the Salafi jihadist ideology of Aweys and other hardliners who had also 
been members of AIAI and the ICU (Wise 2011).  
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The group’s strategic objectives also remained largely the same as its 
predecessor groups’, with a few differences. AIAI and the ICU both wanted to (1) 
overthrow the existing order, (2) establish an Islamic state, and (3) expand that state to 
include greater Somalia. However, al Shabaab’s objectives have changed since its 
inception.  
Al Shabaab initially battled Ethiopian troops and TFG forces, and it is now 
battling AMISOM troops and SNA soldiers. Al Shabaab’s primary goal was initially 
to liberate Somalia from foreign occupation. Whether or not this is still the group’s 
primary goal is highly debatable. Second, while al Shabaab initially wanted to 
establish an Islamic state, the group’s current strategy suggests that statehood may no 
longer be an immediate objective (Menkhaus 2016).  
Both of al Shabaab’s predecessor groups boasted Islamic scholars, judges and 
former government officials as members, whereas al Shabaab is mainly comprised of 
militants. The group does have its hierarchy, of course. However, al Shabaab’s 
leadership continues to be highly decentralized as compared to AIAI or the ICU 
(Turbiville et al. 2014). Third, al Shabaab shares its predecessors’ vision of a greater 
Somalia. This goal is evident by the group’s support for the ONLF and its own 
activity in Kenya and Uganda (Opalo 2010; Hirsch 2015). It is not clear, however, 
what role al Shabaab sees itself playing in the actual governance of such a state once 
it is established. 
 
5.3: Does al Shabaab Employ Strategic Terrorism? 
 
According to Neumann and Smith (2005), strategic terrorism is based upon 
two main assumptions: (1) that a target government’s resolve can be eroded by 
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persistent terrorist violence, and (2) that terrorist violence will create sufficient fear 
within the target population to undermine its trust in the government’s ability (or 
desire) to protect its citizens. Furthermore, strategic terrorism involves three stages: 
(1) disorientation, (2) target response and (3) gaining legitimacy.  
Neumann and Smith argue that in the third and final stage of strategic 
terrorism, an actor attempts to gain legitimacy through either extensive media 
coverage or through grassroots methods of mobilizing public support. However, they 
then propose that such activities in and of themselves make it debatable whether the 
group is still employing strategic terrorism because the main tenet (the sole reliance 
on violence) has been violated. Neumann and Smith thus conclude that strategic 
terrorism is “a potentially flawed strategy, which- except in the most favorable 
circumstances- is unlikely to achieve the political ends for which it is used” 
(Neumann and Smith 2007, p. 10).   
Al Shabaab has been largely operating in the favorable circumstances of 
foreign occupation. The purpose of this section is to explore whether al Shabaab’s 
violence can be labeled as strategic terrorism.  
Since al Shabaab’s primary goal was to drive out the Ethiopian forces, the 
group enjoyed a tremendous amount of legitimacy as most ordinary Somalis 
perceived the group as freedom fighters. This is evident in the fact that al Shabaab 
received support from Somalis living abroad.  
Despite the fact that Somalia’s economy utterly depends upon remittances 
(Lindley 2010), the foreign diaspora supported al Shabaab even though it could very 
possibly have jeopardized the entire remittance structure and left millions of Somalis 
without any assistance at all. Why did they take such a huge risk? Because in 2006-
2007, most Somalis were furious at Ethiopia and the U.S. The Ethiopian invasion 
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devastated Mogadishu. Of approximately 1.3 million people in the capital, 700,000 
were displaced, and the ICU (the only stable governance structure Somalia could 
claim for the past 16 years of civil war) was shattered (Menkhaus 2016).  
So when al Shabaab emerged as the main force, willing and able to stand 
against the invading forces, it was able to combine national sentiment with anti-
Ethiopianism, anti-Americanism and, of course, Islam. Therefore, many Somalis 
rejected the US designation of al Shabaab as a terrorist organization in 2008 
(Menkhaus 2013b). 
Suffice it to say that foreign occupation definitely worked to the group’s 
advantage. Had the organization been militarily and administratively capable, it would 
likely have replaced the TFG and governed Somalia under sharia. However, al 
Shabaab was largely comprised of militants not scholars (it had been the militant arm 
of the ICU).  
Prior to 2008, the group was neither militarily strong enough to confront the 
Ethiopian forces conventionally, nor was it administratively capable of governing the 
country. While it enforced sharia and imposed a crude form of taxation during these 
early years, it operated more like a well-armed gang than a government. The period 
between January 2006 and December 2007 can be considered as phase one. 
Al Shabaab did, however, grow in both capacities. By early 2008, the group 
began to engage its enemies in pitched battles that resembled conventional rather than 
guerrilla warfare. The group also began to assume control of large swaths of territory, 
collect taxes, govern and provide a measure of public goods such as judiciary 
services, law enforcement and welfare (Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010; Wise 2010; 
Mwangi 2012).  
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Wise (2011) also suggests that al Shabaab was able to take over the radio and 
print media outlets in the areas that it controlled and use them to enhance its recruiting 
efforts. Al Shabaab’s 85-member Shura Council boasted a degree of organization that 
made other militias, and even the TFG, pale in comparison (Bruton 2009; Shinn 
2011). January 2008 to April 2008 can be considered as phase two.  
In May 2008, the group changed leadership after Ayro was killed in a drone 
attack. Godane, the new emir, faced a number of challenges. First, he was a 
northerner (from the Isaac clan) leading a primarily southern organization. Because he 
had no clan base to support him, he needed to somehow transcend clan loyalties if he 
hoped to negotiate the clannish political terrain of Southern Somalia. He did this 
primarily by emphasizing allegiance to the group rather than to the clan (Bruton 
2010).  
However, Godane’s attempts to transcend clan loyalty did not sit well with the 
clan leaders, which meant that foot soldiers were now forced to choose between 
allegiance to their clan and allegiance to al Shabaab. Many chose the former as the 
predominantly Sufi Somalis were not easily swayed from allegiance to their clan in 
order to stay in the good graces of a Salafist militant group. The takfiri doctrine 
became an effective motivator. However, the brutal killing of fellow Muslims did not 
bode well with most of the other senior leaders of the group, who had spent years 
perfecting the clan politics game and cementing the support of clan elders. A split 
occurred. 
Thinning recruits were made even thinner as Ethiopian forces began pulling 
out, thus increasing the need for fighters. Conscripts, child soldiers and foreigners 
began to fill the ranks (McConnell 2012). By 2010, as many as eight in ten al Shabaab 
militants were children (Wright 2011). Foreign fighters were particularly useful as 
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they were willing to do things that most Somali fighters would not: defy clan elders 
and commit martyrdom operations. Godane, therefore, needed to make the jihad in 
Somalia more appealing to international fighters. What better way than to pledge 
allegiance to al Qaeda? An alliance with al Qaeda would allow Godane to frame the 
conflict in Somalia as part of the global jihad rather than what it actually was- a local 
squabble primarily in the Southern half of a country that nobody cared about. May 
2008 to July 2011 can be considered as phase three. 
By August 2011, al Shabaab had lost control of Mogadishu to federal forces 
with the help of AMISOM troops. The group began to retreat from the territories it 
once controlled and revert back to guerrilla-style tactics. It also began to launch more 
transnational attacks, increasingly attacking foreign targets. Therefore, August 2011 
to the present comprises phase four. 
While the dates attributed to these four phases are by no means exact (rather 
like attributing the beginning of modern nation-states to the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648), the four phases themselves are accurate in that they represent changes in al 
Shabaab’s tactical operations.72 
 
5.3.1: Stage One- Disorientation 
 
                                                 
72 Another way to slice the data would be to argue that there are two distinct ideological phases. The 
first phase occurring while al Shabaab was still under the leadership of Ayro and the nationalists. This 
phase constitutes the jihadist phase of al Shabaab. The second phase is from the death of Ayro in 2008 
to the present day. This phase constitutes the takfiri phase. It is certainly true that the transition from a 
jihadist group to a takfiri group was not instantaneous. In fact it was not until 2013 that Godane was 
able to completely purge the nationalist faction from the group. However, Godane’s takfiri ideology 
caused a reaction from the nationalist almost immediately and they increasingly refused to take orders 
from him. I have chosen to employ the four phase typology as it allows a more precise analysis via the 
three stages of strategic terrorism.    
 246 
 
Under the leadership of Ayro, al Shabaab enjoyed tremendous popularity as 
the liberators of Somalia. During this early period, the group enjoyed the support of 
the clans, businessmen and average Somalis. Since al Shabaab focused the majority of 
its attention and resources on fighting the Ethiopian military, TFG forces and 
AMISOM peace keepers, one could argue that it more accurately resembled a 
guerrilla insurgency than strategic terrorism because its aim was to topple the corrupt 
regime rather than to coerce political concessions through violence.  
This is where the analysis gets a bit tricky. The primary focus of the first stage 
of strategic terrorism is disorientation, not winning hearts and minds. Up through 
January 2008, while al Shabaab’s senior leadership was very careful to work with clan 
leaders and operate largely within clan politics (winning hearts and minds), the group 
not only targeted its military enemies, but also all supporters of the TFG, the 
warlords, non-cooperative clan leaders and anyone else that resisted the group and/or 
its strict Salafist doctrine. Given the nature of the asymmetric conflict, al Shabaab 
relied primarily upon terrorist violence that killed more civilian bystanders than actual 
targets. Therefore, while collateral damage (disorientation) was very high prior to 
January 2008, it is necessary to look at the group’s strategic objectives. Had al 
Shabaab been strong enough during phase one to confront its enemies more 
conventionally and therefore avoid the extensive collateral damage among civilians, it 
most likely would have.  
One has to question whether the group was primarily trying to erode the 
security of the people in order to make the government look incapable of maintaining 
order and stability or whether it was simply trying to win an asymmetric conflict with 
the resources it had available at the time. In other words, was the group’s strategic 
goal to conquer the enemy or merely manipulate political change through terror? 
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Clearly, at that time, al Shabaab sought to overthrow the TFG and establish a new 
government. Furthermore, one can surmise based on the group’s course of action after 
January 2008 that, had it been previously strong enough to confront its enemies in a 
more conventional manner, it would have- thus avoiding much of the disorienting 
effect.  
While it may appear questionable whether to label al Shabaab’s violence 
strategic terrorism or guerrilla insurgency prior to January 2008, I argue here that the 
group’s resources were simply poorly equipped to meet its strategic goals without 
causing a tremendous amount of collateral damage. However as Neumann (2002) 
implies, sound strategy only requires an actor to employ the means at its disposal in 
such a way as to achieve its policy objectives. Given that al Shabaab’s tactics prior to 
January 2008 drew it nearer to its objectives (as measured in territory under its 
control), I argue that the group’s strategy was sound.  
Al Shabaab’ short-lived success in the first half of 2008 reveals its true 
strategic objectives, at least for that period. The group waged conventional battles, 
controlled territory, collected taxes and governed much as the ICU had done before it. 
Despite any doubt regarding its true nature in phase one (2006 to 2007), al Shabaab 
had clearly moved into the realm of insurgency by phase two- particularly given the 
effort of its senior leadership to coopt the clan elders.  
During this time, al Shabaab began to directly administer the populations 
living in the territories it controlled (Mulaj 2010). The group, therefore, needed to 
cooperate with the clan leadership more than ever. It is difficult to speculate what 
might have happened had the group not suffered the loss of Ayro. Had Ayro survived, 
he would no doubt have been a more diplomatic administrator and not ostracized the 
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other senior leaders and clan elders, who appear to have been Godane’s biggest 
obstacles.  
Phase three (May 2008 to July 2011) under the leadership of Godane 
represents a period of division and stalemate. Even though al Shabaab controlled 
substantial territory and governed during this phase, it had suffered the loss of its 
legitimacy and popular support (Le Sage 2010). The group also split into opposing 
factions and Godane increasingly relied upon foreign fighters to subdue his enemies-
both inside and out of the group. But the use of foreigners also came at a price.  
Somalis are well-known for their hatred of foreign intervention in their 
country (Byman 2012). Godane’s heavy reliance upon foreigners no doubt cost him 
any local support the group may still have enjoyed (Dagne 2010; Shinn 2011). The 
practice of killing apostate Muslims also exacted its toll, resulting in defections and 
resistance from opponents within the group and also from other moderate militant 
groups such as ASWJ. Al Shabaab factions were now fighting each other, the TFG, 
Hisbul Islam, moderate militant groups and AMISOM forces (Mulaj 2010). The 
group eventually began to lose all the territory it came to control. 
Phase three also represents a transition for al Shabaab. Whether Godane truly 
believed in the takfiri doctrine, or whether he simply utilized it to consolidate his 
power is anyone’s guess. However, the group’s strategic objectives were now in flux. 
Godane was no longer seeking legitimacy from clan elders or anyone else that did not 
recognize his leadership. Much like Baghdadi, Godane employed the takfiri doctrine 
against his enemies. This break with clan politics made it impossible for al Shabaab to 
continue to govern the territory under its control effectively. The loss of cooperation 
(passive support), combined with the lack of active support and the sheer magnitude 
of opposition against the group dictated a change in strategic objectives. 
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Just as in phase one, it is difficult to discern whether al Shabaab’s violence 
during phase three constitutes strategic terrorism or insurgency. On the one hand, the 
group no doubt terrorized much of the population, and its actions were indeed 
disorienting. On the other hand, without the realization that the group’s objectives had 
changed, its harsh punishments could easily be construed as intended to enforce its 
strict version of sharia over the territory it controlled, and its growing reliance upon 
suicide attacks and IEDs as reflecting its deteriorating military capacity and growing 
inability to confront its enemies in a more conventional manner.  
It is only through perception of the other that the distinction becomes clear. 
While the earlier leadership of al Shabaab made a distinction between the TFG and 
the Somali people, Godane increasingly began to view them all as enemies. While 
Ayro and other members of the senior leadership in the nationalist camp were 
perceived as liberators and leaders (and indeed viewed themselves as such), Godane 
was perceived as an outsider from the beginning. Al Shabaab was no longer perceived 
as fighting for Somalia under his leadership, and Godane increasingly perceived 
himself as an outsider and those who did not acknowledge his authority as enemies 
(Sjah 2014).  
I argue that al Shabaab’s first two strategic objectives began to change during 
this phase. While the organization still controlled territory and appeared to the rest of 
the world to be the same, it focused less on liberating Somalia and establishing a new 
regime and concentrated its efforts more on destabilizing the surrounding region and 
coercing the governments contributing troops to AMISOM to change their policies. 
Thus, the group was moving toward strategic terrorism. 
Once al Shabaab lost Mogadishu, Kismayo and finally Barawe, the group 
more obviously reverted back to guerrilla-style attacks and, at least in its military 
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capacity, resembled the al Shabaab of phase one- only far less popular. The 
organization’s increase in transnational attacks during phase four (August 2011 to 
present), has been the closet it has come to pure stage one violence so far, as the 
violence is clearly intended to manipulate political change in states contributing 
troops to AMISOM rather than overthrow the regimes there. Thus far, Umar has made 
no substantial changes in the group’s tactical operations, leaving some to wonder 
whether al Shabaab even wants to govern anymore (Menkhaus 2016). 
Therefore, al Shabaab’s main goal in phases one and two was to overthrow the 
TFG, not to effect policy change through violence. However, the group began the 
transition to strategic terrorism in phase three under Godane and has been employing 
strategic terrorism in phase four since. 
 
 
5.3.2: Stage Two- Provoking a Response 
 
In the second stage of strategic terrorism, an actor attempts to provoke a 
reaction from the target. Again, while al Shabaab’s objective was clearly to overthrow 
the TFG in phase one, it lacked the capacity to do so. By phase two (January 2008 to 
April 2008), the group’s tactics had definitely provoked a number of reactions. In 
February 2008, the U.S. State Department designated al Shabaab a terrorist 
organization. Meanwhile, the TFG reacted by striking a deal with the moderate ARS, 
culminating in June 2008 with the call for a 90-day ceasefire and the withdrawal of 
Ethiopian troops. The deal not only isolated al Shabaab politically, the eventual 
withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 deprived the group of its source of 
popular support and legitimacy. 
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During phase three (May 2008 to July 2011), the July 2010 attacks in Kampala 
successfully provoked a response from Ugandan forces which generated increased 
hatred for the TFG if not additional support for al Shabaab. The same can be said of al 
Shabaab’s deliberate targeting of aid workers in Kenya during phase four (August 
2011 to present) which Nairobi claims is what provoked Operation Linda Nchi, 
sending Kenyan forces across the border into Somalia in October 2011. 
Therefore, al Shabaab has been successful in provoking reactions in all four 
stages. However, I argue that in stages one and two it did not attempt to provoke a 
reaction for the purpose of gaining legitimacy or political concessions. This began to 
change by stage three, and by stage four, al Shabaab clearly appears to be 
intentionally attempting to provoke a response.  
 
5.3.3: Stage Three- Gaining Legitimacy 
 
In the third and final stage of strategic terrorism, an actor attempts to gain 
legitimacy through either extensive media coverage or through grassroots methods of 
mobilizing public support.  
In phase one, the group had very little need to gain legitimacy with most 
Somalis. The few public services the group could afford to offer in these early years 
basically amounted to (1) law enforcement (imposing its own Salafist interpretation of 
sharia upon the Sufi majority), (2) judiciary (punishing those who violated sharia), 
and (3) a crude form of patronage to smooth troubled clan waters.  
While the group’s leadership attempted to maximize legitimacy with clan 
elders, the imposition of sharia was actually extremely unpopular. So much so, that it 
had to be strictly enforced or no one would have obeyed it. Had al Shabaab not 
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already enjoyed tremendous legitimacy as the defenders and liberators of Somalia, the 
Somali public would never have tolerated their strict Salafi demands. They were 
tolerated, however. At least until the Ethiopians pulled out.  
The group’s limited capacity in these early years also equated to fewer media 
releases in comparison with later years and a heavy reliance on third party 
organizations such as Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center (MYC) for recruitment outside 
of Somalia (Gatsiounis 2013). 
By phase two, the group had dramatically increased its capacity to govern, 
collect taxes and provide public goods. It also utilized media outlets under its control 
to promote its version of sharia and coopt clan elders. It is important to note, 
however, that al Shabaab did not need to use the media outlets it acquired in this 
phase primarily to enhance recruitment (although this was, no doubt, an added 
benefit). The group already enjoyed substantial support in the form of funds and 
recruits (Dagne 2010). The organization’s primary use of the media outlets was to 
disseminate its Salafist ideology among the predominantly Sufi majority and to 
promote itself among the clans. Again, not to gain legitimacy per se, but as a means of  
promoting its Salafist doctrine, distributing information regarding what the new laws 
were and the consequences for violating them.   
During phase three, al Shabaab relied much more on media outreach than ever 
before. During these years, Godane made every effort to court al Qaeda and thus gain 
legitimacy with foreign jihadis rather than with Somalis. By 2009, the organization’s 
recruiting videos had noticeably increased in production quality, featuring foreign 
fighters, training clips and scenes recorded in battle which substantially broadened al 
Shabaab’s recruitment pool beyond Somalia. Most notably, the releases were narrated 
in Arabic and English rather than Somali, demonstrating that they were intended for 
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foreign audiences (Harnisch and Zimmerman 2010; Vidino 2010). At the same time, 
the group also increasingly engaged in less governance as it lost territory to the TFG 
and AMISOM forces. All of these factors indicate that al Shabaab was steadily 
moving further away from insurgency and closer to strategic terrorism. 
 
5.4: From Near to Far 
 
Al Shabaab did not employ strategic terrorism during its jihadist phase (phases 
one and two) under the leadership of Ayro. Rather it transitioned to strategic terrorism 
in phase three under Godane and has been employing strategic terrorism in phase four 
since. Phases three and four constitute the takfiri phase. I argue that they represent 
both a change in the group’s ideology and its strategic objectives.  
Despite the disorienting effect of al Shabaab’s guerrilla tactics in phase one, 
and the fact that they provoked a response from the various target governments, 
neither of these were the primary objective behind the attacks. Al Shabaab’s main 
goal in phases one and two was to overthrow the TFG, not to effect policy change 
through violence. This qualified the group as an insurgency. Furthermore, the 
Ethiopian occupation already gave the group all the legitimacy that it needed. It did 
not need to provoke a response to discredit the target or gain legitimacy for itself, as 
public opinion was already largely against the occupation and in the group’s favor.  
In phase two, al Shabaab began to confront its military enemies in a more 
conventional manner. It also gained control of large portions of the country and 
governed quite effectively- albeit for a short time. While the Sufi majority in Somalia 
did not welcome the harsh life imposed upon them by Salafism, al Shabaab benefited 
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from the fact that the group was perceived as the lesser evil when compared to the 
alternative.  
However, once the Ethiopians pulled out, al Shabaab faced a very different 
reality. Popular support had already waned considerably as a consequence of the 
group’s change in leadership (and Godane’s emphasis on religion rather than clan 
loyalty). Once the foreign occupiers left, popular support (which in many cases was 
mere toleration) turned to contempt.   
Al Shabaab experienced a dramatic shift in ideology under the leadership of 
Godane. With the adoption of the takfiri doctrine, the group became much more 
brutal. As Ethiopian forces pulled out, al Shabaab fighters moved in and began to 
impose a strict interpretation of sharia. Somalis were no longer willing to tolerate the 
harsh punishments, now that the Ethiopians were gone. When al Shabaab responded 
with amputations, stoning of adulterers and the execution of apostate Muslims, clan 
politics quickly turned against the group. 
Although AMISOM had about 1,600 Ugandan soldiers stationed as peace 
keepers in Mogadishu since 2007, the Somali public did not resent their presence in 
Somalia as much as they did the hated Ethiopians. Once the level of AMISOM troops 
began to escalate to its current level of approximately 22,000, and the atrocities 
became more regular and widespread, public opinion began to shift against AMISOM 
but not necessarily in favor of al Shabaab. The continued lack of popular support 
materialized in ever reducing levels of funding and fewer recruits. The group 
subsequently retreated from all of its strategic holdings. Al Shabaab has since reverted 
back to guerrilla tactics. There has also been a dramatic shift in the group’s strategic 
objectives.  
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Despite AMISOM forces and U.S. airstrikes (one could also argue because of 
these two factors), al Shabaab is still active in much of South Central Somalia. Yet it 
has not declared a state. Despite its considerable resources, the group also appears to 
be content to remain in a stalemate with the Somali government and AMISOM forces.   
Hansen (2013) suggests that in the case of Mogadishu from 2009-2013, the 
stalemate occurred because al Shabaab was simply unable to defeat the superior 
AMISOM forces. Meanwhile AMISOM lacked the mandate to push beyond the 
capital. Alternatively, Menkhaus (2016) argues that al Shabaab might actually prefer a 
stalemate because the current situation allows the group to mobilize without creating 
the need to govern. Menkhaus reasons that if al Shabaab were to take more territory 
(especially in Mogadishu) it would have to govern and that would draw it into a 
number of clan conflicts which the group has learned to avoid.  
The point is salient because when al Shabaab took the TFG stronghold in 
Baidoa after the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in January 2009, it inevitably had to 
negotiate the very complicated web of Somali clan politics which led to a clash with 
the Ras Kamboni Brigade and a number of other struggles with clan leaders. This 
challenge put pressure on the group that exposed internal divisions over practical 
matters of governance.  
The overarching rationale upon which strategic theory is based is comprised of 
three primary assumptions: (1) military force is a dimension of power exercised 
toward political goals, (2) politics is a game of thrones in which each actors strives to 
maximize its own power in relation to other actors, and (3) all actors act rationally 
(Smith 1991).  
Senior leaders such as Ayro were effective in mobilizing Somali resistance 
against the Ethiopian invasion by appealing more to their sense of nationalism than to 
 256 
 
their religious ideology. This helped the group to navigate the troubled waters of clan 
politics (Gartenstein-Ross 2009). However, according to the first assumption of 
strategic terrorism, this focus on nationalism betrays more than just the diplomatic 
ability of the early leadership. Their focus on nationalism and efforts to coopt the 
various clans also reveals that their true strategic objective was to overthrow the TFG 
and establish an Islamic government. Godane did not exercise his power toward this 
same political goal. 
I have argued that Godane’s changes to al Shabaab were employed out of 
necessity rather than a true commitment to global jihad, and there is certainly ample 
justification for this claim. In accordance with assumptions two and three above, it 
makes perfect sense that Godane reacted as he did. In addition to the practical 
necessities discussed earlier (the need for foreign fighters and the benefits of 
associating al Shabaab with al Qaeda), one can add the likelihood that Godane 
decided to retreat from the group’s territories- not only out of military necessity- but 
also because he realized that Somalia was just too difficult to govern, especially for 
someone with little or no clan support. More importantly, Godane no doubt realized 
that governing in Somalia would require more power sharing than he was willing to 
concede. Even if Godane had been able to garner the support of the clan elders, he 
clearly did not want to.  
If one accepts Godane’s adoption of the takfiri doctrine as sincere rather than 
utilitarian, then in his eyes, everyone that did not accept his version of Islam were 
infidels- Sufi idolaters who deserved to die. How could he ever share power with 
them? This is the same ideology that affected the decision making of Zarqawi and 
Baghdadi. One must consider the possibility that al Shabaab’s diminishing military 
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capacity is not the primary reason the group reverted back to guerrilla-style tactics. 
One must also consider the potential outcome of such a possibility.  
If one compares phase one of the group with phase four, the military capacity 
and the guerilla-style tactics are both similar. What appears to be different is the goal. 
In phase one, al Shabaab strove to consolidate its strength and acquire territory. In 
phase four it is doing just the opposite. Under Godane, the group went from governing 
huge swaths of territory to voluntarily retreating in the face of AMISOM forces. One 
has to question whether this tactical shift was driven by sheer asymmetric realities on 
the ground or a new strategic objective.  
Perhaps just as al Qaeda decided to attack the far enemy first, al Shabaab also 
altered its immediate strategic objective from overthrowing the near enemy to 
coercing the various states contributing AMISOM troops to pull out. Perhaps this is 
why Godane began to increasingly rely on violence rather than governance as the 
primary means of obtaining the group’s objectives. But this would mean that the 
group had given up on, or at least put off, its strategic goal of establishing an Islamic 
state in Somalia. However, this appears to be the case.  
If all one considers are the military aspects, then either way, the group is 
employing sound strategy. By terrorizing the areas it once controlled, laying siege to 
them by blocking all routes in and out and attacking AMISOM forces where they are 
weakest, al Shabaab is either making the best use of the military strength it has left, or 
it is following the strategic terrorism playbook chapter and verse.  
In the first stage, an actor tries to erode the security of the people in order to 
make the government look incapable of maintaining order and stability. This is 
typically attempted through a series of random violent attacks. By yielding towns and 
cities to AMISOM and SNA forces, the organization is setting the government up for 
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failure as it has neither the resources to govern nor the ability to protect. Its only 
options are to agree to political concessions, depend on foreign assistance to drive al 
Shabaab out or learn to live with the violence.  
In the second stage, an actor attempts to provoke a reaction from the target. In 
addition to terrorizing Somali targets, al Shabaab has also increasingly engaged in 
transnational attacks intended to disorient foreign populations and provoke a response 
from states contributing AMISOM troops. Neumann and Smith discuss four potential 
responses proposed by N.O. Berry (1987). First, a target could potentially overreact 
by engaging in extra-legal responses and thereby discrediting its own legitimacy such 
as when Ugandan forces retaliated in July 2010 by bombing a residential district in 
Mogadishu. Another possible reaction is that the target fails to react sufficiently to 
demonstrate that it is capable of dealing with the threat. Berry calls this reaction 
“power deflation” (1987, p.10). This appears to be the Somali government’s default 
response, and it plays directly into al Shabaab’s hands. 
Alternatively, if al Shabaab is indeed simply losing ground due to diminishing 
military capacity, then it is utilizing its assets as best it can. But to what end? If the 
organization’s strategic objectives are still the same, why would it continue to 
marginalize itself from the clans and forego the support of the people when it needs 
them more than ever?  
The most likely reason is ideological. The takfiri doctrine is the most 
satisfying explanation as to why al Shabaab continues to shun the Sufi majority even 
in the face of extermination. Neumann and Smith (2005) contend that most religious 
groups that employ strategic terrorism are not willing to compromise. Therefore, one 
of two options is probable: (1) the group will either fail to sufficiently escalate the 
violence to the necessary level to provoke a reaction, or (2) if it is successful in 
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provoking a reaction, the group will lose the support of the people, disintegrate into 
splinter factions and/or be annihilated by the target government.  
In the case of al Shabaab, this is precisely what happened. The organization 
successfully provoked a reaction- to the extent that a U.S. drone strike took out its 
leader (Ayro). The group lost the support of the people after Ethiopia withdrew its 
forces in January 2009 and subsequently split into opposing factions. The likelihood 
that al Shabaab will succeed in provoking just the right response so as to cost the 
Somali government a sufficient measure of legitimacy and also garner a measure of 
legitimacy for itself is highly unlikely.  
I suggest that al Shabaab’s strategic objectives have changed from (1) 
liberating Somalia, (2) establishing an Islamic government and (3) creating Greater 
Somalia to (1) destabilizing the entire region in order to coerce the states contributing 
troops to AMISOM to withdraw their militaries, and (2) creating Greater Somalia. I 
believe that, like al Qaeda, al Shabaab has adopted a more sound and realistic strategy 
of fighting the far enemy given the strength of the near enemy and its own current 
resources.  
The benefits of foregoing the group’s original first two goals are multiple. 
First of all, at least for the present, al Shabaab can side-step Somali clan politics. 
Second, Salafism is rare enough in Somalia. Takfiri Salafism, which promotes the 
killing of apostates, is a very hard ideology to sell- particularly in Somalia where clan 
loyalty is so strong. It is much easier for the group to recruit Somalis in surrounding 
states where non-Somali Sufis and Christians can be targeted.    
Given that Umar appears to be following in Godane’s footsteps, it is quite 
possible that al Shabaab has transitioned from guerrilla insurgency to strategic 
terrorism. The true test of the group’s new strategic objectives (if they are indeed 
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new) will be the course of action it takes in the future. Does al Shabaab still want to 
drive the foreign occupiers out of Somalia? Or is it attempting to draw them in? Will 
al Shabaab again pursue an Islamic state in Somalia? Or has the group set its sights on 
an even bigger prize? Only time will tell.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: The Future of Terror and the Role of Strategic Theory 
It should not be entirely surprising that militant groups such as al Shabaab and 
Boko Haram attack and kill civilians. As heinous as it might seem, this is exactly 
what most states do in armed conflict. Not just “rogue” states such as Libya (Pan Am 
Flight 103) and Iran (Hezbollah), but status quo states as well. 
During World War One, for example, Britain made a clear distinction between 
its policy objectives concerning the German people (which it intended to liberate) and 
the German government (which it intended to defeat). Yet, Britain made little 
distinction between government and civilian targets in its urban bombing campaigns. 
Still, it fully expected the German people that it was bombing and killing to side with 
the British government rather than with the German government. The November 1918 
German revolution is often cited as evidence that the British achieved their goals. 
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Again, in March 2003, the U.S. (backed by Britain) make the same play in Iraq with 
less measurable success.  
As for Muslim extremist ideology, it has been around for a long time. In this 
project, I have distinguished between three categories of extremist ideology (Islamist, 
jihadist and takfiri).  
After comparing and contrasting the ideological underpinnings of al Qaeda 
and the Islamic State (IS) and by tracing the respective influences that each have 
borrowed from their predecessors, I have concluded that al Qaeda is a jihadist 
organization that meets the criteria for strategic terrorism and Islamic State is a takfiri 
group that does not. Given that al Shabaab has pledged allegiance to al Qaeda but has 
also adopted the takfiri doctrine, I explored whether the so-called alliance between the 
two organizations has had any impact upon al Shabaab’s ideology and/or strategic 
objectives. Other than the potential influence that al Qaeda may have had on al 
Shabaab’s relatively recent switch to a strategy that focuses on the far enemy, there 
does not seem to be any concrete ties between these groups.  
Al Shabaab has thus far gone through three phases (from inception to 
December 2007, January 2008 to April 2008, May 2008 to July 2011) and is now in 
phase four (August 2011 to the present). In the first two phases, al Shabaab was a 
jihadist group, and in the last two phases it has been a takfiri group. In the first three 
phases, the organization’s activity more closely resembled an insurgency than 
strategic terrorism as two of its strategic objectives were to overthrow and replace the 
enemy, rather than merely manipulate political change through terror. Therefore, the 
group’s audience (the targets of its violence) has also necessarily changed. 
Furthermore, while al Shabaab possessed very limited military and 
administrative capability in phase one, by phase two it had managed to incorporate 
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both the political organization of the masses and the eventual use of conventional 
military force. It is not until phase four that the group began to retreat from its 
territorial holdings and revert to tactics that more closely fit the first two stages of 
strategic terrorism (disorientation and target response).  
I have considered the likelihood that al Shabaab has changed its strategy from 
attacking the near enemy to attacking the far enemy and suggested that its strategic 
objectives have also likely changed from (1) liberating Somalia, (2) establishing an 
Islamic government and (3) creating Greater Somalia to (1) destabilizing the entire 
region and (2) creating Greater Somalia. 
 
Table One 
 
 
Al 
Shabaab 
Phase One Inception to December 2007 Jihadist Insurgency 
Phase Two January 2008 to April 2008 Jihadist Insurgency 
Phase Three May 2008 to July 2011 Takfiri Insurgency 
Phase Four August 2011 to Present Takfiri Strategic Terrorism 
 
What does the future hold for al Shabaab? Without a crystal ball, no one can 
know for sure. However, one can be certain that whatever developments occur, 
analytical tools such as strategic theory and strategic terrorism will prove 
indispensable for understanding terrorist violence and the strategic goals of actors that 
engage in it. 
It is time to answer the “so what” question. What could it possibly matter 
whether al Shabaab is engaged in insurgency or strategic terrorism?  
As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, the violence in Somalia 
represents conflict that is much older than al Shabaab itself. The U.S. decision to 
designate the group as terrorist organization was politically motivated. Since The U.S. 
refuses to negotiate with terrorists as a matter of policy, but has on several occasions 
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backed insurgents, the designation has long-term implications as it has set U.S. 
foreign policy toward this organization in stone. America’s involvement in Somalia 
has only served to exacerbate the violence.  
Rather than attempting to understand actors that engage in violence via the 
traditionally suspected causes of terrorism, a more productive approach would be to 
consider the strategic value of violence in relation to the groups’ respective long-term 
goals.  
In addition to being a less efficient approach, the continued reliance on either 
widespread systemic or lower-level explanations of terrorism has led to questionable 
“solutions”- often with disastrous results.  
For instance, economic aid certainly has not improved popular opinion toward 
America in the Middle East, and the fact that Israel has consistently received 
substantially more aid than any other country in the Middle East has been a point of 
contention among Arab states (Stockman 2011). 
According to both systemic and lower-level approaches to countering 
terrorism, however, economic aid should have produced positive results toward the 
reduction of anti-American violence. Systemically, aid is intended to alleviate poverty 
and improve overall living standards. Yet despite the net increase in living standards 
(after factoring for corruption), popular opinion towards America is still low.  
We certainly cannot blame America’s low popularity rating on mental illness 
or moral deficiency alone, although the latter almost certainly did play at least a 
partial role. Furthermore, as unpopular as American foreign policy has been in the 
Middle East, it’s certainly not among the more pressing grievances of the average 
individual faced with high unemployment, rising prices and fading hope for the 
future.  
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From a purely cost-benefit analysis, one would expect states receiving U.S aid 
to act in accordance with America’s foreign policy goals so as not to jeopardize future 
aid. Yet this has certainly not been the case for most Arab states in the Middle East. 
Economic aid has neither reduced violence nor improved America’s popularity in the 
region. Nor was it the case when the U.S. entered Somalia in the early 1990s.  
Organizations that engage in violence often rely on popular support to 
succeed. One can distinguish between active support (providing safe haven, recruits and 
donations) and passive support (refusal to cooperate with the group’s opponents). Both 
types of popular support equate to an overall reduction in the cost of engaging in 
violence, making future incidents even more feasible.  
The simple distinction between insurgents and groups employing terrorism can 
often be an enlightening exercise regarding how much popular support an 
organization enjoys. Al Shabaab enjoyed tremendous popular support because the 
group fought against regimes that were largely hated by the majority of Somali 
citizens. When the U.S condemns the human rights abuses of one state but then 
enforces the human rights abuses of other states with its own military (as it has done 
in Somalia) it both loses legitimacy and lends legitimacy to those who fight against its 
perceived hypocrisy and hegemony. 
While tactical counterterrorism is necessary, it often exacerbates violence 
when it is not employed as part of an overall strategy. Unfortunately, this is most 
often the case. America needs to be more strategic in its response to violence. 
Firefighters don’t just automatically spray water on every single fire that breaks out. 
First they need to understand the nature of the fire. Water may put it out, or it may 
make it worse, spreading the fire to other structures and creating a far greater 
problem. The same is true with violence. 
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Simply responding to violence with more violence is often ineffective in 
preventing more violence. What’s worse, it is often the very response that perpetrators 
are hoping for as it plays directly into their hands, affording them a measure of 
legitimacy and helping them generate support.  
If the first mistake in the “war on terror” is to exact a pound of flesh regardless 
of the long-term results, then another mistake is to focus on the suspected “causes” of 
terrorism rather than the strategic goals of those who engage in it- for this is simply 
the opposite side of the tactical coin. The tradition of isolating our focus on either 
systemic or lower-level causal variables (such as religion, poverty, illiteracy, political 
grievances, insanity or a cost-benefit analysis) is virtually the same approach as 
reacting to tactical violence with more tactical violence. Both are tactics, and neither 
address the strategic goals of the perpetrators.  
The strengths of this research include its original contribution to the body of 
literature. Silke (2003) points out that despite the growing multidisciplinary body of 
literature on terrorism, only one fifth of research published on the subject produces 
substantially new findings. To date, no work has applied Neumann and Smith’s 
(2005) framework of strategic terrorism to al Shabaab.   
Another strength is that, in the course of gathering data, I have visited blast 
sites and interviewed survivors and witnesses whenever possible, rather than relying 
solely upon secondary sources. Dolnik (2013) argues that the best way to increase the 
current output of new information is for terrorism scholars to rely less on secondary 
sources and to rely more on theory-driven approaches to field research. 
Field research can also present a major limitation, however, as first-hand 
experiences leave a much deeper and lasting impression than information one 
consumes second hand. For this reason, I simply do not agree with many of the 
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statements made by experts about matters for which they make confident assertions. 
This is not to say that I am correct and they are not, but rather to point out that 
personal interaction with your subject matter makes it infinitely more difficult to 
remain impartial, unbiased and to refrain from making normative judgements. 
An obvious example of the subjectivity of the field is the 200 plus definitions 
of terrorism. While most would agree that terrorism is a cancer affecting society, there 
are not 200 definitions of melanoma or astrocytoma. There are, of course, physicians 
that disagree on diagnoses (i.e. the condition of the patient), but not on the essential 
nature of the cancer in question. Terrorism studies lacks any such objectivity. As I 
have discussed, there are those that argue that we should not strive for an objective 
definition, or even a definition at all for that matter. I disagree. 
 Other limitations of this research include the difficulty of aiming at a moving 
target. Obviously, while al Shabaab continues to evolve, analyses of them need to 
evolve as well. While I have done my best within the space allowed to conduct a 
historical analysis by drawing a clear connection between the two groups under 
examination and their predecessors, space is limited and difficult choices had to be 
made concerning which information to include from the past and which to omit in 
order to include relevant contemporary data. 
A third limitation is that different scholars assess the phases of each group 
differently. For example, Wise (2011) concludes that al Shabaab has gone through 
two phases (phase one: December 2006- early 2008 and phase two: early 2008- 
present). While Hanson (2013) also concludes that al Shabaab has gone through three 
stages and is now in stage four, his dates are different than mine (phase one: 2005-06, 
phase two: 2007-08, phase three: 2009-10, phase four: 2010- present). 
 267 
 
 Different scholars have their own various reasons for computing these phases 
the way that they do, all of which have merit. I have chosen to approach the data in 
the manner that I have as it seems the most logical demarcation of the timelines 
involved, taking into account not just changes in leadership but also key changes in 
tactics as well as strategic goals. Others may disagree. 
 A fourth limitation concerns the survey of literature. There is simply far too 
much terrorism literature to review in the space allotted. My effort has been to discuss 
a representative sampling in as fair and unbiased a manner as possible. This work has 
now been reviewed by multiple scholars from a variety of disciplines on a number of 
continents, and all have offered vastly different, and often contradictory, feedback. 
What may be essential literature to one scholar is superfluous to another. Or to borrow 
from the spirit of Jones and Smith (2009), what may be “critical” to one, is 
“hypocritical” to another. Realities such as these further demonstrate the subjective 
nature of the field.    
This leads to a final limitation that I would like to point out (not that there are 
only five, but I believe these to be the major and most glaring limitations). As 
mentioned briefly in the Acknowledgement, I was trained as a political scientist in the 
United States, and I am very much a product of the empirical school. During the past 
three years, I have been exposed to a very different epistemological approach. While I 
have worked very hard to familiarize myself with an enormous amount of literature 
that was completely absent from both my undergraduate and graduate curriculum, I 
still have considerable ground to cover. Consequently, my research reflects a 
distinctly American bias. However, I strive to correct this deficiency. Thanks to the 
guidance and direction of Professor Richards and Dr. Gerodimos and the extensive 
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feedback from Professor Parker and Dr. Harris, I am on my way to achieving greater 
balance. 
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